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7Introduction
In 2001, article 8 of the United Nations’ International Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities outlined the following objectives:
 To raise awareness throughout society, including at the family level, regarding 
persons with disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons 
with disabilities;
 To combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to persons with 
disabilities, including those based on sex and age, in all areas of life;
 To promote awareness of the capabilities and contributions of persons with disabilities.
The language of human dignity that is used in this foundational document is a compelling 
means to challenge the way society perceives people with disabilities. Furthermore, the 
emphasis on human dignity is to be found in all three the religions of the Book (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) – this despite the fact that these religions quite often have had (and 
continue to have) an abysmal human rights track record, being complicit in many forms 
of discrimination, including discrimination against people with disabilities. Nevertheless, 
as Carol Fontaine points out, each of these three religious traditions also contains insights 
and theological traditions that can be utilised in support of universal human rights.1 The 
conviction that human dignity belongs to all people regardless of factors such as skin colour, 
gender, social status, physical or mental capabilities and sexual orientation constitutes a 
basic element of religious belief that can be recovered and employed in order to move the 
conversation away from achievement or utility value in assessing human worth.2
This emphasis on human dignity provided the inspiration for a conference with the theme 
‘Theology, Disability and Human Dignity’ that was hosted by Stellenbosch University’s 
Faculty of Theology in conjunction with the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies in the 
Faculty of Health Sciences in May 2011. Within a broader context the conference on which 
this volume is based formed part of the Stellenbosch University’s Hope project. Inspired by 
the millennium goals set by the United Nations, the Faculty of Theology and the Faculty 
of Health Sciences both chose to focus on the promotion of human dignity and health. 
The conference brought together members of various disabled communities, theologians 
(represented in this volume by the likes of Gerrit Brand, Julie Claassens, Nico Koopman and 
1 Fontaine, C. 2008. “With Eyes of Flesh”: Toward a Concept of Human Rights in the Bible and the Ancient Near 
East. In With Eyes of Flesh: The Bible, Gender and Human Rights. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 26. In both Christian 
and Jewish traditions, the notion of human dignity goes back to the imago Dei, i.e. the theological proposition 
in Gen 1:27 that God created both male and female in the image of God. For a helpful exposition of how this 
image functions in both the Jewish and Christian traditions cf. Frymer-Kensky, T. 2000. The Image: Religious 
Anthropology in Judaism and Christianity. In Frymer-Kensky, T. et al. (eds), Christianity in Jewish Terms. Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 321-37. Cf. also the Qur’an’s emphasis on the “sacred duty” to protect life (Fontaine, “With 
Eyes of Flesh”, 27).
2 Reinders H. S. 2006. Human Dignity in the Absence of Agency. In Kendall, S. and Woodhead, L. (eds), God and 
Human Dignity. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 139.
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n Hans Reinders), medical doctors, occupational, physical and speech therapists (Martha 
Geiger and Gubela Mji), pastors (Pieter van Niekerk, both as pastor and as a person living 
with a disability), psychologists (Leslie Swartz), philosophers (Anton van Niekerk), 
educators (Tsitsi Chataika), social workers (Erna Möller), students (Michelle Nell and 
Tatjana Metzger), parents of children with disabilities (Tom Reynolds, both as theologian 
and parent of a child with disabilities) and other members of the public. These participants 
came from different parts of South Africa, but also from the Netherlands, Canada, Malawi 
and Zimbabwe to attend this conference, which offered a space for disabled and able-
bodied persons to talk about ways in which they and the societies they form part of can 
confront stereotypes and prejudices, and can grow in respect for the dignity of persons 
with disabilities, acknowledging their unique capabilities and contributions to society. It 
was evident in many of the contributions that dignity remains a key issue to consider in the 
interaction amongst all people, able-bodied and disabled.
For a faculty not accustomed to interacting on an equal basis with people with disabilities, 
hosting a conference such as this was a steep learning curve in itself. For instance, when 
it came to the venue where we would host the first two days of the conference, members 
of the organising committee of the Faculty of Theology proudly showed our partners the 
wheelchair access ramp to the building, the elevator and the newly renovated lecture 
hall where most of the addresses would be delivered. However, through the eyes of our 
colleagues who work with disability on a daily basis, we at the Faculty of Theology had 
to learn that our ideas of wheelchair accessibility fell short: the ramp was too steep, the 
elevator too narrow, the hall only had space for wheelchairs in the front and there were 
no wheelchair-accessible bathrooms. Fortunately, we were able to move the conference to 
a nearby venue that was much more accessible. Still, this experience underlined just how 
often one is complicit (however unintentionally) in able-bodied privilege. 
As was said, the ‘Theology, Disability and Human Dignity’ conference took place in 
the context of Stellenbosch University. Academics and students of different faculties 
contributed to this interdisciplinary exploration of issues of disability, in particular as it 
relates to issues of religion and faith. As such this conference served as an important start to 
a conversation that is far from finished and that ought to continue on the following levels.
First, it is important that the conversation regarding disability (particularly on the 
challenges experienced by disabled students and university staff) occur in our university 
at every level – in our respective faculties, as well as on administrative and management 
levels. Participants should be warned, though, that dealing with the reality of disability is 
not always an easy conversation – for one, because it has definite monetary implications 
(retrofitting inaccessible buildings to make them wheelchair accessible, for example, is 
very expensive).
Second, an honest conversation regarding disability in higher education will include 
difficult questions regarding what an institution such as Stellenbosch University is 
doing to make higher education accessible for students with disabilities. And yet this 
conversation also occurs with the realisation that universities in their very essence are 
exclusionary in nature – a notion attested to by the fact that only a very small proportion 
of South Africa’s population will end up obtaining a university degree. However, this fact 
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should not prevent the conversation from continuing and it should concern more than the 
issue of removing barriers at an institution like Stellenbosch University, making it a more 
hospitable space. It also requires the assurance that the university is able to draw on and 
benefit from the talents and abilities of the widest possible range of people.
This book is by no means the first such contribution from the academy in South Africa – it 
forms part of an on-going broader conversation (see, for example, the 2006 publication by 
Watermeyer, B., Swartz, L., Lorenzo, T., Schneider, M. and Priestly, M. (eds), Disability and 
Social Change: A South African Agenda. Cape Town: HSRC Press). However, as far as we are 
aware, it is the first contribution of this kind from a faculty of theology in South Africa. 
Therefore, on a third level, as is evident from the title, the ‘Theology, Disability and Human 
Dignity’ conference initiated an important conversation in South Africa on theology and 
how it pertains to disability. Internationally, this is not a new conversation at all, as is 
evident from the long list of publications that have appeared in Europe and the United 
States on this subject. (A few are listed in footnote 3 below. See also the Journal of Religion, 
Disability and Health, and the contribution to this volume by its editor, Hans Reinders, as well 
as the work by Tom Reynolds, who was one of the keynote speakers at the conference).3 
As was noted above, religion has not always been friendly towards people who live with 
disabilities – one only has to be reminded of the widespread harm caused by the theological 
idea that human disability, disease and disasters can be attributed to human sin. On the 
other hand, religion is very important to many people, including many disabled people. 
Some of the contributions to this volume thus explicitly seek to name and rethink harmful 
religious expressions, as well as to reclaim those religious traditions that may serve as a 
source of hope for people living with disability.
It was furthermore significant that the conference on theology, disability and human 
dignity took place specifically at the Faculty of Theology of Stellenbosch University. In 
2009, this Faculty celebrated its 150th year of existence, years that saw more than their 
share of exclusion. For a very long time it was the place where white male pastors were 
trained for the ministry in the Dutch Reformed Church. In the past twelve years, though, 
the face of theology at Stellenbosch University has changed considerably. Since 2000, 
black and coloured Uniting Reformed Church students have been studying together with 
white Dutch Reformed Church students – more recently being joined by Presbyterian, 
Anglican and students from many other Christian denominations. In terms of gender, too, 
the picture looks quite different today. Whereas twenty years ago there were no female 
lecturers and only a handful of pioneering female students (one or two per year group), 
there are currently six female lecturers (including a former dean who became the first 
female dean of a theological faculty in Africa) and almost half of the Faculty’s students 
are female.
3 Cf. e.g. Reynolds, T. E. 2008. Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality. Wheaton, IL: Brazos; 
Reinders, H. S. 2008. Receiving the Gift of Friendship: Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology, and Ethics. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans; Eiesland. N. L. 1994. The Disabled God. Nashville, TN: Abingdon; Creamer, D. 2009. 
Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
Avalos, H., Melcher, S. and Schipper, J. (eds). 2007. This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies. Atlanta, 
GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
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the ‘Theology, Disability and Human Dignity’ conference that sought to reframe harmful 
theological ideas and to find new ways to talk about God and about human beings that 
respect their inherent dignity as unique individuals created in the image of God. The 
Faculty has a long way to go, as does the University; we regard this volume as a small 
milestone on the way.
Before proceeding to the specific contributions and their sequence in this volume, a short 
note of caution on the limitations and strengths of a volume such as this. One of the core 
issues raised by both the conference and this resultant volume, is the question of how to 
change the situation regarding the everyday lives of people with disabilities, and indeed 
of society as a whole. In keeping with other fields of activism focusing on the undoing of 
oppression, such as feminism and black consciousness, disability scholarship and politics 
have gone through periods of separatism in which it has been argued that only people with 
disabilities themselves may contribute meaningfully to disability studies. There is no doubt 
at all that this approach has merit and needs to be taken seriously. However, the approach 
taken with regard to the conference and this publication has been more inclusive. None of 
the editors is a person with a disability, and the authors of the chapters in this volume are 
a mixed bag as far as their own disability status is concerned. Some critics would say, and 
they would have good reason to, that a volume such as this should have more extensive 
participation in design and authorship by people with disabilities. We agree with this 
criticism. We also believe, though, that a volume such as this, coming at this time in the 
history of theology at Stellenbosch University, has a particular importance as it begins to 
open up very important issues to a new but potentially very influential audience in the 
lives of people with disabilities in South Africa. The fact is that organised religion in South 
Africa (and in the case of this volume, organised Christianity of a particular kind) has a 
very long way to go in thinking through issues facing people with disabilities, and we hope 
that this book will be an important first step on a path leading to greater participation by 
people with disabilities at all levels of religious life and practice – and certainly not just as 
objects of study or as people to be cared for by the able-bodied majority.
This being said, in compiling this volume we also took some ideological decisions we regard 
as important, but which may not be welcomed by all. During the conference itself it was 
clear that some of the energy amongst participants had to do with policing the boundaries 
of an inner circle of those already in the know about disability issues and those new to 
the field. Some participants more experienced in disability politics, for example, berated 
those less experienced for using inappropriate terms, including using language which 
people with disabilities commonly find offensive. We agree that the issue of the language 
we use is an important one, but we believe that part of the role of the conference and of this 
volume is not to declare a boundary between those who know about disability issues and 
those who do not, but to use the opportunity of engagement to help people who have not 
thought enough about the politics of disability to think more deeply and more consciously 
about the issues at stake. A part of this rethinking does indeed involve thinking about the 
language we use.
But the question of how to be inclusive is more complex and goes much further than 
questions of the language we use. Some of the people at the conference expressed views on 
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disability with which we ourselves disagree and view as discriminatory, but which were 
interwoven with insights we believe are important to consider in debates about disability. 
For us, the easiest thing to do with the contributions with which we disagreed, and indeed 
probably the safest for us in terms of our own ever-fragile reputations as scholar-activists 
in the disability field, would have been simply to exclude such contributions from this 
volume. We have decided not to do so and to include some contributions with which 
we disagree, and disagree strongly. As is expected of a publication intended for a broad 
scholarly circle of readers, all the contributions have also been subjected to a rigorous 
process of double-blind peer review. This is in keeping with the best of what we believe 
disability politics and scholarship have to offer and shows the extent to which we value 
debate and contestation, and we encourage readers of this volume to engage with the 
contributions in the book. It will be a strength, rather than a weakness, of this volume if 
you as a reader like some of the chapters but dislike (and are even enraged by) others. In 
reviews and other writings, we hope to see reactions to different parts of this book. We are 
convinced that a volume that presents a homogenity of voices is far less provocative than 
one that is more diverse. We look forward to a range of reactions to what we ourselves 
and other contributors have written in these pages. Multiple responses, multiple voices, 
discomfort and contestation – all these are important if scholars like ourselves and the 
contributors to this volume are collectively to make a useful contribution to the future of 
disability studies in South Africa, and beyond.
With regard to the arrangement of the contents of this volume, the following logic was 
at work. As mentioned above, the ‘Theology, Disability and Human Dignity’ conference 
wanted to contribute to the discourse on disability, and it wanted particularly to be the 
start of a conversation on the relationship between theology, disability and human dignity. 
As such, it comes as no surprise that next to the issue of change, that of the language we 
employ in this conversation will be of paramount importance. In fact, most contributions 
to this volume refer in some way or another to the issue of language and it is placed on the 
agenda right from the outset as Tom Reynolds, in the first essay, calls on us to “change 
the conversation” regarding theology and disability. In this first section, ‘Changing the 
Theological Discourse’, Reynolds’s essay and that of Hans Reinders are important as they 
serve as orientation, mapping the field of Christian theological reflection on disability that 
has been a growing field of interest internationally. The next essay, by Nico Koopman, 
serves as a further example of theological reflection on the themes of disability and human 
dignity, but coupled with the concepts of hope and vulnerability. Central to Juliana 
Claassens’s contribution is a call to find – amidst the many examples of stereotypical Old 
Testament views on disability, disease and suffering – elements of a counter-narrative in 
the Book of Job in a process of “moving towards a new kind of speech” regarding God 
and disability, while another theologian, Gerrit Brand, expresses his views on “language 
injustice” and “linguistic marginalisation”, especially of speakers of sign language.
In the second section, ‘Changing Practices’, the issue of theology, disability and human 
dignity are addressed by those working with people with disabilities – therapists, educators 
and psychologists. In fact, before one can even begin to think of the relationship between 
theology, disability and human dignity, one may indeed ask what the relevance, if any, is 
of religious faith for the topic of disability. From the perspective of his position as a lead 
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Programme (the SRP), and as someone from outside the ranks of religious believers, 
Leslie Swartz reflects on this question. Without changing his own position regarding 
religious faith, Swartz tells of his own realisation of the importance of issues of faith and 
spirituality for many people despite the fact that many of them “had been excluded and 
vilified by aspects of religion”, and that “religion also sustained them and gave them a sense 
of meaning and identity”. This is something also reflected in Martha Geiger’s essay as a 
speech therapist on how children with severe communication disabilities “do theology”. 
Still related to the issue of language and conversation is the fact that the language we use 
in our discourse on disability is, of course, indicative of the perceptions that lie behind it. 
The question of perceptions is especially important in the next contribution, by Anton van 
Niekerk, on different views regarding bio-ethical enhancement. 
Language and perceptions are two factors that, in the end, may contribute not only to the 
recognition or not, to the promotion or even the violation of the human dignity of people 
living with disabilities, but also to their inclusion in or exclusion from society. It is this 
exclusion and overcoming it that forms the focus of Tsitsi Chataika’s essay ‘Cultural and 
religious explanations of disability and promoting inclusive communities in Southern 
Africa’, and Erna Möller’s essay ‘The experiences of people with disabilities in faith 
communities and suggestions to enhance their inclusion’.
The publication ends with a section, ‘Changing Lives’, on the daily challenges (including 
challenges of faith) those with disabilities face, their vast (often untapped) potential and 
the contribution they can and do make. The four short essays are by Gubela Mji (the head 
of the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies (CRS) at Stellenbosch University), Pieter van 
Niekerk (a pastor living with a disability), and Tatjana Metzger and Michelle Nell (both 
students from Stellenbosch University living with disabilities). 
It is our sincere hope that the above selection of contributions will reflect the fact that the 
conference on theology, disability and human dignity, and the ensuing conference volume, 
was indeed an enriching experience that forced many of us out of our respective comfort 
zones to cross disciplinary boundaries in a joint quest for dignity. One of the elements of 
this richness was the sheer diversity of viewpoints reflected here and at the conference. 
This diversity is also reflected in the case of the editors of this volume – two members of 
the Faculty of Theology (Christian and specifically Dutch Reformed) working together 
with a member of the Department of Psychology who is a self-professed Jewish atheist. 
This diversity of viewpoints, which may even include ideological differences, attests to the 
fact that the issue underlying this volume is important enough to us to come together and 
learn from one another. Of course, this publication would not have been possible without 
the financial assistance of the Stellenbosch University Hope Project (via the Faculty of 
Theology and the CRS), without SUN MeDIA Stellenbosch and the key role they played 
in the publication process and, last but not least, without all those who contributed by 
presenting papers at the conference and by submitting them for publication. You truly 
represented multiple responses, multiple voices. At times you did cause us some discomfort 
and at times your views were contested, but most of all you enriched our perceptions and 
understanding of disability and its relationship to theology and human dignity with your 
own experiences and expertise. For this, we thank you all.
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A final word regarding the title of this volume. “Searching for Dignity” is a reference to Bob 
Dylan’s powerful song ‘Dignity’. Reflecting a context of slavery in the American South, as 
well as ongoing human rights violations in the USA where people are killed for no reason 
and others are facing hunger in the land of plenty, the singer is searching high and low and 
everywhere he can, asking people: “Have you seen dignity?” 
This search for dignity is equally relevant in our own context. We can think of numerous 
instances both past and present in which people’s basic human rights have been 
disrespected. In terms of the title of this volume, it is thus very relevant to contemplate this 
search for dignity also in terms of the indignity that people with disabilities experience. 
The collection of essays contained in this volume seeks to recover dignity by changing the 
discourse regarding disability through changing the conversation, changing practices and 
changing lives.
Julie Claassens, Leslie Swartz and Len Hansen 
Stellenbosch, June 2012
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1
Theology and disability
Changing the conversation
Thomas E. Reynolds1
Disability unsettles easy assurances. It exemplifies how people can be represented in terms 
that exclude. Disability often signifies the way that some people are recognised as lacking 
something basic to what is understood as human, being abnormal, a body gone wrong. The 
implications of such “recognition” – which is more adequately a ‘mis-recognition’ – extend 
far beyond disability, and in fact touch on the cultural, social and religious systems by 
which human beings gain orientation in the world and traffic with each other. 
I discovered this personally in the process of raising my son, Chris (now 20 years old), who 
is diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome (on the autism spectrum) and Tourette Syndrome, 
OCD, Bipolar disorder and ADHD. Chris’s own uniqueness presents itself in ways that 
challenge, indeed, upset and turn upside-down the taken-for-granted conventions and 
ideals that commonly are held up as ‘normal’ in the process of caring for and loving a child. 
Attending to him has meant “letting go” of my own preconceived expectations about what 
human flourishing means, and instead learning to listen – and listen deeply – to the ways 
his own humanity requires affirmation, attending and empowerment. The process has been 
disconcerting and painful, and has demanded patient and persistent practice. But Chris’s 
particular way of being in the world, his own neuro-diversity and beauty, radiates outward 
and serves something other than satisfying the norms of a world set up in neuro-typical 
terms. It is its own good, precious in its own right. 
I recall one particularly powerful way that Chris’s presence in my life compelled me to 
adjust my orientation in the world. It happened in a theology class I was teaching. We 
were engaged with various perspectives on the question of evil, in particular, asking why 
a supposedly all-powerful and all-good God would allow suffering to exist in this world. 
This kind of question is usually asked under the banner of a theological-philosophical 
term, “theodicy”. As I was talking with the class, it suddenly occurred to me that, seen 
through the lens of my experience with Chris, the whole setup of the question was bogus. 
I had assumed disability is an example of something gone wrong, a deficiency, a site of 
abnormality and suffering. Consequently, I realised the answers – grand and totalising in 
their sweep – ended up trivialising the complexity of the life I knew in Chris, presuming 
that his condition was less than ordinary and therefore characterised by “suffering”. I had 
simply presumed he suffered, as an individual, because of his impaired condition. Suddenly, 
as if shocked awake by a splash of cold water, I was dis-oriented and as a result had to 
1 Thomas E. Reynolds is Associate Professor of Theology at Emmanuel College, of Victoria University in the 
University of Toronto and the Toronto School of Theology.
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SE begin reconsidering my whole theological framework. For I found myself saying things that 
did not square with my love for Chris and how I experienced his way of being in the world. 
It does not take much to recognise that serious problems accompany religious language 
about God and God’s love when applied to disability. After all, encountering disability 
challenges the assumptions by which non-disabled people find order and meaning in the 
world. In order to uphold these assumptions, people of faith almost automatically defer 
to notions that imply that God somehow “causes” disability – for example, as a curse or 
punishment, a “cross to bear”, an opportunity for God to “heal”, a way for non-disabled 
people to demonstrate charity, a kind of moral lesson for non-disabled people (“there but 
for the grace of God go I”), or a spiritual lesson (“those people are so childlike and open 
to God”).2 Even though these kinds of responses can be found in biblical texts, I suggest 
that they trade upon a faulty way of representing disability. Namely, that disability is not 
“normal” (abnormal), that it displays something different than the “standard” human body 
should, a stigma marking a deviance considered a deprivation. But what is normal? And 
what constitutes a disability?
Today, then, I would like to propose that faith communities shift the way disability is 
thought about, and this means, as the title of my talk suggests, changing the conversation. 
If we think of ‘conversation’ as an exchange, a conversing, between people through which 
ideas, visions, mechanisms of power, strategies of caring, and so on are conveyed and 
shared, then changing the conversation involves modifying practices as well. After all, our 
language is a performance with certain effects. It enacts viewpoints and reflects orientation 
with others. It is no accident that questions of accessibility for people with disabilities are 
so tightly connected with attitudes and perspectives toward disability. And further, as 
my story above illustrates, it is often our relationships with people that challenge us to 
reconsider our attitudes, to rethink, for example, what ‘accessible’ means.
Of all places, religious communities should be models of “accessible communities”, a point 
of entry into God’s love radiating through the lives of its participants. For, in the words of 
Jennie Weiss Block, a Christian writer, “the Body of Christ presumes a place for everyone”.3 
However, “place” is difficult for persons with disabilities. Too often thresholds are 
encountered in our churches that signal “access denied” – whether physical, behavioural or 
attitudinal. This is tragic both for those with and those without disabilities. For specific 
kinds of people are rendered “helpless” or “deficient” or “special” in some way(s) by others. 
On this basis they are excluded from participation or relegated to secondary status, which 
diminishes their genuine humanity. Also diminished are faith communities themselves, as 
disabling principalities and powers come to obscure how people with disabilities can and 
do make real contributions to their communities. Not only is this unjust; it also restricts, 
I believe, the redemptive pulse of God’s presence in our midst. So it becomes important to 
reflect theologically about how persons of faith might engage the issue of disability with a 
more critical and compassionate edge. 
2 For an excellent survey and critique of such responses, see Kathy Black. 1996. A Healing Homiletic: Preaching and 
Disability. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press. See Reynolds, T. E. 2008. Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability 
and Hospitality. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, chapter 1, IV. 
3 Weiss Block, J. 2002. Copious Hosting: A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities. New York, NY and London: 
Continuum, 131.
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In my talk today I want to propose changing the conversation in three ways, moving 
beyond disability as
(1) a “problem” to be erased or done away with; 
(2) something otherwise than “us”, which then must subsequently be included according 
to an ideal of normalcy that is established by non-disabled people (often through 
ablest ideologies); and finally 
(3) something merely to be accommodated and “tolerated” and instead toward genuine 
being with, not ‘doing for’ but receiving gifts from people with disabilities, who are 
valued as contributing parts of a shared communal life. There are, of course, many 
other issues and proposals that could be raised, and many theological implications 
that could be discussed. My aim is simply to suggest possibilities for interrogation 
and communal transformation.
I
First, as many of the papers from this conference have already indicated, it is crucial to 
shift away from seeing disability as a tragic flaw, the product of circumstances and bodies 
“gone wrong”. This entails moving away from referencing an individual’s impairment in 
terms of reduced ability and reduced personal fulfilment. For this not only individualises 
disability, when it is often the social order that makes an impairment disabling, it also 
makes accommodation a personal caring matter for the individual or family rather than 
the cultural system or society. It ends up focusing on a deficiency through curative or 
remediating medical practices (even prayers for “healing”) and as a result depersonalises 
people with disabilities and overlooks the disabling powers and principalities in the system 
itself. Disability scholars often highlight such a contrast in term of the “medical model” and 
the “social model”. The latter complicates the very notion of disability.
I adopt a view that signifies disability as the consequence of impairment, that is, an inability 
to perform some task or activity considered necessary within a social environment.4 This 
makes disability, to a large degree, a social construct. Disability represents a diminishment 
relative to a context of valuation and its conventions, a lack of ability to function in ways 
considered valuable to a group. In this way, as disability theorist Lennard Davis describes, 
disability and normalcy are part of the same system.5 Impairment does not necessarily mean 
disability. For example, visual impairment in today’s world is not considered a disabling 
condition, but needing a wheelchair or medication for bipolar disorder is. And sometimes 
impairments are caused by social systems. Why the difference between disability and 
impairment? Because certain conventions have become part of the status quo, constructing 
what is “normal” and thereby creating the difference between bodies that are “able” and 
those that are “disabled”. There is more at stake, then, in the matter of disability than an 
impairment that someone happens to have. For society disables people by representing 
4 Eiesland, N. L. 1994. The Disabled God: Toward a Liberation Theology of Disability. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 27. 
Eiesland refers to S. Z. Nagi’s 1979 definition, from The Concept and Measurement of Disability in Disability 
Policies and Government Programs. In Berkowitz, E. D. (ed.), Disability Policies and Government Programs. New 
York, NY: Praeger, 3.
5 Davis, L. J. 1995. Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body. London and New York: Verso, 2. See also 48-9. 
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curative practices to remedy such flaw or deficiency. As Arthur Frank notes: “Society 
prefers medical diagnoses that admit treatment, not social diagnoses that require massive 
change in the premises of what that social body includes as part of itself.”6 In fact, even 
impairment itself can be seen as a social construct of sorts, its representation trading upon 
certain definitions of the body that include and exclude particular features governed by 
conceptions of normality. Disability then invokes questions of accessibility as a matter of 
justice and human dignity. Personhood should not by defined by disability. But this is not 
the end of the story.
II
A second change becomes necessary in the conversation. There is a need to move away 
from representing disability merely as a problem to be included, an anomaly that is 
somehow “other” and outside, which, according to the good graces of a community, “needs” 
to brought “inside” and given access and power to be involved. For this often becomes 
a way temporarily non-disabled people claim nobly to give something those others – 
“they” – do not have, perpetuating an “us-them” or “inside-outside” dualism that retains a 
paternalistic ethos of exclusion. It may be true that without accommodation an impairment 
(physiological difference, bodily condition) becomes a disability (social and environmental 
experience of restriction that results from limited access, from being considered to have 
an impairment). However, outside preconceived programmes and expectations fuelled by 
dominant visions of what is “normal”, people with disabilities convey a powerful sense of 
personhood and dignity, which rises in multiple ways to make contributions and offer gifts 
to communities. So it now becomes a matter of deproblematising the “problem” of disability 
and instead problematising the way communities represent disability vis-à-vis normalising 
assumptions that either exclude or assimilate-normalise people with disabilities on this 
basis. I want, therefore, to move beyond binaries of “us-them”, especially as couched in terms 
of “normal” versus “abnormal”, in order to disrupt the usual “ability-disability” binary.
If we grant that the “normal” is a standard that is socially constructed, we are brought 
to recognise that it can also be critiqued and de-constructed. The basis for this, I believe, 
lies in something all human beings share, which helps undercut the “us-them” binary: 
vulnerability. It is an inescapable fact that we are born, live our lives, and then die as 
vulnerable creatures exposed to and needing each other. Not just to survive as helpless 
infants, but also to grow and come to flourish as people loved by others, eventually dying 
in the care of others helpless before our mortality. Such vulnerability binds us together 
with those who accompany us. As Kristine Culp recently noted, it does not simply mean 
susceptibility to injury or harm, as something negative, but also susceptibility to good, to 
joy and fulfilment through others.7 Highlighting this theme is essential because it provides 
a way into more vigorously acknowledging and experiencing our deep connecting points 
with one another, points that indicate a basic web of mutual dependence, but which all too 
6 Frank, A. W. 1995. The Wounded Storyteller: Body, Illness, and Ethics. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 113.
7 Culp, K. C. 2010. Vulnerability and Glory: A Theological Account. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2-4.
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often become cloaked by the exchange values that animate human communities under the 
sway of what I have called the “cult of normalcy”.8 
The cult of normalcy routinises and naturalises – through systems of power and their 
rituals – ways of being human that are taken to be “normal” and thus the status quo. It takes 
what are in fact social constructions and ascribes “commonality” to them as particular 
standards that become prototypical for all. In this way, ableist discourses that construct 
disability as “other” or deviant come to mobilise representations that uphold communal 
identities based in binary systems of exclusion – able/disabled, “us” versus “them”. Michel 
Foucault famously speaks of binary divisions (mad/sane; normal/abnormal; in/out) and the 
“power of normalisation”, whereby exclusion is not so much ejection from community as it 
is productive of community.9 Exclusion has formative power. The excluded supplemental 
defines the “identity”, making language itself a vehicle for inscribing “the normal” into 
our everyday sense of who we are within a social identity (for example, think about how 
terms like “cripple”, “blind” and “deaf” are used pejoratively). The point is that there is no 
“natural” able-bodied person. And because of this, there is the possibility of deconstructing 
ableism and opening up multiple ways of being human together.
This is why, rather than to focus on what counts for “ability” – for example, the capacity 
to think rationally, act autonomously, look healthy, or produce and purchase things as 
self-interested consumers – we might explore human vulnerability as a starting point for 
discovering what we share in our differences, a source bearing the precious and fragile grace 
of solidarity with one another. Jean Vanier, founder of L’Arche, a network of communities 
for intellectually disabled people, sums it up eloquently: “We do not discover who we 
are, we do not reach true humanness, in a solitary state; we discover it through mutual 
dependency, in weakness, in learning through belonging.”10
Viewed through the lens of basic vulnerability, “neediness” or “lack of ability” is not a flaw 
detracting from an otherwise pure and complete human nature. Rather, it is testimony to 
the fact that we – all human beings – receive our existence from each other. And recognising 
this is a source of relational openness to others, who are in turn similarly constituted. 
Genuine wholeness is found not through bodily completeness or ability, but through an 
acknowledgment of vulnerability that is made concrete in relations of mutual giving to 
and receiving from others.11 Human beings are exposed to one another, subject to each 
other even before any clear sense of self emerges. We need each other. I am not arguing 
that vulnerable interdependence is itself a moral virtue, but rather that it is a fact of human 
existence (much as Alasdair MacIntyre argues in Dependent Rational Animals). What is crucial 
here, in order to move beyond the descriptive element of ‘fact’ toward a moral posture of 
sorts, is the acknowledgement of vulnerable interdependency.
This notion is difficult and painful to process under the sway of dominant social conventions; 
it runs counter to the common assumption that value is based upon power and ability. We 
8 See my Vulnerable Communion, chapter 3. 
9 Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (Trans. Alan Sheridan). New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, see 29 and 199.
10 Vanier, J. 1998. Becoming Human. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 41.
11 See Vulnerable Communion, chapter 4.
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to be independent and self-initiating, able to control our bodies in the face of others and 
thus be recognised as contributing to the group. The irony is, in the words of Stanley 
Hauerwas, “our neediness is also the source of our greatest strength, for our need requires 
the cooperation and love of others from which derives our ability not only to live but to 
flourish.”12 Living out of this reality is a source of genuine good, for it entails helping others 
– in their so-called “disability” – as essential not only to our own flourishing, but also to the 
common good of the community in which we flourish.
Yet neediness is a difficult reality to accept. For it means recognising that we are at the 
core exposed to imperilment and suffering, contingent and incomplete beings who need to 
belong to become ourselves.13 Indeed, we do suffer. Vanier observes: “Weakness is at the 
heart of the need to belong; weakness that we may fear, because we have been hurt.”14 Fearful 
of being wounded, we often attempt to cover our vulnerability, protecting it by denying our 
dependence upon others. The irony in this, however, is that belonging is inescapable. We 
become who we are through community. Yet in the modality of fear, even community can 
become a false means to assure ourselves of strength and completeness, in effect denying 
our vulnerability. We buy into the cult of normalcy. We presume that security entails 
conforming to the projected strength of others, bolstered by the conventions of society and 
its power mechanisms. It is as though acquiescing to the status quo offers protection by 
rendering us immune to contingency and its perils. 
Such pretence is what fuels efforts to build protective walls around the “normal” and 
classify certain anomalies as “abnormal”. We thereby come to judge the different and the 
strange – that which does fit into the ordered scheme of things – according to our fears. In 
a state of insecurity we hunt for a scapegoat for our fear, someone or something to turn into 
the object of fear and then our contempt.15 The different is frightening, because it mirrors 
our own weakness and vulnerability. It ruptures conventions of normalcy and forces us to 
acknowledge that which we shun and seek immunity against: inability, incompleteness 
and neediness. Hence disability is considered a weakness, because it concretely reveals to 
us what we shun in ourselves: weakness.16 Often the cement that binds a group together is 
cast over the sense of vulnerability that preoccupies its constituents. And this is a moral 
failure. Not only does it lead to representing vulnerability as a flaw, but it also seeks to 
objectify such flaw as an attribute of the other who is different. By projecting our own fear 
of vulnerability onto another, we become cut off from the wellspring of our own flourishing: 
mutual dependence. We deny the other, and so ourselves. 
Our efforts to suppress it notwithstanding, mutual dependence is primary. It is the fulcrum 
from which we emerge as persons. It elicits a fundamental sense of wholeness that, even 
as we conceal it, rises here and there like grass through asphalt, captivating our attention. 
Vanier explains why: “Weakness carries within it a secret power. The cry and the trust that 
12 Hauerwas, S. 2004. Suffering the Retarded. In Swinton, J. (ed.), Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of 
Disability: Disabling Society, Enabling Theology. Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Pastoral Press, 97.
13 Hauerwas, Suffering the Retarded, 100-4.
14 Vanier, Becoming Human, 46.
15 Vanier, Becoming Human, 73.
16 See Vanier, Becoming Human, 74-81.
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flow from weakness can open up hearts.”17 The vulnerability of another is a window into our 
own vulnerability, evoking a sympathetic relation that eludes the tyranny of the normal, 
sweeping under the radar of conventional economies of value exchange. In this way Vanier 
suggests that those who embody weakness and are considered “nobodies” in a society – 
i.e. people who exhibit disabilities – “have profound lessons to teach us”.18 They invite 
us to move out from behind closed walls of false security and exclusion to acknowledge 
and accept our vulnerability. Theologian Jürgen Moltmann confirms the point in stating, 
“A person with disabilities gives others the precious insight into the woundedness and 
weakness of human life.”19 Disability is a profound symbol of human brokenness, not as a 
flaw but a pervasive condition.20 Of course we can suppress or deny our weakness, fleeing 
from it by pushing away those others whose difference overtly exhibits it as something we 
deem ugly or dirty or deficient. But by doing this we shun what is perhaps most human 
about us – the need to belong and be recognised as of value. 
However, this is not to say that people with disabilities are “the” vulnerable, with intrinsic 
transformative capabilities for “us” non-disabled people. Rather, that vulnerability is 
something shared differently by all humans. And it is distributed differently among 
humans, some being made more vulnerable than others in specific ways – such as by race, 
gender, class, etc. – and in specific locations and contexts – such as in Canada, South Africa 
or China, and in different religious contexts, and in rural or urban situations, and in various 
climates, etc. When seen in this light, we quickly see that disability is not the property of 
“them” versus an “us” – a flaw or aberration – but a pervasive condition affecting everyone 
in varying degrees as they are subject to imperilment, suffering and/or violence that 
diminish human flourishing. There is, in the end, no hard and fast line between ability 
and disability, but rather a nexus of reciprocity that is based in our vulnerable humanity. 
All of life comes to us as a gift, an endowment that is received in countless ways from 
others throughout our lifetime. When we acknowledge this, the line between giving and 
receiving, ability and disability, begins to blur. The binary “us” versus “them” language 
begins to unravel. Moltmann goes so far as to state: “There is no differentiation between the 
healthy and those with disabilities. For every human life has its limitations, vulnerabilities, 
and weaknesses. We are born needy, and we die helpless. It is only the ideals of health of a 
society of the strong which condemn a part of humanity to being ‘disabled’.”21 Conversely, 
having a disability is not equivalent to being ill or sick, needing a cure. Disability does not 
define a person.
Full personhood is neither diminished by disability nor confirmed by ability. Instead, it is 
a factor of the interdependent relationships we share with one another as creatures loved 
into being by God and in the image of God. There is a wider horizon in which all persons 
in their uniqueness and vulnerability coexist within the enfolding presence of a gracious 
17 Vanier, Becoming Human, 40.
18 Vanier, Becoming Human, 45.
19 Moltmann, J. 1998. Liberate Yourselves by Accepting One Another. In Eiesland, N. L. and Saliers D. E. (eds), 
Human Disability and the Service of God. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 105-22 (121). 
20 See Govig, S. 1989. Strong at the Broken Places: Persons with Disabilities and the Church. Louisville, KY: Westminster/
John Knox.
21 Moltmann, Liberate Yourselves, 110.
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into the woundedness and weakness of human life. But a person with disabilities also 
gives insight into the humanity of his own world. Through persons with disabilities, other 
people can come to know the real, suffering, living God, who also loves them infinitely.”22 
Put in terms that avoid setting up binary tensions between people with disability (“them”) 
and non-disabled people (“us”), it could be said that the issue of disability, manifest variously 
in different bodies, calls us (all of us) into acknowledging our common human weaknesses 
and thus opens us (all of us) more radically to God’s grace.23 
To exist as a finite creature is to be vulnerable. And, speaking theologically as a Christian, 
it is precisely such vulnerability that God embraces in Christ, entering fully into the frailty 
of the human condition, even unto a tragic death. Jesus is Emmanuel, God with us. God’s 
sharing of the divine self in this way sends a distinct message: God is in solidarity with 
humanity at its most fundamental level, in weakness and brokenness. Here God reveals 
the divine nature as compassion not only by “undergoing” or “suffering with” human 
vulnerability, but also by raising it up into God’s own being. Redemption, then, is a 
welcoming, a divine act of hospitality. It is not a condescending move of pity. Neither does 
it negate vulnerable finitude by making humans inviolable and perfectly whole. Nancy 
Eiesland notes this by calling our attention to the fact that Jesus’ body remains scarred 
after his resurrection.24 So instead of doing away with the capacity to suffer, redemption 
transforms vulnerability into a communion with God, prefiguring the final eschatological 
horizon to come when all things will become so transformed. 
Thus I contend that disability is both anthropologically and redemptively fundamental. It 
signifies vulnerability as a condition of the gift of sharing life with one another. Yet there 
is a need for healing, not because disability signifies “bodies gone wrong”, but because it 
entails real suffering, sometimes bodily but in many cases communal and social in the form 
of alienation, exclusion and assimilation. Disability, then, is redemptively fundamental 
because it opens up our human vulnerability and dependence upon each other and God. 
This gets to Paul’s proclamation in II Corinthians 12 that God’s power is made “complete” 
and perfected in weakness. And it has dramatic implications for living together. Wholeness 
is not self-sufficiency. Rather, it is the genuinely inclusive communion that results from 
sharing our vulnerable humanity with one another in the light of the grace of God. Would 
it not be appropriate, then, to open koinonia communion to all God’s children, sharing the 
radically inclusive love of God without representing some people as “abled” and others 
as “disabled”? Of course, this would mean taking a hard look at our own humanity, the 
humanity we all share. And doing so could be transformative for ourselves, our religious 
communities and our society as a whole. 
III
On this basis, there is need for another change in the conversation. And I would 
like to conclude with this (not that I have exhausted all options for change in the 
22 Moltmann, Liberate Yourselves, 121. 
23 Vanier, Becoming Human, 39-41.
24 Eiesland, The Disabled God, 98-105. 
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conversation), using Catholic ethicist Margaret Farley’s term, “compassionate respect”.25 
I see compassionate respect as a way of attending to human dignity. Here the ethical 
implications of vulnerability come to the fore. Compassionate respect honours persons by 
paying attention to both equality and difference. That is, it treats someone as equal without 
therefore being made over and assimilated into the image of what is taken by dominant 
visions as “normal” – which effectively erases difference – and as different without therefore 
being marginalised as “deviant” and “abnormal” – effectively denying equality.
My concluding proposal is that alterity in the shape of disability is a gift that teaches and 
empowers communities. As Carolyn Thompson writes: “Disability is about difference; it 
is one of the characteristics that contribute to the diversity, the plurality of life.”26 This is 
important to stress, first of all because such difference is often stigmatised and excluded 
by ableist ideologies. Second, it is important because disability itself is not singular, but 
diverse. The lives of people with disabilities are as varied and different as the lives of those 
without disabilities. Indeed, it is such difference that God creates as blessed and good, 
that through encountering it we meet traces of the divine.27 The roots of the injunction to 
hospitality lie here. The full participation of people with disabilities is not an option for 
the church, but rather a defining feature, opening up relationships of interdependence and 
respect and friendship far beyond what is often taken for “inclusion”.28
However, is it really inclusion when temporarily able-bodied people practise care as 
“mainstreaming”, “normalising”, or “rehabilitating”? Disability scholar Patty Douglas 
notes in her work on autism and education that inclusion often amounts to a process by 
which people with disabilities “are not only brought into ‘view’ as a population subject to 
‘inclusion’, then, but also as a population potentially in need of ‘improvement’.”29 Based 
upon what has just been said about equality and difference, I would like to propose an 
alternative to this. To be included entails one’s difference being welcomed and made a part 
of a community, given access to intended participation in that community, treated as an 
equal belonging among others, like everyone else. To be inclusive, then, means intentionally 
making room for difference, the different treated as difference, not as pathology or a deficit 
to be cured or fixed before being fully accepted. The link between these two, I believe, 
is access, in that disability is included through accommodation, so that a person with 
disabilities can participate with others as a contributing part of a community’s life. This 
means recognising difference and diversity, bodily and neurologically, and welcoming it as 
part of “us” – not something “other” and abnormal, to be remade in the image of the “same” 
as “normal”. It is not so much a matter of accommodating so “you” can be a part of “us” on 
“our” terms, but rather so you can be with and augment “us” differently, accessing on your 
25 Farley, M. 2002. Compassionate Respect: A Feminist Approach to Medical Ethics and Other Questions. New York, NY: 
Paulist Press. 
26 Thompson, C. 2009. Ableism: The Face of Oppression as Experienced by People with Disabilities. In Kugawa-
Holbrook, S. A. and Montagno, K. B. (eds), Injustice and the Care of Souls: Taking Difference Seriously in Pastoral Care. 
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 211-26 (219).
27 See Sacks, J. 2002. The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations. New York, NY: Continuum, 59. 
28 Thompson, Ableism, 221.
29 See Douglas, P. 2010. Problematizing Inclusion: Education and the Question of Autism. Pedagogy, Culture and 
Society 18:105-21 (111).
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homogeneity, a communal heterogeneity and diversity is introduced.
However, does this train of thinking not still subject certain kinds of people to inclusion 
and care as somehow “special” in “their” difference precisely because of what I have just 
said above is common to us all (vulnerability)? Is an “us-them” dualism implied despite my 
efforts to recognise disability as not simply about “those others” but about vulnerability? 
As if there is a group of people more vulnerable and fragile, an exception to the norm, who 
need remunerative care and compassion? Here we must acknowledge the dangers of being 
inclusive, of opening up access through accommodation.
Inclusion as accommodation is potentially insidious in two ways. First, it trades upon 
misrecognising difference as other, and in fact names kinds of difference as “outside” and 
thus anomalous, something to be brought into an “inside” that functions normatively as 
“us”, an identity. As Miroslav Volf bluntly puts it, inclusion “implicitly portrays ‘them’ 
as the kind of people ‘we’ are not.”30 Inclusion functions by maintaining binary divisions 
that play out subtle mechanisms of exclusion – to be “us” we need “them” to be different 
and not equal, and more, to be an inclusive “us” we need to engage “them” insofar as they 
can become “us”, incorporated into the same. Second, because of this, inclusion can be 
uncritical and lack self-awareness, assuming the rightness of its own position as an “inside”, 
all the while masking the fact that the inside itself is a construction based upon “othering” 
an outside. For people with disabilities, then, inclusion is often experienced via logic 
that is exclusionary at first (based in a binary figuration), and subsequently assimilative 
(normalising), all in the name of care and doing good. 
In her provocative essay “Violence, Mourning, Politics” Judith Butler uses the term 
“vulnerability” to suggest that we find another way of imagining community. She contends 
that we admit “we are alike only in having this condition [of vulnerability] separately and 
so having in common a condition that cannot be thought without difference.”31 This holds 
together both equality and difference, common sharing and distinctiveness, and opens out 
into a relationality of vulnerable interdependence. Building from Butler, what is needed, 
I believe, is a transformative sense of inclusion that connects members of the community, 
healing by empowering creative agency, not simply by including the helpless or by restoring 
bodily intactness, but by opening a physical/social space of non-domination and mutuality. 
Here the genuine recognition of differences can help destabilise normative assumptions 
about what constitutes an “us”; differences become a teacher opening up communities 
beyond inclusion toward acknowledging diversity as productive of life together, not a 
deficiency, differences being equal and not incorporated insofar as they might become 
the same. 
And yet, often practised in religious communities are forms of inclusive accommodation 
tantamount to tolerance, normalising assimilation, or restricted hospitality. First, with 
tolerance, different bodies are given minimal access and “put up with” in ways that 
guarantee the safety of the status quo by keeping the dominant system intact. Tolerance 
30 Volf, M. 1996. Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation. Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon Press, 58.
31 Butler, J. 2006. Violence, Mourning, Politics. In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso, 27.
27
Theology a
nd
 d
isa
b
ility: C
ha
nging the conversa
tion   |   Thom
a
s E
. R
eynold
s
allows deviation, but seeks to manage by distancing it as something that remains “outside” 
and unable to fully participate (e.g. tolerating noises by disabled people in church, but 
considering them disruptive instead of communicative). Second, with normalising or 
assimilative gestures of inclusion, different bodies are remade and fixed/cured to reflect the 
“inside” as they gain access to participation (e.g. healing ceremonies). Here, romanticised 
notions of disability as “special” or “gifted” can become ways that people without 
disabilities project their own need to remake disability into a palatable and meaningful 
event, an ironic display of normalising powers. Lastly, hospitality itself can be a false 
pretence, the “host” retaining mastery of the home and the “guest” rendered dependent by 
receiving gifts of welcome, the home remaining fully under control by the host. All three 
of these manifest what Iris Marion Young, following Theodore Adorno, calls the “logic of 
identity”, which in an effort to provide unity and coherence either reduces differences to 
the same via management and control, or rejects differences as utterly other.32
These dangers are especially real to me as a parent of a child with autism. How have 
I accommodated myself to ‘neuro-diversity’ in the shape of autism? Indeed, parenting has 
been a different life than I imagined, and it’s been hard. No ‘Hallmark Card’ glossing is 
possible. In relation to Chris’s predicament, I too often suppose that my identity and worth 
derive from the powers of my ability as a “good parent” to love Chris by helping him get 
along in the world, coupled with a capacity to be independent and self-initiating, to achieve 
and be able to control my body in the face of others and thus be recognised as contributing 
to others around me (children, work, church, etc.) in some way. The irony that Chris raises 
for me, however, is that this whole setup is bogus. Being in relationship with Chris has 
taught me that caring for others as different is not a matter of “helping”, of giving from a 
position of strength, but of recognising my vulnerability and becoming open to the ways 
I receive from others. Others – in ways that include their “disabilities” – become essential 
not only to my own flourishing, but also to the common good of the communities in which 
I flourish together with Chris. This opens up the power of giving through first receiving, 
receiving from Chris.
Receiving others in such a manner is, as Letty Russell would say, the practice of hospitality 
at its best.33 There is no inside/outside binary, but rather a roundtable gathering into which 
each guest is invited as hosts to one another, joined in relationships of mutual partnership, 
and giving and receiving rather than dependency relationships of unilateral caring giving. 
An attentive practice listens and receives, letting-be the speaking voice of another and 
hearing how she or he perceives. In this way, the margins and the centre, the guest and 
host, each circulates and shifts among the other, distinctions blurred. The listener comes 
to confront the biases, false assumptions, and unequal power quotients that obscure 
encountering the difference of another. Furthermore, the listener responds, adjusting to 
the way of another by entering into their story. And the speaking voice grows into itself 
and gains dignity by being heard and accommodated. The dynamic shifts, then, as each 
trades roles and becomes an other for and with the other in an ongoing exchange of mutual 
welcome. Communities of genuine partnership are built upon this transformational 
32 Young, I. M. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 98-9.
33 See Russell, L. M. 2009. Just Hospitality: God Welcome in a World of Difference. Shannon, J. and Ott, K. M. (eds). 
Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press.
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enduring systems of power on micro and communal levels, because vulnerability is often 
not parcelled out equally within such “ongoing exchanges of mutual welcome”.
So I have proposed changing the conversation in three ways: (1) beyond disability as a 
bodily deprivation or problem to be cured or done away with; (2) beyond the able-disabled 
binary that pits “inside” versus “outside”; and (3) beyond mere inclusive “accommodation” 
of disability, but a receiving of its difference as a gift, one that disrupts and pre-empts easy 
closures, and in the end opens up new transformative possibilities for being in mutual 
relation. This is what my son, Chris, has taught me. Chris does not need rescuing; he is 
neither a moral lesson nor an object for my compassion and charity. His is a life radiating 
with its own preciousness, an excess that constantly disrupts the pretence of normalcy, and 
accordingly becomes a gift of grace that I could have never planned for on my own terms.
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Theology and disability
What is the question?
Hans S. Reinders1
IntroductIon
Over the last decades there has been a growing interest in the relation between theology 
and disability in the academic literature that suggests we are witnessing the birth of a new 
field. Inspired by a series of remarkable publications, among which The Disabled God by 
the late Nancy Eiesland in 1994 surely was a landmark,2 people interested in this emergng 
field have come together to organise conferences and form new academic platforms for the 
exchange of ideas and thoughts. Examples are the establishment of the European Society 
for the Study of Theology and Disability3 and the formation of a study group on theology and 
disability in the American Academy of Religion.4 Quite recently, people like Amos Young and 
Debbie Creamer have published important new books, and among these one of my own 
favourites is Vulnerable Communion by Tom Reynolds, published in 2008.5
Looking a bit closer at this literature, the main question we find addressed over and over 
again is the question of inclusion. In many ways people with disabilities and their families 
do not feel they are included in their communities, nor do they feel welcome to participate. 
Starting from this experience, the authors then raise the question of what can be done 
to change this. How can people with disabilities and their families become full members 
of their communities? Insofar as these communities are shaped by religious traditions, 
theologians try to answer this question from the perspective of the particular tradition 
they represent. Facing this task, it turns out there are two different ways of approaching 
it. The one I will identify as the approach of pastoral care. It is very practical, attuned to 
issues of access, enabling people with disabilities and their families to participate in their 
community’s activities. The main point of this approach is summed up, quite adequately, 
in the admonition to “practise what you preach”. Many people with disabilities have 
been told they are welcome, but this message is often not followed by appropriate action. 
1 Hans S. Reinders is Professor of Ethics, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
2 Eiesland, N. L. 1994. The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
3 Online at: http://esstd.org
4 Online at: http://www.aarweb.org
5 Young, A. 2007. Theology and Down Syndrome: Reimagining Disability in Late Modernity. Waco, TX: Baylor University 
Press; Reynolds, T. E. 2008. Vulnerable Communion. A Theology of Disability and Hospitality. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos; 
Creamer, D. B. 2009. Disability and Christian Theology. Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. See also Reinders, H. S. Receiving the Gift of Friendship. Profound Disability, Theological Anthropology 
and Ethics. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
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that focuses upon the belief structure underlying religious practices. Also this approach 
is certainly interested in changing practices for religious communities to become more 
inclusive, but it insists upon the primary task of deconstructing the controlling cognitive 
framework that underscores the existing practices of exclusion, often without people 
being aware of it. To paraphrase the rule “Practise what you preach”, one could read the 
second approach as a comment: “Before you start practising, you had better make sure you 
preach the right thing.”
In this paper I propose to stand back and look at the differences between these two 
approaches, because they will tell us something important for any theological discourse 
on disability and human dignity. So I will start with mapping the field to identify what 
I see as the important question in thinking about disability and human dignity. Particulary 
for readers who are practitioners in medicine, education, or social work, and therefore not 
necessarily familiar with theological reasoning, starting with a meta-analysis may appear 
as a bit of a detour. But I hope to show that this procedure, even though it requires some 
patience, is worthwhile to get our feet back on the ground by knowing where we stand.
Before turning to this task, however, let us look at the beginning. In virtually all the literature 
on theology and disability that I am aware of, experience comes first. This means that we are 
introduced to the issue by listening to the all too often disappointing experience of people 
with disabilities and their families. Usually there are stories to begin with, sometimes first 
personal,6 sometimes collective,7 to present testimony of this experience, the experience of 
being excluded. So let me follow this first step by providing an extensive quotation from 
the late Nancy Eiesland, where she tells of her less than salutary experience as a child with 
a congenital disability in the congregation of her family.
As a person with a disability, I could not accept the traditional answers given 
to my own query of “What is disability?”. Since I have a congenital disability, 
I have had opportunities to hear and experience many of these so-called answers 
through the years. They included “You are special in God’s eyes, that’s why you 
were given this painful disability.” Imagine, it didn’t seem logical. Or “Don’t 
worry about your pain and suffering now, in heaven you will be made whole.” 
Again, having been disabled from birth, I came to believe that in heaven I would 
be absolutely unknown to myself and perhaps to God. My disability has taught 
me who I am and who God is. What would it mean to be without this knowledge? 
I was told that God gave me a disability to develop my character. But by age six 
or seven, I was convinced that I had enough character to last a lifetime. My family 
frequented faith healers with me in tow. I was never healed. People asked about 
my hidden sins, but they must have been so well hidden that even I misplaced 
them. The theology that I heard was inadequate to all of my experience.8
6 See Eiesland, The Disabled God, 19-20, 116-17; Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 11-13.
7 Webb-Mitchell, B. 1994. Unexpected Guests at God’s Banquet. Welcoming People with Disabilities into the Church. New 
York, NY: Crossroads.
8 Eiesland, N. 2002. Liberation, Inclusion, and Justice: A Faith Response to Persons with Disabilities. In 
Gaylord, V., Gaventa, B., Simon, S. R., Norman-McNaney, R. and Amado, A. N. (eds), Impact: Feature Issue on Faith 
Communities and Persons with Developmental Disabilities 14, 143. Online at: http://ici.umn.edu/products/impact/143 
[Accessed: 30 April 2009].
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Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s a number of Christian authors testified to similar 
experiences.9 Some recall having been confronted in their local church by the belief that 
there must be something wrong with disabled people, because if God punishes you with 
a disability, there must be a reason. Others have been confronted with the opposite belief 
that God must love you dearly to be given such a special task to fulfil. Both beliefs have 
confronted many others.
“What can We do to help them?”
To reflect upon the testimony of exclusion, let us look at the first kind of theological 
response, the response from the point of view of pastoral care. Roughly the strategy 
followed in this approach goes something like this. Having listened to the experience of 
being excluded by people with disabilities, the author raises the question of how such 
people are viewed in the sources of his or her particular tradition. When the author is 
arguing from the perspective of the Christian tradition, this usually means proceeding from 
biblical stories, often taken from the New Testament, from which the picture of Jesus’ 
teaching emerges showing that including marginalised people was the very point of his 
message.10 Having established this reading of primary sources, the author then proceeds to 
describe the implications for a stance toward ‘disability’ as part of the human experience. 
This part of the analysis usually aims to show that, according to the sources, people 
with disability are to be recognised as full members of their communities without any 
justification of discrimination or marginalisation. After the key references have been put in 
place, the conclusion usually follows that the problem is not what the primary sources of 
the tradition tell about disabled human beings; the problem is in the practices of everyday 
life in the religious communities that supposedly live from these sources. In other words: 
religious traditions are okay, but religious communities and their practices are not okay.
By way of illustration, here are a few examples. Since the strategy that I am describing here 
is by no means typical of authors committed to the Christian tradition, I have taking them 
from both Jewish and Islamic sources. The first comes from an essay by Wallace Green, 
called Jewish Theological Approaches to the Human Experience of Disability. Green introduces his 
argument as follows:
My search of the sources [of Judaism] will reveal a very modern attitude towards 
disabilities and people with disabilities. Unfortunately, society as a whole, and 
9 See, for example, Wilke, H. H. 1980. Creating the Caring Congregation: Guidelines for Ministering with the Handicapped. 
Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press; Govig, S. D. 1989. Strong at the Broken Places: Persons with Disabilities and the Church. 
Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox; Eiesland, The Disabled God.; Creamer, D., 1995. Finding God in Our 
Bodies: Theology from the Perspective of People with Disabilities. Journal of Religion in Disability & Rehabilitation 
2(1):27-42; Black, K. 1996. A Healing Homiletic. Preaching and Disability. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
10 There is also a line of argument against this move, however, because of what is seen as the exclusivist view 
on disability that speaks from the so-called ‘healing narratives’ in which Jesus relates disability to sin. See for 
example: John M. Hull. 2004. How I discovered my blind brother. In The Bible in Transmission: A Forum for Change 
in Church and Culture. London: Bible Society, 9-11. Online at: http://www.johnmhull.biz; see also Black, A Healing 
Homiletic.
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did not always put forth a cogent means to address disability [...]. The power of 
what is socially acceptable has for too long determined the place of people with 
disabilities in Jewish society.11
The key distinction here is between “the sources”, on the one hand, and “the Jewish 
community”, on the other. While the sources show “a very modern attitude towards 
disability”, the Jewish community apparently does not. Proof for the latter claim is found 
when Green continues to say that in Jewish communities some conditions were deemed 
to be acceptable (e.g. wearing eye glasses, using a hearing aid, or walking with a cane), 
without any stigma attached, but other conditions were not: “Individuals who had learning 
or physical disabilities, stuttered, or where otherwise labeled as ‘different’ from a societal 
norm were marginalised.”12
Another example stems from an essay by Melinda Jones in the Journal of Religion, Disability 
& Health.13 She argues that it is not Jewish Law that is culpable of the unjust treatment of 
people with disabilities, but
Rather it is Jewish practice and the social action of Jews and Jewish communities 
that are at fault in the exclusion or abuse of the rights of Jewish people with 
disabilities. It is not Jewish law that is in need of updating or change, but rather 
Jews need to take Jewish Law more seriously, if there is to be an inclusive Jewish 
community.14
Again the same pattern: the sources of Judaism are not the problem, the conduct of Jewish 
people and Jewish communities is.15 This pattern also occurs in an essay called Disability 
in the Qur’an by Maassa Bazna and Tarik Hatab.16 The authors introduce their approach by 
making a point about their methodology in the following way:
We were born Muslim and were raised in Arabic-speaking countries where we 
received education that included only basic and elementary knowledge about 
Islam. As we grew up, we found it difficult to accept many of the religious 
notions and practices espoused by the majority of Muslims [with regard to 
disability]. After several years of reflection and research, we arrived at a renewed 
understanding that the common Muslim has a duty and a responsibility to 
examine the original sources [...]. Accordingly, we base our exploration of the 
attitude and position of Islam towards disability on the Qur’an, in its original 
Arabic form, and the Hadith.17
11 Green, W. 2006. Jewish Theological Approaches to the Human Experience of Disability. Journal of Religion, 
Disability & Health 10(3-4):9-26.
12 Green, Jewish Theological Approaches.
13 Jones, M. B. 2007. Judaism, Theology and the Human Rights of People with Disabilities. Journal of Religion, 
Disability & Health 10(3-4), 101-45, (105).
14 Jones, M. B. 2007. Judaism, Theology and the Human Rights, 105.
15 I should mention that Jones argues here against her colleague rabbi Judith Z. Abrams, who in her study Judaism 
and Disability. Portrayals in Ancient Texts from the Tanach through the Bavli (Washington, DC: Gallaudet University 
Press, 1998) makes the case against the sources of Jewish law.
16 Bazna, M. S. and Hatab, T. A. 2005. Disability in the Qur’an: the Islamic alternative to defining, viewing and 
relating to disability. Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 9(1):5-27.
17 Bazna and Hatab, Disability in the Qur’an, 9.
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The implication here is the same as in the examples from the Jewish literature. If one 
listens to how religious people habitually explain their behaviour towards people with 
disabilities, one is confronted by a view that is unwarranted in the primary sources of their 
particular tradition. 
According to this view, there appears to be a gap between how religious people behave, 
on the one hand, and how their religion tells them to behave, on the other. The disability 
scholar M. Miles nicely sums up the point in a review article on the literature in this area. 
He writes:
Of course, it is true that the practice and behavior of Muslims (as also of 
Christians, Buddhists, Jews, or adherents of any other religion or philosophy), at 
particular times and places, has often fallen short of the highest standards taught 
by each faith or belief; and both belief and practice are usually mixed up with 
some secular practices that are less than ideal.18
Miles confirms the claim made above: when it comes to the relation between theology 
and disability, the problem does not seem to be what a given religious tradition teaches, 
but whether its followers practise what it teaches. Put differently, the problem is ethics, 
not theology.
In what follows I will take issue with this view by following the second approach to 
the task of theological reflection on disability within the Christian tradition. Christian 
theology has everything to do with the exclusion of marginalised people, and this concerns 
some of its more profound doctrines. All too often one finds that, if ethics is the problem, 
an idealist reference to human rights is presented as the solution. Exclusivist religious 
practices are pushed aside by positing human rights claims for people with disabilities, 
without inquiring into the underlying religious beliefs that sustain these practices in the 
first place. Raising human rights awareness in religious communities has a long way to go, 
however, if we leave the underlying theological framework of exclusion untouched. The 
same holds for moral appeals to human dignity. Human dignity is only a useful notion when 
it is developed in a critical encounter with the theological tradition. Put in another way, 
the approach described above as a theology of access fails to do the hard work, the kind 
of work that makes inclusion a painful experience for those who are currently occupying 
communal space, meaning – roughly – me and you. A theology of access frequently trades 
on the question “What can we do for them?” without recognising that the question 
unconsciously betrays a vantage point from centre stage. My preferred way of making the 
point is to say that most people with disabilities do not suffer from their disability, nor 
do they necessarily suffer from what ‘we’ think about ‘them’. What they suffer from, if 
anything, is what we think about ourselves, or – even better – our lack of thinking critically 
about our own position.19 The issue of thinking about inclusion is thinking theologically 
about ourselves in ways that eliminate the distinction between people with and without 
disabilities. The question to ask is, quite frankly, a very simple one: what in the eyes of God 
18 Miles, M. 2007. Islam, Disability and Deafness: A Modern and Historical Bibliography, with Introduction 
and Annotation. Online at: http://www.abdn.ac.uk/cshad/documents/ISLAM-DISAB-BibAbdn-070723.pdf 
[Accessed: 10 May 2011].
19 Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 43-44.
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that are not so marked. To raise the question is to answer it. Theologically speaking, there 
is no difference. To identify a disabling condition and distinguish it from other conditions 
is relevant for all sorts of practical purposes. From a religious point of view, however, the 
distinction between people with and without disabilities is irrelevant. 
the meanIng of dIsabIlIty20
To provide the argument for this claim, I propose to look in more detail at the religious 
meaning ascribed to disability. In the literature on theology and disability you find authors 
from various religious traditions emphatically denying that people with disabilities are 
defective human beings in the eyes of God. But of course, one has reason to deny only 
what other people affirm. As a matter of fact, many religious people do believe that disabled 
people are defective human beings and that their disability can be taken as proof. “Rabbi, 
tell us, who sinned so that this man was born blind?” Even the Gospel implies the belief 
that connects disability with divine judgment.21 This view, which I will call the view of 
popular religion, holds that there must be something wrong with disabled persons, because 
if not, why are they disabled? One way to respond to this view is to dismiss it absolutely 
out of hand as religious bigotry, but I think that would be a mistake. It warrants critical 
reflection, because it may tell us something important about Christian beliefs.
So let us look in more detail at the religious meanings ascribed to disability, for which 
I will concentrate exclusively on the Christian tradition. As the earlier quote from Nancy 
Eiesland already indicated, there are both negative and positive meanings. On the negative 
side, disability has been named a curse, a punishment for sins committed, either by the 
disabled person herself or by others, a lack of faith, a sign of imperfection, or a blemish that 
renders this person unfit to approach God in worship. In view of these negative responses, 
people tell us that they have caused them to consider withdrawing from the Christian 
Church altogether. Wounded people come to a community looking for consolation, only 
to find judgment, which is about the opposite of what they had hoped to find.22 The 
same is experienced by students in institutions for higher education in theology who 
are refused because they are deemed unfit, either for Church ministry or for theological 
research.23Among the positive responses are those that call disability a blessing, or a special 
token of God’s love, or an opportunity for spiritual growth. Disabled children have been 
called “holy innocents”, God’s “little ones”; they have also been referred to as “the poor” – as 
in the Beatitudes.24
20 This section and the following contains materials from Reinders, H. S. 2011. Is There Meaning and Disability? Or 
Is It the Wrong Question? Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 15(1):62-69. 
21 In the present case I am referring, of course, to the Gospel of John, chapter 9.
22 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 11-13.
23 Anderson, R. C. (ed.). 2003. Graduate Theological Education and the Human Experience of Disability. Binghamton, NY: 
Haworth.
24 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 16.
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While such positively intended comments seem to forestall explanations of divine 
judgment as an affront, they are nonetheless to be rejected. Whether a curse or a blessing, 
the underlying assumption in both types of responses is that disability is a special condition 
of being human. But in my view the language of “special” is suspect. One finds it in standard 
phrases such as “special needs” and “special education”, or “Special Olympics”, all of which 
share the same implication: “special” refers to people excluded from mainstream society. 
The language of “special” predicates a culturally mediated dichotomy: there is “special” 
as distinct from “general”, there is “abnormal” as distinct from “normal”, each of which 
reflects the basic opposition: there is “disabled” as distinct from “non-disabled”.25 One 
way or another, positive or negative responses to disability as a special condition are to 
be criticised for being indebted to patterns of exclusion. Whether God has blessed you or 
punished you, in both cases you are set aside from his other creatures about whom such 
verdicts are usually not communicated. That is what is wrong with them. 
Looking at the issue in this way, it seems that the very act of ascribing religious meaning 
to disability must be inevitably suspect. Each and every attempt to do so depends on the 
assumption that disability is a special problem that needs a special answer. In view of this 
consideration, the theological question begins to take a more definite shape. Does what we 
want to say about disability, theologically speaking, have anything to do with ‘meaning’? 
It cannot be denied that religion has reinforced social stigma, even when this may not 
be the only thing it has done. God has too often been perceived as being on the side of 
‘normal’ people, represented by ‘us’, leaving anybody perceived as ‘abnormal’ out, meaning 
‘them’. Whatever religious responses have contributed to the experience of people with 
disabilities, therefore, empowering them in living their daily lives has very rarely been part 
of it. So the question before us is what theological reflection has to say to people with 
disabilities that does not set them apart from the rest of humanity?
rethInkIng provIdence
As indicated above, I suggest that the answer starts with reflecting critically upon the 
controlling theological framework underlying religious beliefs. Here I will focus on the 
implicit reference to providence in the responses listed above. Whether it is termed a ‘curse’ 
or a ‘blessing’, in both cases the occurrence of disability is obviously attributed to the divine 
will. Because it implies that nothing happens in the world that people do not somehow 
deserve, this attribution introduces the notion of a divinely governed universe. The pattern 
is apparent in the disciples’ question in the Gospel of John already referred to: “Rabbi, 
tell us, who sinned that this man was born blind?” The question in itself presupposes a 
moral geometry that regards the occurrence of disability in terms of culpability or merit. 
According to this presupposition, the universe is governed in such a way that for every bad 
result there must be a bad cause, and, conversely, for every good result there must be a good 
25 Criticising this dichotomy, disability studies scholars have coined the phrase of “temporarily able bodied” to 
indicate that “disability”, in some form or other, is part of the human condition. It does not contradict the human 
condition, as the dichotomising distinctions suggest.
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disobedience to God for which you are punished with a disability.
It can be shown that this theology is in fact highly implausible, however. In fact, it can 
only be maintained by people who forget to ask about their own location in the scheme 
of universal retribution. To believe that God may send disabling conditions upon people 
to punish them for their wrongdoings is implausible, because it is hard to see that their 
wrongdoings exceed mine, or yours, for that matter. Since we have not been punished 
similarly, the conclusion should follow that divine justice is in fact a mockery. If it were 
true that God sends disabling conditions upon some but not on others, this would mean 
that in distributing good and evil, his will works about as randomly as chance and fortune 
do. In fact, this implication would render the very notion of a divine will meaningless. 
A divine will that as such is indistinguishable from chance or fortune cannot be a divine 
will in any meaningful sense of the term. Of course, it can be argued that this consideration 
is a persuasive reason to abandon the belief in a divine will, which it might well be. But it 
can hardly be a reason for those who implicate their belief in a divine will by attributing 
the occurrence of disability to it.
There is a second argument, however, why attributing disability to divine judgment is 
implausible. This argument appears when we bring to light another presupposition. The 
belief that good things happen to good people and that therefore – on the assumption that 
disability is not a good thing – people with disabilities cannot be good, presupposes in fact 
that there is no contingency in our lives. If whatever happens to people happens because 
of a divinely controlled moral geometry, there is no logical space left for contingency. It 
could never be true that some things just happen for no reason at all. Without contingency, 
however, religious believers could never be uncertain about God’s will, for then would be 
nothing occurring in their lives that would not be his will. Consequently, they could never 
be in the dark about why God commands that bad things happen to good people. As a 
matter of fact, it would be hard to explain how bad things can be bad if God wills them, 
nor would it be easy to explain how good people can be good if God judges them to deserve 
such things.
The understanding of providence that eliminates contingency from its picture of the 
universe is implausible, because it has been experienced by all people of all times that their 
moral equations do not add up. Too often people who deserve to be punished walk away 
freely. And too often people have been hit undeservingly by life’s contingencies. The cry 
for a providential God is most intensely felt precisely at those moments when life seems to 
turn against us. So it is rather because of the overwhelming force of life’s contingencies that 
questions about divine justice arise. The Dutch anthropologist Van Baal writes accordingly:
Man experiences his universe as a universe full of intentions, a universe which 
holds a claim on him, addressing him with something undefined, urging him to 
act or to be in some way or another. The experience is strongest in moments of 
crisis, when events turn up with such an overwhelming force that it is as if they 
address their victim, delivering a message to him.26
26 Van Baal, J. n.d. Providence. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Online at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/47249/J-van-Baal [Accessed: 6 August 2008].
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If it were not for this experience – the experience of existential crisis – the Book of Psalms 
would not exist. Crying out for God’s help in the feeling of abandonment at one moment, the 
Psalmist exalts in God’s praise in the next, reassuring himself that he will not be forsaken. 
Providence is what you need in the face of being swept off your feet by life’s contingencies. 
Put differently, it is the benumbing experience of moral perplexity, trying to find God in his 
absence, rather than the supposition of a moral geometry that invokes the ‘why?’ question.
When we bring both these arguments together, we see that they both point in the same 
direction. Attributing the things people have to face in their lives to the divine will is 
only plausible as long as one leaves oneself out the picture. One will refrain from such 
attribution as soon as one ponders the things happening in one’s own life, for it will be 
very hard to ‘read’ these things consistently in terms of punishments and rewards. These 
considerations are sufficient to conclude that the connection between disability and divine 
judgment cannot stand the test of critical reflection. We will resist making this connection 
as soon as we bring our own location in the scheme of divine justice into the equation.
At this point we see why thinking theologically about disability is first of all a question 
of proper self-knowledge. The claim that when people with disability suffer, they usually 
suffer from what ‘we’ – to the extent that we distinguish ourselves from ‘them’ – think 
about ourselves, can now be reformulated theologically. When people with disabilities 
suffer, they usually suffer from the fact that others fail to see that they are in exactly the 
same place in the eyes of God. Coram Deo there is no difference between human beings. His 
judgment as well as his grace rests equally upon each and every one of us. The question of 
whether disability has to do with divine judgment becomes implausible as soon as I realise 
that my own position before him is not different from yours, regardless of the state or 
condition of either one of us.
The same argument holds against the view that puts people with disabilities in a privileged 
position, as occurs in the positively intended religious responses that I mentioned before. 
Surely people with disabilities are special in the eyes of God, but not in the sense that they 
are more special than you or me, or anybody else for that matter. There is no justification 
for setting people apart, therefore – at least not in Judaism, Islam or Christianity. In the end 
the argument against ascribing a religious meaning to the occurrence of disability in terms 
of either culpability or merit rests on a simple mistake. The mistake is namely that of seeing 
the existence of people with disabilities as the exception to a divine rule – the rule that as 
his creatures we stand in equal relationship to him – that is what is wrong with this view.
human dIgnIty
If this is true, then the foregoing arguments have important implications for thinking 
theologically about human dignity as well. If we ponder the question of what human 
dignity is and on what grounds the respect demanded for it can be justified, we soon 
come across the idea that human dignity is based on our distinct human capacities. But 
this view cannot be true, for it is precisely the distinct human capacities that render us 
unequal. There is a huge difference in human individuals when it comes to their potential 
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completely absent, as in some persons with profound intellectual disability. But also in 
other cases, such as elderly persons with dementia, or persons with chronic mental disease, 
the view that grounds their dignity in their capacities in fact undermines the moral claim 
to respect. What reason do we have to respect people because of particular capacities, if it 
happens to be the case that they do not possess these capacities?27
A theological reflection along the lines I laid out in the foregoing sections, however, 
immediately clarifies at least this one point. Human dignity is conferred upon each and 
every one of us because of our equal relationship with God. It is not the relationship 
we have with him by virtue of our distinctive capacities, as the theological tradition in 
Christianity has often maintained,28 but the relationship he has with us as his creatures 
that grounds our dignity. In other words, human dignity is dignitas aliena, as Martin Luther 
had it. If it is true – as I have argued – that people stand equal before God because there is 
no difference between them as his creatures, then human dignity is a creaturely notion. It is 
conferred upon human being by the grace of God in which all share equally.
Finally, I would like to suggest that this theological account of human dignity has a very 
important ethical implication as well. It is best explained by comparing secular arguments 
referring to human dignity in the public domain. In the public domain we find human 
dignity claimed as commanding the respect for our fellow human beings that guarantees 
them equal moral standing as equal citizens. Important as this is for public morality, the 
theological account of human dignity pulls in a different direction. If the theological basis 
for human dignity lies in the fact that God bestows on all his creatures – with or without 
disabilities – his loving kindness, then it is hard to deny that he expects his creatures to 
do the same. 
People with disabilities face some hardships in life. To the extent that these hardships 
are caused or reinforced by how other people treat them, it is incumbent upon Christians 
to support them, so that they regain trust in their lives. That is what their stories tell us. 
There can be any number of ways to regain trust, of course, but from a Christian point 
of view there is no way to regain trust in life that does not proceed from God, and the 
same holds true for Judaism and Islam as well. Not because in turning to God one finds all 
the answers. As human beings we do not always understand the divine will. Many things 
happen in our lives that we do not understand. Life hits us at times with its contingencies, 
and we do not have answers as to why that is. But instead of being a reason for despair, it 
does not matter, ultimately. According to the Christian tradition, Christ promised that his 
Spirit will be with those who find faith and hope in his life. If they turn to God, it is not 
because of the answers, but because of the promise that he will be with them in their times 
of despair. The Spirit of divine love – the Paraclete, as the Gospel of John says – will help 
people to regain trust in the midst of experiencing hardships because it will unite them 
with others. That is what the Spirit does; it forges the bonds of friendship by inspiring 
people to embody loving kindness toward one another. The gift of the Spirit is to open our 
eyes to the possibility of friendship.
27 On this question, see Hans S. Reinders, 2006. Human Dignity in the Absence of Agency. In Soulen, K. and 
Woodhead, L. (eds), God and Human Dignity. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 121-39.
28 See Reinders, Receiving the Gift of Friendship, 229-31.
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Hope, vulnerability and disability?
A theological perspective
Nico Koopman1
IntroductIon
This chapter attempts to offer a cursory, but hopefully nuanced, description of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is firstly described in terms of the threat of unfulfilled needs. Humans are 
always under the threat that our physical, social and spiritual or teleological needs might 
not be met. The second dimension of vulnerability is that of suffering. Where our needs are 
not met, we experience various forms of suffering, namely physical, social and teleological. 
Disability is discussed as a specific expression of vulnerability. Two major responses to 
vulnerability will be discussed, namely anxiety and hope. Over against anxiety as a way of 
dealing with vulnerability, the Christological hope of the heavenly solidarity of the cross 
of Christ, and the expectation of renewal of the resurrection of Christ, are suggested as 
a faithful response to vulnerability. This hope is described as realistic hope, responsible 
hope and resilient hope. Throughout the paper a distinction is made between the general 
vulnerability to which all human beings are exposed, and the specific vulnerabilities that 
specific humans (people with disabilities) live with.
on VulnerAbIlIty
The notion of vulnerability is used in a variety of ways. Vulnerability firstly means that we 
are at risk and face the threat to suffer. We are predisposed to various forms of suffering. 
We are frail and fragile and can easily be wronged and hurt. Theologian Thomas Reynolds2 
refers to the root meaning of vulnerability to illustrate this point. Vulnerability derives 
from the Latin word vulnerare, to injure and harm, and to be open to be wounded, or in my 
words, to be under the threat of, and be predisposed to, being hurt and wounded. Secondly, 
vulnerability refers to our actual and concrete suffering in a variety of forms.
1 Nico Koopman is Professor of Systematic Theology, Dean of the Faculty of Theology and Director of the Beyers 
Naudé Centre for Public Theology at Stellenbosch University. The ideas and arguments in this article build 
upon, advance and appropriate previous work of the author on related themes. See, for instance, Koopman, N. 
2009. Endgültige Heilung? Vorläufige Heilung? Fürsorge? Christliche Hoffnung und Krankheit. In Thomas, G. 
and Karle, I. (eds), Krankheitsdeutung in der postsäkularen Gesellschaft. Theologische Ansätze im interdisziplinären Gespräch. 
Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 393‑407; Koopman, N. 2003. The dis(otherly)‑abled and public morality. Scriptura 
1(82):72‑81.
2 Reynolds, T. E. 2008. Vulnerable Communion. A Theology of Disability and Hospitality. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 108.
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living might not be met. Three types of needs need to be addressed in order to avoid severe 
suffering and to experience a life of dignity.
Psychologist Abraham Maslow and, in line with his thinking, Dutch social scientist Rob 
Buitenweg, identify three sets of basic human needs to be addressed in order for humans 
to flourish. The first set of needs pertains to our physical needs, namely the need for goods 
such as housing, food, water, clothing, medical care and education. Our vulnerability with 
regard to the fulfilment of these needs might be called physical vulnerability. 
The second set of needs refers to our need for safety and security, and also the need to 
participate in different spheres of life, including the political and economical domains. 
Living in communion with others and not being alienated and excluded are central aspects 
of the fulfilment of this second set of needs. The predisposition to the non‑fulfilment of 
these needs might be called social vulnerability
The third set of needs refers to our quest for the freedom to actualise our potentialities and 
to render meaningful service to others. The fragility that we experience with regard to the 
fulfilment of these needs can be termed teleological vulnerability, since it has to do with 
the meaning-giving telos, purpose and aim of our lives. 
When these sets of needs are not met, we experience suffering in a variety of forms. Dutch 
theologian Bram van de Beek3 discusses the various faces of human suffering, i.e. physical, 
psychological, social, political and economic. Suffering takes on the form of homelessness, 
hunger and famine, dehydration, nakedness, illness, death, assault, violence, alienation, 
exclusion, political oppression, poverty. Suffering is intensified by the powerlessness to 
overcome forms of suffering such as severe poverty, illness and death. Van de Beek states 
that all forms of suffering, also the suffering of animals and perhaps also plants, constitute 
the violation of wholeness and shalom.
dIsAbIlIty As expressIon of VulnerAbIlIty
Our vulnerability comes to expression in multiple ways. The various disabilities with which 
human beings live may be one concrete expression of our vulnerability.4 Indeed, Alasdair 
MacIntyre5 explains that all humans face forms of disability and dependency throughout 
their lifespan. “This dependence on particular others for protection and sustenance is 
most obvious in early childhood and in old age. But between these first and last stages our 
lives are characteristically marked by longer or shorter periods of injury, illness or other 
disablement and some among us are disabled for their entire lives.” 
3 Van de Beek, A. 1984. Waarom? Over Lijden, Schuld en God. (Why? On Suffering, Guilt and God) Baarn: Nijkerk: G.F. 
Callenbach BV, 24-6.
4 Not all people with disabilities would regard themselves as more vulnerable than other people, nor would they 
be regarded as such.
5 MacIntyre, A. 1999. Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. London: Duckworth, 1.
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MacIntyre6 is convinced that Western societies, and I would add African and other 
societies of the world, attend inadequately to the depth of the challenge of vulnerability, 
dependency and disability. 
From Plato to Moore and since, there are usually, with some rare exceptions, only 
passing references to human vulnerability and affliction and to the connections 
between them and our dependence on others [...]. Dependence on others is of 
course often recognised in a general way, usually as something that we need in 
order to achieve our positive goals. But an acknowledgement of anything like the 
full extent of that dependence and of the ways it stems from our vulnerability and 
our afflictions is generally absent.
This illuminating description of the general vulnerability and general disability, and 
consequent dependency, of all human beings does not relativise or minimise the variety of 
specific vulnerabilities and specific disabilities, and the consequent unique challenges, that 
human beings have to live with. 
People with disabilities experience vulnerability in ways which are different from those 
experienced by the general population. If we listen to their experiences, we will hear 
the various narratives of risk, predisposition, fragility, vulnerability and actual suffering 
and wrongs.
People with disabilities experience physical vulnerability, as described above, in a specific 
way. Many, for instance, experience viscerally how buildings are constructed in unfriendly 
manner. Most of our buildings in South Africa do not cater for the variety of needs of 
people with disabilities. The conference where this paper was originally to be read had 
to be moved to another venue because the buildings of the Faculty of Theology were not 
adequately accessible for people with mobility impairments.
People with disabilities also experience social vulnerability in a specific way. At a recent 
conference I was saddened to see how people started to avoid those conference participants 
who were disabled. People with disabilities were excluded to some extent from some of the 
very important informal social interaction between sessions during conferences. This social 
exclusion is an issue across the board for people with disabilities, but may be especially 
acute for people with sensory and communication impairments.
People with disabilities also experience teleological vulnerability. They are to some extent 
excluded from opportunities to make unique, indispensable contributions. In a culture 
of economisation, commodification and the estimating of someone’s worth in terms of 
economic value, people with disabilities experience that their contributions are valued 
less, because they are presumed to have less economic value. In a culture of economisation 
these people often experience that they are not making a meaningful contribution. It is 
6 MacIntyre, Rational Animals, 1‑3. MacIntyre’s post‑liberal anthropology of dependent living constitutes a 
criticism of liberal anthropologies that are dominated by the idea of rationality, autonomy and independence. 
His work is, however, increasingly attended to in modern‑postmodern societies. I appreciate the fact that more 
attention is given to the notion of vulnerability and dependence in contemporary anthropological discourses, 
as well as in the work of philosophers such as Eva Kittay (see, for example, Kittay E. 2009. The personal is 
philosophical is political: a philosopher and a mother of a cognitively disabled person sends notes from the 
battlefield. Metaphilosophy 40(3‑4):606‑7 (607e27), and social theorists such as Judith Butler (see, for example, 
Butler J. 2006. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York, NY: Verso).
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indispensable contributions to the common good.7 It is consequently more difficult for 
them to live with the knowledge that their lives have meaning, purpose, telos.
AnxIety As response to VulnerAbIlIty
The very influential North American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr,8 argued decades ago 
that individual human beings, and even groups and nations, respond to vulnerability with 
anxiety. We struggle to accept our vulnerabilities and to live constructively with them. He 
even argues that we hide our anxieties in various forms of pride, namely the pride of power, 
intellect, morality and religiosity. This pride is often the cause of personal and public 
expressions of aggression and violence.
Another influential American theologian, Paul Tillich,9 identified three forms of anxiety 
that we as vulnerable human beings live with. His typology exercises great influence to 
this day, and in fact receives renewed attention in modern-postmodern societies with 
high levels of anxiety. These anxieties are the anxiety about fate and death, emptiness and 
meaninglessness, guilt and condemnation. We are sinners, and we have the status of being 
guilty, and we therefore face the risk of condemnation and rejection. We are finite beings 
who are exposed to the threat of fate, tragedy, contingency and death. The most severe 
form of anxiety is the anxiety about emptiness and meaninglessness.
Tillich argues that we simultaneously experience all these anxieties, which are inter-
related.10 Sometimes one of them is prominent, whilst the others are also present. These 
types of anxiety manifest in the personal biographies of individuals, but also in the 
histories of broader societies and civilisations. Up to the Middle Ages fate and death were 
the prominent causes of anxiety. During the late Middle Ages and Reformation period guilt 
and condemnation had to be addressed, and in the modern period since the Enlightenment 
the anxiety about meaninglessness and purposelessness has had to be dealt with.
Many people respond to vulnerability and disability to offer judgemental and condemning 
explanations of the causes of disability. These explanations often evoke the type of 
anxieties that Tillich refers to. People with disabilities in both the general and specific 
senses often have to face these anxieties. Often well-meaning, self-appointed people who 
attempt to make sense of their lives with disability evoke these anxieties. They explain 
7 There are two issues at stake here. First, it is true that some people with disabilities will not make the same 
economic contribution as other people, and it is an indictment that their humanness is therefore seen as less 
valuable than that of others. Second, despite some good evidence that people with disabilities are often more 
productive employees than other employees, social values and organisational cultures may create barriers to 
economic participation by people with disabilities who have a substantial economic contribution to make (see, 
for example, Schur, L., Kruse, D. and Blanck, P. 2005. Corporate Culture and the Employment of Persons with 
Disabilities. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 23:3-20.
8 Niebuhr, R. 1949. The Nature and Destiny of Man. A Christian Interpretation. Vol.2. New York, NY: Scribner, 161-213.
9 Tillich, P. 1952 (1961 repr.). The Courage to Be. Digswell Place: James Nisbet, 1961 repr., 37‑51.
10 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 53-9.
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that their disability or the disability of a family member is a matter of fate. This is simply 
how the dice have fallen for them, and they must make peace with that. Their disability 
might also be attributed to their sin and guilt, or the sin and guilt of a forebear, and an 
expression of their condemnation. These explanations of the causes of especially specific 
disabilities, as well as inadequate confirmation by society of the unique contribution to the 
common good made by people with disabilities, may contribute to a sense of emptiness and 
meaninglessness among some of them.
Anxieties experienced by both vulnerable people in general, and people with disabilities, 
might lead to despair, which can only be overcome by courage and fortitude that flow 
from hope.
Hope As response to VulnerAbIlIty
Over against anxiety as a response to vulnerability and disability, the Christological hope 
of the heavenly solidarity of the cross and the expectation of renewal of the open grave 
are suggested as a faithful response to vulnerability. This hope is described as realistic 
hope, responsible hope and resilient hope. This threefold hope perspective might have 
meaning for all of us in all our vulnerability, as described above, and especially for people 
with disabilities.
  Realistic hope
German theologian Gerhard Sauter describes hope in terms of a so‑called realistic 
eschatology. Sauter bases hope in the promises and actions of the triune God.11 Hope means 
trust in the good that God has promised and provided. Hope is rooted in God’s promises 
and through it in the confidence in God’s providence.12 Hope, according to Sauter, is not 
only based in the historical act of the resurrection of Christ, but more so in the communion 
with the resurrected Christ who is present through his Spirit. This communion with 
the resurrected Christ who, as One seated at the right hand of the Father, enjoys inner‑
Trinitarian communion, says Sauter, is the basis of our hope.13 This inner-Trinitarian 
communion between Father, Son and Spirit is why Christ is present with us, why we enjoy 
communion with Him, and why we have reason to hope. Sauter also writes about God’s 
hope.14 God waits patiently and tirelessly for us to put our confidence in his promises and 
acting, and for us to leave room for his redeeming activity. On this hope of God for us, our 
hope rests!15 Sauter bases our hope in communion with the resurrected and ascended and 
reigning Christ.
11 Sauter, G. 2000. Our Reasons for Hope. In Polkinghorne, J. and Welker, M. (eds), The End of the World and the Ends 
of God. Science and Theology on Eschatology. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, 211‑16.
12 Sauter, Our reasons for Hope, 211.
13 Sauter, Our Reasons for Hope, 212.
14 Sauter, Our Reasons for Hope, 214.
15 For a more extensive account of Sauter’s views on eschatology and the Trinitarian roots of hope, see his 1999 
publication, What dare we hope? Reconsidering eschatology. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity.
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Christ who is also the crucified Lord. On his cross we witness God’s ultimate identification 
and solidarity with vulnerable and suffering people, with people having to live with 
disabilities. In the cross of Jesus Christ God reveals Himself as the God of “com‑passion”. 
Some theologians would even go further and state that in Jesus Christ we meet God as the 
vulnerable God, even the disabled God. 
Realistic hope does not call us to a withdrawal from the world with all its challenges. Realistic 
hope sees the reality of this world, but also imagines and envisages new possibilities. Famous 
Brazilian theologian Rubem Alves also describes hope as realistic hope.
What is hope? It is the presentiment that imagination is more real and reality 
less real than it looks. It is the hunch that the overwhelming brutality of facts 
that oppress and repress is not the last word. It is the suspicion that Reality is 
much more complex than realism wants us to believe; that the frontiers of the 
possible are not determined by the limits of the actual, and that in a miraculous 
and unexpected way life is preparing the creative event which will open the way 
to freedom and resurrection.16
Decades ago, the German theologian Eberhard Jüngel17 argued that hope enables us to 
imagine what is possible in the midst of the old broken reality. Realistic hope enables us 
to consistently distinguish between current reality and envisaged possibility. Applied to 
the theme of this paper, we can argue that realistic hope enables us to acknowledge the 
struggles and suffering of especially people with disabilities, as well as the prejudices, 
wrongs and injustices against them. Simultaneously realistic hope enables us to imagine, 
envision and work for the actualisation of new possibilities where all people, especially 
people with disabilities, experience justice, peace and joy.
One also needs to emphasise that this realistic hopes resides in the reality of the presence 
of the resurrected Lord who is also the crucified Lord. Exactly the central Christian 
conviction that Jesus Christ had experienced specific vulnerability, suffering and even 
the ultimate specific disability of god‑forsakenness, communicates the hopeful reality of 
heavenly solidarity with people with disabilities. 
  Responsible hope
Responsible hope means that we give account of the hope living in us. And we give account 
of this hope by responding faithfully to God’s call to seek a life of wellbeing and wholeness 
for his people and all of creation, a life of dignity, justice and freedom. Responsible hope 
is responsive to, answers to, this vision of dignity. Responsible hope is also responsive to 
betrayals of this dignity, especially with regard to the most vulnerable in society.
Responsible hope comes to expression in the quest for justice for all people. Famous 
American theologian Nicholas Wolterstorff explains how exposure to suffering and 
wronged people made him change his mind.18 He no longer emphasised responsibility as a 
16 Alves, R. 1972. Tomorrow’s Child. Imagination, Creativity, and the Rebirth of Culture. New York NY, Evanston, IL, San 
Francisco, CA, London: Harper & Row, 194.
17 Jüngel, E. 1969. Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit. Evangelische Theologie 29:417-42.
18 Wolterstorff, N. 2011. Hearing the Call. Liturgy, Justice, Church, and World. Gornik, M. R. and Thompson, G. (eds). 
Grand Rapids, MI/Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 13‑14. 
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faithful response to the gospel, but justice for all, especially the most vulnerable. He makes 
justice to the most vulnerable – and for the purpose of this article, justice to people with 
disabilities – the acid test for a just society.
A society is just when all the little ones, all the defenceless ones, all the 
unprotected ones have been brought back into community, to enjoy a fair share in 
the community’s goods, and a standing and voice in the affairs of the community.19
Wolterstorff even reminds us of John Calvin’s statement that to wreak injustice on one’s 
fellow human beings is to wound and injure God.20
Responsible hope is concrete hope, active hope. Stellenbosch theologian and University 
Vice-Chancellor, Russel Botman, describes this responsible hope as hope in action. Botman 
writes remarkably about this hope in action.
When the scientist works with conscience to find a cure for cancer, we see God’s 
mission as hope in action. When people call for the forgiveness of the debt of 
“the third world countries”, we see God’s mission as hope in action. When an 
investor in North America conducts business as if the children in Africa are his or 
her own, we see God’s mission as hope in action. When a Cuban doctor goes to 
the poor villages of South Africa to reduce the infant mortality rate, we see God’s 
mission as hope in action. When a person in sub-Saharan Africa is trained to care 
for people living with HIV‑AIDS, we see God’s mission as hope in action. When 
a church opens its heart to the homeless, we see God’s mission as hope in action. 
When subjugated cultures find their way back into the church, we see Gods’ 
mission as hope in action. When communities opt for reconciliation instead of 
civil war, we see God’s mission as hope in action [...]. I know you want to stop me 
here, saying, “But these things are already happening.” I answer, “Precisely, my 
argument as well”.21
This hope in action compels all of us to work for the realisation of dignity and compassionate 
justice to all people, in a special way to people with disabilities. This quest for dignity 
and compassionate justice implies care for those with disabilities. It also challenges us to 
work for the fulfilment of human dignity and human rights for all, including people with 
disabilities. The three generations or dimensions of human rights, namely political and 
civil rights, socio-economic rights, and the right to develop environmental sustainability, 
all address the three sets of needs of humans. 
Responsible hope addresses the plea of people like feminist theologian Christine Smith, 
who argues that the plight of people with disabilities be addressed with a focus on 
particular individuals with their particular narratives in the context of human dignity 
and human rights. Smith pleads that the variety of disabilities be recognised and that 
disabilities and people with disabilities not be generalised and stereotyped, but that the 
particularity of not only a specific disability but also of the life of a specific person with a 
disability be heard, read and known.22 This plea for particularity is affirmed by a woman 
with a disability, who is quoted by Smith: 
19 Wolterstorff, Hearing the Call, 14.
20 Wolterstorff, Hearing the Call, 15.
21 Botman, H. 2001. Hope as the coming reign of God. In Brueggemann, W. (ed.), Hope for the World. Mission in a Global 
Context. Louisville, KY/London: Westminster John Knox, 80.
22 Smith, C. 1992. Preaching as Weeping, Confession, and Resistance: Radical Response to Radical Evil. Louisville, KY. 
Westminster/John Knox, 21‑30. 
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of mobility. Relationships. Community structures. Cultural/ethnic/racial 
backgrounds. Whether our disabilities are progressive or stable; whether they’re 
visible or hidden; whether they’re life‑threatening; whether they’re clearly 
diagnosed or mysteries to Western medicine; whether they cause us pain; 
whether they break up regular sleeping and eating patterns; whether we grew up 
with them or they were caused by disease or accident later in life.23
Responsible hope helps us to view the plight of people with disabilities as a common good 
plight. Alasdair MacIntyre pleads that the plight of people with disabilities be addressed 
as a common good challenge. He articulates this inclusive understanding of dependence 
as follows:
[...] consequently our interest in how the need of the disabled are adequately 
voiced and met is not a special interest, the interest of one particular group rather 
than of others, but rather the interest of the whole political society, an interest 
that is integral to their conception of their common good.24
Responsible hope enables us to relate the notion of care to the idea of responsibility and 
justice. Sharon Welch argues that an ethic of caring as responsiveness to others,25 as 
preventing harm and maintaining relationships, as Carol Gilligan describes it, is not a 
sufficient response to brokenness in the form of social injustices. She rather pleads for an 
understanding of care in terms of an ethics of risk. She describes the aims of an ethic of 
responsibility and risk as follows:
The aims of an ethic of risk may be modest, yet it offers the potential of sustained 
resistance against overwhelming odds. The aim is simple – given that we cannot 
guarantee an end to racism or the prevention of nuclear war, we can prevent 
our own capitulation to structural evil. We can participate in a long heritage 
of resistance, standing with those who have worked for change in the past. We 
can also take risks, trying to create the conditions that will evoke and sustain 
further resistance. We can help create the conditions necessary for peace and 
justice, realising the choices of others can be influenced and responded to, never 
controlled. Even if we prevent nuclear war in our lifetime, the challenge of 
preventing such destruction will also be faced by another generation. We cannot 
make their choices; we can only provide a heritage of persistence, imagination, 
and solidarity.26
An ethic of risk, according to Welch,27 entails that those who benefit from an unjust system 
are called upon not to be oblivious to the nature of their exploitation of oppressed people, 
to acknowledge this exploitation, to repent and converse, to be aware of the fact that our 
ancestors who were well educated, well-mannered, loving and kind people, participated 
in a mechanism of oppression, to overcome the inability to hear and tolerate the rage of 
oppressed people, to let go of the upper-class certainty of the right to control others and of 
the arrogant assumption of the universal validity of upper-class morality, to acknowledge 
the equality in dignity of oppressed people and to be open to developing a new identity 
in the light of the legacy of oppression without being afraid that this change implies loss 
23 Smith, Preaching as Weeping, 21-2.
24 MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals, 130.
25 Welch, S. 1990. A Feminine Ethic of Risk. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress.
26 Welch, A Feminine Ethic, 22.
27 Welch, A Feminine Ethic, 55-64.
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and self‑destruction, to share in the ‘dangerous memory’ of oppressed people that it had 
been a people of dignity and self-respect who had been oppressed, to be freed from despair 
in the discovering of injustices by participating in the heritage of courage and wisdom of 
oppressed people. 
Responsible hope is embodied through an ethic of risk, an ethic that proposes epistemologies, 
policies and practices that seek the actualisation of dignity, justice and freedom for 
all struggling people, including people with disabilities. Welch’s analysis provides 
illuminating parameters for discussing the pursuit of justice for people with disabilities. 
The needs of people with disabilities, therefore, need to be addressed in the context of a 
broader quest for justice. The plight of people with disabilities is specifically to be discussed 
and addressed in the framework of human rights discourse. It needs to be addressed in the 
framework of first‑, second‑ and third‑dimension human rights. This implies that their 
first‑dimension political and citizenship rights are to be advanced, as well as their second‑
dimension socio-economic rights, and also their third-dimension developmental rights in 
the context of the sustainability and ecological rights of the natural environment.
This brief discussion makes it clear that responsible hope entails that our ethos, our 
epistemologies, our individual choices and communal policies, as well as our individual 
conduct and collective practices should facilitate the expression of dignity, compassionate 
justice and freedom to all, and particularly to people with disabilities.
  Resilient hope
Resilient hope enables us to live with patience amidst vulnerability, fragility and disability; 
with courage amidst suffering; with fortitude amidst injustice and dehumanisation. Paul 
Tillich’s notion of courage and fortitude might be viewed as a manifestation of resilient 
hope. He pleads for a courage that is both ethical and ontological. 
Courage as a human act, as a matter of valuation, is an ethical concept. Courage 
as the universal and essential self‑affirmation of one’s being is an ontological 
concept. The courage to be is the ethical act in which man [sic] affirms his own 
being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential 
self‑affirmation.28
The courage that is an expression of resilient hope is the courage to be, the courage to act 
morally and to accept your being amidst many threats to that being. 
This courage to be is manifested in the realisation that I am part of a whole, that I can also be 
alone, and that I receive my courage from a transcendent being, in the case of Christianity 
from the triune God. And where I live with this courage to be I overcome despair which is 
especially the outcome of the anxiety of meaninglessness and purposelessness.
Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches argue that the virtue of patience is the most 
neglected and most needed virtue in contemporary societies.29 They claim that patience is 
the most neglected virtue in modern societies where the levels of addiction to hyperactivity 
are very high. Where people are aware of the presence and involvement of God in the 
28 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 3.
29 Hauerwas, S. and Pinches, C. 1997. Christians Among the Virtues. Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern 
Ethics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 175, 176.
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commandment, and the impatience of Cain, which made him become the killer instead 
of the shepherd of his brother, and the impatience which makes us desert our suffering 
brothers and sisters, because we impatiently think that if we cannot cure immediately, we 
can also not care patiently.
Joel Shuman identifies various virtues of care.30 The virtues of dependency and constancy 
are virtues of the receivers of care. Hospitality and presence are the virtues of caregivers. 
According to Shuman, dependence means to let one be cared for by the members of the body 
of Christ.31 He uses the phrase ‘letting the body be the body’ to express the fact that this 
care is not contractual, but that the body, according to I Corinthians 12, is constituted in 
such a way that its members live in relationships of dependence and interdependence. The 
essential nature of the body of Christ implies that its members give care and receive care.
Constancy, according to Shuman, is the virtue which means that Christians live, in the face 
of illness, suffering and death, in congruence (consistency) with the good life that we led 
before.32 It is the skill which enables suffering and dying people to look back on their lives 
and to be able to make sense of it, to be able to say it was worth it and we would not have 
it otherwise. In the exposure to these virtuous people others acquire these skills as well.
The virtues of the caregivers, which are the more active corollaries of the two patient 
virtues discussed above, are hospitality and presence:
Hospitality and presence are in fact not readily separable. Formally, at least, it can 
be said that hospitality is the name given to the virtue that enables us to welcome 
others into our lives, whereas presence is an expression of our willingness to 
enter into and share the lives of others. In this sense these virtues represent our 
willingness to share our bodies and our sustenance with one another.33
Although these virtues have a long history in the church, in modern times with their 
emphasis on efficiency, these virtues which take time and are in terms of modern managerial 
science ineffective, according to Shuman, have to be acquired through training.34 They are 
after all no longer integral parts of our lives. In acquiring these virtues we must be aware of 
the challenge to resist what Shuman calls the gods of the modern world, namely efficiency, 
hard work, success and the accumulation of private property, private wealth, private space 
and private time.35 Hospitality for Christians implies sacrifice. It means taking time and 
sharing space. 
Shuman’s thoughts provide liberating perspectives for the nurturing of resilient hope. 
Resilient hope is expressed in the quest of so-called abled people who practise an ethic 
of hospitality and presence, to seek caring justice with and for people with disabilities. 
Resilient hope is also expressed in the ethic of dependency and constancy of people with 
disabilities as they bear and resist wrongs. 
30 Shuman, J. 1999. The body of Compassion. Ethics, medicine and the church. Boulder, CO: Westview, 130-50.
31 Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 131-4.
32 Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 134-5.
33 Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 143.
34 Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 152-3.
35 Shuman, The Body of Compassion, 145.
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Resilient hope, with its building-blocks of patience and perseverance, fortitude and 
courage, dependency and constancy, hospitality and presence, enables us to care even 
though we cannot always cure. It enables us to survive in the most despairing situations. 
And this resilience paves the way for caring, penultimate forms of curing as expressed in 
our quest for dignity, justice and freedom, whilst we realistically, actively and courageously 
wait upon the dawn of the reign of perfect caring and curing – for people living with 
vulnerability in general (that is, all people), and for people with specific vulnerabilities 
and disabilities. 
conclusIon
As human beings we are all vulnerable. We are under threat. We are fragile. We suffer. 
In general we live with various vulnerabilities. Millions of human beings live with 
specific vulnerabilities and some have disabilities. These disabilities are expressions 
of the vulnerability of humans, and confront all of us with our own vulnerabilities. We 
are called to respond to our vulnerability, disabilities and dependency not with anxiety, 
camouflaging and violent pride, and pacifying despair. We respond with hope that is based 
in Christological faith and that comes to expression as realistic hope that stems from the 
reality of the crucified and resurrected Christ, responsible hope that actively seeks the 
fulfilment of dignity, justice and freedom, and resilient hope that is illustrated in a life of 
patience and perseverance, fortitude and courage, dependency and constancy, hospitality 
and presence amidst threats and practices of dehumanisation, injustice, oppression 
and despair. 
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Job, theology and disability
Moving towards a new kind of speech
L. Juliana M. Claassens1 
Probably one of the most daunting challenges facing people living with disabilities is the 
stereotypes and misguided perceptions regarding disability that pervade society today. 
One sees this clearly illustrated in the “Ag Shame”/“Siestog, foei tog”2 attitude that is 
epitomised in the image of the plastic girl with her blue dress and harness on her leg that 
one often sees in stores collecting money for children with cerebral palsy (most recently 
I have seen her standing at the SPAR across from the Paul Roos Gymnasium),3 as well as 
in the image of the superhero who, according to Leslie Swartz, is portrayed as “overcoming 
enormous obstacles to triumph over adversity in spectacular ways” (cf. the following real 
life examples cited in Swartz’s book Able-Bodied: “‘Men Climb Kilimanjaro in Wheelchairs’; 
‘Touch the Top of the World: A Blind Man’s Journey to Climb Farther than the Eye Can 
See’; ‘Beating the Odds: Beauty Queen with Cerebral Palsy’”4).
But perhaps one of the most harmful stereotypes is the numerous examples that portray 
disability in terms of monsters, evil or punishment. Swartz writes: “This is where club-
footed ghouls come in, and their surrogates, such as the monster created through human 
arrogance in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.”5 The message sent is, as in the case of the 
Hunchback of Notre Dame, that people living with disabilities are misfits in society, not 
fully human.
The Bible is not helpful in this regard. Religion has done more than its share in instilling and 
reinforcing negative stereotypes regarding disability. For instance, in Leviticus 21:16-23, 
1 Juliana Claassens is Associate Professor of Old Testament in the Department of Old and New Testament, 
Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University.
2 Colloquial expressions of pity in South African English and Afrikaans. 
3 The reference to “the plastic girl with her blue dress and harness on her leg that one often sees in stores 
collecting money for children with cerebral palsy” refers to a fundraising initiative that for many years was 
often found in shopping centers and that would be widely recognised in a South African context as a symbol 
of disability intended to garner sympathy. SPAR is a reference to a local grocery store in South Africa and Paul 
Roos Gymnasium is a boy’s school in my home town of Stellenbosch, South Africa.
4 Swartz, L. 2010. Able-Bodied: Scenes from a Curious Life. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 112-13. Swartz also writes: 
“A number of comic book superheroes are also disabled, such as Dare-devil, who is blind but able to use a special 
‘sixth sense’,” 113. Cf. also the essay by Kathleen McDougall. 2006 “Ag Shame” and Superheroes: Stereotype and 
the Signification of Disability. In Watermeyer, B., Swartz, L., Lorenzo, T., Schneider, M. & Priestly, M. (eds), 
Disability and Social Change: A South African Agenda. Cape Town: HSRC Press. McDougall notes that the reason that 
these two stereotypes are so problematic is that the “Ag Shame” image contributes to the notion that people 
living with disabilities are helpless and in need of support, whereas the superhero narrative “implies that those 
who do not fit the ‘superhero’ success mould are failures” (390, 392).
5 Swartz, Able-Bodied, 112-13.
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of the Hebrew word mu ˆm (“blemish”) that aligns with the idea that those who suffer from 
some sort of ailment or disability have restrictions placed on their ability to participate 
in cultic events.6 Moreover, the Hebrew Bible often uses language and imagery related to 
disability to denote some kind of negative quality. For instance, Isaiah 56:10 uses words like 
“blind” and “mute” as metaphors to denote the lack of leadership in Israel.7 But probably 
most disturbing is the way in which disability is used as a curse in the biblical traditions. 
In Deuteronomy 28:28‑9 it is said that God will punish the transgressor with madness 
and confusion of mind so that he/she will be like a blind person in the dark. This text 
is representative of the numerous texts in the Hebrew Bible that draw a link between 
disability and sin, viewing disability as a punishment of God. Rachel Magdalene outlines 
this problem as follows:
The theological idea that human disability, disease, and disaster stem from human 
sin is very ancient and continues to hold sway in some theological circles. This 
concept has contributed to the terrible abuse or total neglect of persons with 
disabilities and chronic illness in religious settings. Such theology remains highly 
problematic to those who experience disability, illness, or any kind of trauma, 
whether or not the subject defines himself or herself as a religious person, because 
of the predominance of such a theology.8
What is needed is a radical change in how we think, talk and act when it comes to 
disability, and specifically when it comes to a religious framework for disability. Closely 
aligned with the conference objectives that took human dignity as an important focal point 
in our discussion on disability, this essay will contemplate ways in which we can challenge 
stereotypes and learn a new kind of speech that values the capabilities and contributions 
of persons with disabilities.9 
To assist us in this endeavour, we will turn to the same biblical traditions that have been 
responsible for instilling harmful stereotypes. The reason for this is that it is vital to develop 
a different way of reading Scripture. In what Thomas Reynolds calls a “hermeneutics 
6 Creamer, D. B. 2009. Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 43. Cf. also Schipper, J. 2011. Disability and Isaiah’s Suffering Servant. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 63, who argues that “the list of physical blemishes that disqualify a priest from certain activities 
(Lev. 21:16‑23)” may have influenced texts like 1QIsaa that focus on physical requirements in terms of cultic 
participation. Cf. also 1QSa 2:11-22: those members of the community who have some kind of ailment, who are 
paralysed, blind, deaf, or have some skin disease, are excluded from the great banquet (Bailey, K. E. 1980. The 
Great Banquet. In Through Peasant Eyes: More Lukan Parables. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 90‑1).
7 Jeremy Schipper argues that the “Hebrew Bible separates its language of disability from the context of people 
with disabilities and applies it rhetorically to able-bodied people” (Schipper, J. 2006. Disability Studies and the 
Hebrew Bible: Figuring Mephibosheth in the David Story. New York, NY: T&T Clark, 68). These texts, though, tell us 
very little regarding the way people with disabilities really lived, but mainly that disability was regarded in a 
negative light and that people living with disability were victims of social stigma.
8 Magdalene, R. 2007. The ANE Legal Origins of Impairment as Theological Disability and the Book of Job. 
Perspectives in Religious Studies 34:23-60 (23).
9 In this regard, there are some exciting developments in the field of biblical studies that investigate disability 
in the various temporal and social locations reflected in the biblical text and employ the experience of people 
living with disability as hermeneutical lens to read biblical texts. Cf. e.g. the work by Schipper, Disability Studies 
and Disability and Isaiah’s Suffering Servant, and Avalos, H., Melcher, S. J. and Schipper, J. (eds). 2007. This Abled Body: 
Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies. Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
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of disability”, this essay will seek to resist particularly harmful parts of biblical text by 
identifying counter-voices that elevate and amplify a different kind of speech.10
In particular, this essay will focus on selected examples from the Book of Job that represent 
something of this movement of learning a different kind of speech when it comes to people 
living with disabilities.11 In the Book of Job one encounters some of the religious stereotypes 
regarding suffering, disease and disability common to the Hebrew Bible, which relate to 
the many stereotypes and misguided perspectives that people living with disability in 
today’s society have to face. In the Book of Job, though, one also sees glimpses of a counter-
narrative that moves toward a new kind of speech regarding disability and theology, 
particularly with regard to what it means to be human. These glimpses of an alternative 
way of speaking about theology and disability serve as encouragement in our own journey 
to find a different kind of (theological) speech regarding disability rooted in values such as 
human dignity, inclusion and hospitality. 
The Book of JoB and disaBiliTy 
The Book of Job offers a classic example of a person moving from able-bodied privilege to 
disability through a series of losses (children and possessions), including a debilitating 
disease.12 In Job 2:7‑8 it appears that Job is suffering from an unidentified skin disease that 
has a dramatic effect on his daily life – the stigma associated with this disease leading him 
10 Thomas Reynolds proposes that such a hermeneutical approach allows us to read the Bible against itself, 
according to which “texts which are themselves polyphonic or even contradictory” are carefully juxtaposed 
(Reynolds, T. 2008. Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality. Wheaton, IL: Brazos, 34-5). A 
good example of such an approach is found in the work of John W. Rogerson, who reads the image of the 
suffering servant in Isaiah 53 in terms of disability saying that Isaiah 53 read in this way becomes “good news 
for handicapped people, especially if they have been told by no doubt well-meaning but misinformed Christians 
that their handicap is in some way an outworking of divine disfavor”. He argues as follows: “The Old Testament 
speaks with many voices and is invariably at its most interesting when it appears to contradict itself and to 
undermine commonly held views. Part of the question ‘what does it mean to be human?’ is that from God’s 
perspective it does not entail outstanding physical appearance or perfection. God looks on the heart and, in 
the case of the servant, uses someone who has a physical handicap” (Rogerson, J. W. 2010. A Theology of the Old 
Testament: Cultural Memory, Communication and Being Human. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 184).
11 This essay does not intend to offer an exhaustive analysis of the Book of Job but will rather draw on selected 
examples that are suggestive of this movement toward a new kind of speech regarding disability.
12 And yet most of the major commentaries on Job do not read Job in terms of disability. See e.g. Balentine, S. E. 
2006. Job. Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary 10. Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys; Habel, N. 1985. The Book of Job. 
OTL. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster; Newsom, C. A. 2003. The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imagination. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press; Clines, D. J. A. 1989. Job 1-20. WBC. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson; Clines, D. J. A. 
2006. Job 21-37. WBC. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson. This failure of major commentators to address or even 
acknowledge the reality of disability with reference to the Book of Job is indicative of the silence and continuing 
marginalisation of people who live with disability today. In addition to the essays by Magdalene (ANE Legal 
Origins) and Raphael (Raphael, R. 2004. Things Too Wonderful: A Disabled Reading of Job. Perspectives in 
Religious Studies 31(4):399‑424) cited in this essay, one exception would be the essay by Hector Avalos in This Abled 
Body (Avalos, H. 2007. Introducing Sensory Criticism in Biblical Studies: Audiocentricity and Visiocentricity. In 
Avalos, H., Melcher, S. J. and Schipper, J. (eds), This Abled Body: Rethinking Disabilities in Biblical Studies. Atlanta, GA: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 47-60.)
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to the outskirts of society.13 
Even though it is true that disability is not necessarily connected to disease,14 and the 
writer probably would not have thought of his main character as facing the challenges of 
disability, in the case of Job, there are quite a few parallels with the experience of disability 
that warrant a “disabled” reading of Job.15 
What makes the Book of Job particularly interesting is that it offers us a first‑hand 
perspective of the challenges facing a person who lives with disability. In the Book of Job 
we see how Job emerges as a subject who insists on telling his own story. This act of sharing 
his own experiences serves as a means of challenging his able-bodied friends’ attempts to 
define Job and his experience of disability. We see, for instance, harrowing self‑descriptions 
of his diseased and disabled body (30:16‑19), as well as the social and physical isolation Job 
is experiencing due to his disability (30:1-15). One text is representative of Job’s anguish:
He [God] has put my family far from me, and my acquaintances are wholly 
estranged from me. My relatives and my close friends have failed me; the guests 
in my house have forgotten me; my serving girls count me as a stranger; I have 
become an alien in their eyes. I call to my servant, but he gives me no answer; 
I must myself plead with him. My breath is repulsive to my wife; I am loathsome 
to my own family. Even young children despise me; when I rise, they talk against 
me. All my intimate friends abhor me, and those whom I loved have turned 
against me. My bones cling to my skin and to my flesh, and I have escaped by the 
skin of my teeth. (Job 19:13‑20 NRSV)
In this description, something of the dehumanisation and rejection that people living with 
disability may experience is evident. The effect of prolonged suffering and the accompanying 
social stigma is devastating, so much so that Job even wishes that he had not been born (cf. 
also Job 3:3-16).16 We read, for instance, in Job 10:18-20 how Job rebukes God for acting as 
midwife at his birth:
Why did you bring me forth from the womb? Would that I had died before any 
eye had seen me, and were as though I had not been, carried from the womb to the 
grave (Job 10:18-20 NRSV).
13 Clines, Job 1-20, 47-8; Habel, The Book of Job, 95 This text furthermore points to the systemic nature of disability 
that is often linked to factors such as poverty and psychological and social exclusion. Cf. Emmett, T. 2006. 
Disability, Poverty, Gender and Race. In Watermeyer, B., Swartz, L., Lorenzo, T., Schneider, M. and Priestly, M. 
(eds), Disability and Social Change: A South African Agenda. Cape Town: HSRC, 219‑20. Emmett not only outlines the 
relationship between poverty and disability but also considers the impact of factors such as race and gender.
14 One should note that there exists a complex relationship between disease and disability. Not all disability can 
be traced back to disease and not all disease inevitably leads to disability. For instance, a person may lose the 
use of his/her legs due to polio, which then can be termed an impairment. However, if this person then cannot 
function in a social and/or working environment due to inadequate access ramps, this becomes a disability. 
This distinction relates also to the medical model versus the social model regarding disability. The medical 
model tends to reduce disability to a problem that needs to be fixed; an obstacle that needs to be overcome. In 
contrast, the social model rather focuses on the capabilities rather than the disabilities of a person, striving to 
remove those barriers that prevent full social participation (Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 400-1; Reynolds, 
Vulnerable Communion, 25-7). 
15 Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 401.
16 Carol Newsom (The Book of Job, 96) writes that “the intentionality of human existence, which expresses itself in 
projects and relationships and gives to life a sense of coherency, has been shattered for Job. All that remains is 
turmoil – incessant and emotionally charged events without coherent meaning – from which misery only death 
can provide relief.”
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The Book of Job moreover offers an excellent example of the stereotypes regarding disability 
that were highlighted before. So one repeatedly finds the notion that disability or disease 
is the direct consequence of sin. Particularly in the friends’ speeches, one hears the refrain 
that Job must have done something wrong to warrant the predicament he is in (e.g. Job 
22:5-11). Job resists this idea; again and again pleading that he is innocent and does not 
deserve the debilitating disease that he considers as an unfair punishment. Related to this, 
one encounters in Job’s response to his situation a harrowing description of divine violence 
(Job 16:8-17) – God is depicted as a hostile presence whose arrows, according to Job, have 
pierced his diseased body (Job 6:4).17 Within this theological construct, it is God who is 
held responsible for disability.
These stereotypes that occur in both the friends as well as in Job’s contemplation serve as 
a way to make sense of disability and suffering.18 However, such a theological framework is 
limited as well as limiting, and most certainly harmful to people who live with disability.19 
The Book of Job is interesting, though, as it already offers signs of deconstructing the 
stereotypical ideas that assume a narrow connection between sin and suffering. In her 
essay that offers a disabled reading of the Book of Job, Raphael argues that the friends’ 
convictions are so thoroughly undermined by Job, by God’s speeches and by the ending of 
the book that the reader is urged to query the traditional view represented by the friends. 
As Raphael argues: “to explain the suffering by finding fault with Job is to cling to the tidy 
worldview that the book seems bent on demolishing.”20
In the rest of the essay I will focus on two instances with reference to the Book of Job in 
which we see signs of the development of a different kind of speech regarding disability. 
I propose that these examples offer us the impetus to develop a new theological framework 
when it comes to disability as well as people who are living with disability. 
aM i a MonsTer?
The first example from Job that denotes the development of a different kind of speech 
has to do with the way monsters function in this intriguing book. I mentioned in the 
introduction that, in the cultural mindset, a connection is often assumed between monsters 
and disability. It is interesting that in the case of Job the main character expresses his 
17 Newsom, The Book of Job, 138‑9. 
18 Newsom describes the friends’ moral explanation in terms of the therapeutic, i.e. attempts to remedy and fix 
whatever they perceive as upsetting the cosmic order – as Newsom puts it: “Wickedness disorders. Prayer 
reorders.” Thus because Job must be guilty of something, he needs to turn to God in prayer, and all will be well 
again (The Book of Job, 127-8).
19 Reynolds formulates this concern as follow: “Whatever the intellectual merits of the theodicy question, it leads 
down a path with troubling consequences for thinking about human disability. Indeed, it trades upon the 
medical model and fosters a theological reductionism that equates disability with personal tragedy” (Vulnerable 
Communion, 32).
20 In this regard, Raphael points out that Job’s innocence forms a central theme in the book, repeatedly maintained 
by Job himself (9:15, 20) and reiterated by God in the beginning and the end of the book (1:8; 2:3; 42:7‑8) (Things 
Too Wonderful, 402-3). Cf. also David Clines (Job 1-20, xlvi) who argues that God’s viewpoint in the divine 
speeches does neither affirm nor deny the doctrine of retribution but marginalises it. 
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Tannin (dragon), Tehom (chaos) and the Leviathan, which in the Chaoskampft alternatively 
constitutes the object of God’s attacks.21 Job’s experience of his disease, and particularly his 
description of physical dismemberment, leads him in 7:12 to make a comparison between 
himself and the primordial monsters. He asks: “Am I the Sea, or the Dragon, that you set a 
guard over me?”22 
Job’s experience of his disease is that he, like the monsters, is attacked by God. Moreover, 
as in the stereotypes that have followed people living with disabilities throughout the ages, 
Job feels like a monster that is vilified and pushed out of society. As Raphael argues: 
Just as the monsters exist on the margins, before creation or in the still-chaotic 
sea, so also the chaotic (crippled) human body is ostracised to the margins of 
the social world (19:13‑20). His defeated body and isolation from human society 
make him a monster of sorts, on a small scale.23
The answer to Job’s rhetorical question in 7:12, “Am I a monster?” is, of course, “No!” Job 
maintains that he is not a dangerous monster that God should attack and dismember, so 
resisting society’s stereotypical characterisation of his condition (even though leaving 
intact the idea that disability is deemed subject to an attack by God). 
God’s speech from the whirlwind though changes the picture. The speeches offer a radically 
different picture of the way in which the primordial monsters and by implication also Job’s 
disability is understood. The divine speeches in some way alter the core presuppositions 
regarding both the monsters as well as Job’s disability.
One thus finds in Job 40 and 41 an expansive exposition regarding the Behemoth and 
Leviathan. Forming a central part of God’s speech, both these monsters are portrayed as 
powerful and majestic. It is significant that instead of destroying and dismembering the 
chaos monsters, God lauds these monsters as majestic – an integral part of God’s creation 
inspiring awe. For the greater part of these two chapters, the monsters take up the central 
place while the humans take a back seat.24 This focus on the monsters is employed to help 
Job as well as the rest of the community think differently about the situation in which Job 
finds himself. Raphael says it well:
The descriptions of the monsters take up and transform the vocabulary of Job’s 
experience. By the choice of monsters, the speeches draw Job farther along 
the path on which he has set out, rather than forcing him back into the neat 
categorizations of the friends.25
By presenting himself in terms of a monster, Job is voicing his own feelings of anguish as well 
as the stereotypes that prevail in the community. However, it also changes the discourse 
by giving Job’s experience a new meaning, moving “the monsters”, and by implication the 
21 Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 404. Habel, The Book of Job, 162. In Job 26:12-14, God’s power is denoted in terms 
of the slaying of the mythical sea monster Rahab. Cf. also Isa 51:9 (Rahab); Ps 89:9‑10 (Yam); Ps 74:13 (Tannin); 
Isa 27:1 (Leviathan).
22 Cf. Habel’s translation of “muzzle”, which enriches the traditional translation of “watch” or “guard” for mišma ¯ r. 
The notion of “muzzle” relates well to the idea of Job who feels that he has no voice (cf. 9:2‑3, 14‑30, 32‑5), (The 
Book of Job, 153).
23 Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 402-3.
24 Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 413.
25 Raphael, Things Too Wonderful, 423.
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disabled Job, to the centre of the cosmos, so celebrating their strengths rather than their 
weaknesses; valuing their capabilities instead of their disabilities.
This transformation regarding Job and the primordial monsters’ relationship to God does 
not change the fact that the Book of Job remains a complex book. Even though one sees signs 
of resistance, the book leaves intact the conviction that God, in quite a sadistic fashion, is 
responsible for Job’s suffering. Moreover, Job also does not take his protest far enough; 
ultimately he just wants to be restored to his prior position of able-bodied privilege.26 
And yet one sees in this movement of finding a different kind of speech in the Book of 
Job “glimpses” of an alternative vision of the world. This book offers us a means to start a 
conversation on the stereotypes and negative religious perceptions of disability, God and 
suffering that still prevail, challenging us to change the way we speak.
affirMing huMan digniTy 
A second instance in the Book of Job in which we find the possibility of a different 
kind of speech regarding disability pertains to the profound expression of vulnerability 
experienced by the main character. It is exactly Job’s experience of a debilitating disease 
and the accompanying physical, emotional and social effects of this disease that raise 
important questions regarding what it means to be human. In particular, I propose that 
reflection on the notion of human dignity might be valuable for the conversation regarding 
theology and disability.
The Book of Job bravely takes on what in today’s terms can be called “the cult of normalcy”. 
In the world of the biblical text the ideal of the good life was equated to health, wealth and 
progeny – all blessings that were directly linked to living an upright life. The fact that the 
main character, fairly early on in the book, loses all three of these blessings for no reason at 
all challenges the preconceptions about what constitutes “normal” or a desired life.
The cult of normalcy is everywhere to be found in our society today. Thanks to the media, 
Hollywood celebrities as well as sporting heroes, people have developed a fascination with 
physical beauty and perfection. As Reynolds writes:
Normalcy is made desirable and enforced in public venues as the standard. We 
see this illustrated on network television and in advertisements, novels and 
popular magazines. The ideal is held up as normal: the perfectly sculpted and 
athletic body presented as commonplace, even though it actually represents only 
a slim margin of thin people.27
26 As Carol Newsome argues: in Job’s mind there is no doubt that God as the Sustainer of the moral world would 
in the end “declare Job to be righteous and so confirm his honor” (The Book of Job, 196). At first glance it seems 
as if this indeed is the case in the conclusion of the book (42:7-17), when Job is said to receive twice as much 
as before: riches; a long life and many children. However, it is significant that the epilogue does not mention 
that Job’s disease was ever healed. Thus, while Job returns to a position of social privilege, it is not necessarily 
able-bodied privilege. In this regard see Jeremy Schipper’s article, Healing and Silence in the Epilogue of Job 
(Schipper, J. 2010. Healing and Silence in the Epilogue of Job. In Word and World 30(1):16-22 (21-2)). 
27 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 33. Reynolds reminds us that many of us “participate in the cult of normalcy 
and require ongoing transformation by God’s love in the context of human frailty. Most of us do”, 33. Cf. also 
Rogerson, A Theology of the Old Testament, 181.
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beauty products, health clubs and even cosmetic surgery to reach the impossible ideal of 
physical perfection and beauty, but even more serious is the pervasive message that they 
receive, i.e. that there is no room in society for anyone who does not fit the idealised vision 
of health, wealth and beauty.
In his book Eccentric Existence, David Kelsey pleads for another understanding of the human 
that is not based on people’s characteristics such as physical appearance, intellectual 
or sporting aptitude, or in the case of Job, wealth, health and progeny, but that rather 
holds on to the inherent dignity of a person that demands unconditional respect.28 Kelsey 
grounds this view of being human in the person’s “eccentric existence”, i.e. personhood is 
not rooted in one’s intellectual or physical capacities, but in the individual’s relationship 
with the Creator God, who enters into a special relationship with each and every unique 
person regardless of his/her ability, thus relating “to different kinds of creatures on their 
own terms”.29
This unique relationship is no more evident than in one’s own story of being created. Kelsey 
writes that “being born is a gift by the Triune God who is immediately and intimately 
involved in the process.”30 In the Book of Job we see this illustrated in Job 10:8-12, where 
Job invokes reference to his birth story when he addresses God in the following manner:
Your hands fashioned and made me; and now you turn and destroy me. Remember 
that you fashioned me like clay; and will you turn me to dust again? Did you not 
pour me out like milk and curdle me like cheese? You clothed me with skin and 
flesh, and knit me together with bones and sinews. You have granted me life and 
steadfast love, and your care has preserved my spirit (Job 10:8-12 NRSV).
In this creation narrative reminiscent of Ps. 139:13‑16 and Gen. 2:7, one sees an image of 
God that is intimately involved with Job – like a potter, fashioning him like clay; like a 
seamstress covering his frame with skin and flesh and knitting together his bones and 
sinews. The image in v 10 of God pouring Job out like milk and curdling him like cheese 
may have to do with an ancient understanding of the role of conception and gestation. 
Robert Gordis (1978) suggests that these metaphors denote the specific stages of the 
gestation process: “the embryo is fashioned out of clay, the semen being poured out like 
milk, solidifying like cheese, being clothed in skin and flesh and finally knitted together 
with bones and sinews.”31 
From the depths of his despair, and as a person facing disability, Job invokes these images 
of his birth in order to remind God of their close personal relationship. This relationship 
28 Kelsey, D. 2009. Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 289‑90. 
Kelsey warns that is dangerous indeed to judge people on their utilitarian value as history has taught us that 
people or whole groups of people can at any moment loses their status as persons, e.g., the Jews, Gypsies and 
homosexuals in Nazi Germany – not even to talk about our own history in apartheid South Africa. 
29 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, 256. He proposes a “theocentric concept of ‘person’”, according to which “human 
creatures are constituted as personal beings by God relating to them, rather than by certain types of creaturely 
capacities – emotional, moral, or intellectual” (291).
30 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, 250.
31 Gordis, R. 1978. The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation and Special Studies. New York, NY: JTS, n. 12, 522. This 
vivid description of a craftsman shaping and forming the embryo with care and skill on the one hand highlights 
God’s involvement in the prenatal process, but on the other sets up the “tension between God’s tender concern in 
the past and his ruthless destructiveness in the present” (Clines, Job 1-20, 247. Cf. also Habel, The Book of Job, 199).
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that affirms Job’s dignity as one of God’s creatures deserving of unconditional respect is 
not dependent on Job’s state of health nor his socio-economic status. Their relationship 
endures the loss of all these elements that traditionally were thought to be responsible for 
a person’s honour – including also by Job who views himself as cast out from his former 
situation of honour to the outskirts of society.
Within this relationship there is room for passionate disagreement. In vv 8‑9, Job expresses 
his bewilderment that God would destroy the work of his own hands, turning his prize 
work of art into dust. Within these words of resistance, one observes Job’s desire to be 
treated once more as a human worthy of respect – also by God, whom Job considers to be 
responsible for the situation in which Job finds himself. 
In the divine speeches it is significant that God affirms Job’s experience by employing birth 
imagery as well. However, God extends Job’s argument of the special relationship between 
creator and created being to include other entities as well. So God applies birth language 
to the formation of the greater universe when God is said to be participating in the birth 
of the ocean. We read in Job 38:8-11 how God, instead of acting as the ocean’s opponent in 
battle as in the traditional understanding of the Chaoskampf, rather acts as a midwife who 
assists at the birth of the baby monster called Sea and wraps it “in the swaddling bands of 
darkness and cloud”. Newsom describes the significance of this image as follows:
Wrapping a baby in swaddling bands serves to restrain its arms and legs from 
moving about and so to calm the child. Through this imagery both the traditional 
aggressiveness of the sea and the restraints placed upon it are taken up. But the 
image of a baby in place of a battle foe transforms the emotional register and 
introduces novel implications. The metaphorical filter diminishes the sense of 
the sea as a hostile, alien power and associates it rather with the vigor of new 
life. Moreover, the restraints placed upon it are cast in terms of nurturance and 
protection.32 
As in the previous section regarding the monsters, we see in this text how the traditional 
understanding of the ocean as symbol of chaos is taken up and transformed in terms of an 
image of divine care. 
In the divine speeches God is furthermore said to be intimately involved in the birth stories 
of the animals, acting as midwife to the mountain goats and the deer (39:1‑3).33 Even the 
ostrich, which is not known for its wisdom and leaves its offspring in plain sight to be 
trampled by wild animals (39:13‑17), is portrayed as created in a unique and special way by 
God.34 Habel writes how “the ostrich is a comic anomaly” that demonstrates the belief that 
all creatures have some sort of natural wisdom (ability). He writes: “She has no wisdom, 
32 Newsom, The Book of Job, 244. Habel says that “the image is deliberately absurd; the violent chaos monster is but 
an infant, born from a womb, wrapped in baby clothes, placed in a playpen, and told to stay in its place” (The 
Book of Job, 538).
33 Newsom notes that almost all the animals are chosen for belonging to the realm of the desert wilderness that is 
beyond human control, particularly the mountain goats and wild deer are contrasted to the domesticated sheep 
and goats, (The Book of Job, 245).
34 Marvin Pope suggests that “the judgment on the ostrich’s intelligence is understandable even if not entirely fair 
in comparison with other creatures.” He argues that the “peculiarities of this amazing bird are elaborated in 
order to suggest that, in spite of his stupidity, God looks after it and gives it speed greater than that of a horse” 
(Pope, M. H. 1973. Job. AB; New York, NY: Doubleday, 310).
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as the eagle’s do; she cannot soar like the hawk but her stubby wings rejoice (39:13‑18).”35
By using birth imagery in the divine speeches, it seems as if God is saying that God relates 
to different entities in a unique way: wild animals with different strengths and weaknesses; 
the sea as the quintessential symbol of chaos, and by implication humans on different 
levels of health, ability and socio-economic standing. This varied response that is rooted 
not in the individual’s intellectual or physical ability but in an intimate relationship with 
the Creator God has profound implications for how we think about disability.36 Kelsey 
rightly argues that “there is a great variety in the range of human creatures’ capacities 
for intentional responses to neighbors and to God” – including many individuals “whose 
relevant capacities were significantly limited at birth as well as others whose capacities 
have been damaged in the course of their lives”. However, as Kelsey points out: 
The theologically important point remains: human living bodies are unique and 
unsubstitutable one for another in the accountability each has for whatever 
response each is capable of making into God relating creatively.37
ConClusion
The Book of Job and its portrayal of the main character who is suddenly faced with the 
challenges of disability confront all of us with our own vulnerability and limitations. 
Reynolds puts it well: “For all humans are only partially and temporarily able-bodied. We 
are subject to limitations, suffering, and finally death – and at any moment.”38
 We are indeed all temporarily able‑bodied, “living”, as Kelsey (2009) so poetically expresses 
it, “on borrowed breath”.39 We are all faced with aging, and many of us have already learnt 
that our bodies are fragile and limited in a number of ways. Moreover, accidents happen. 
One moment a person can be healthy and on the go, and the next one has to learn to live 
with the challenges that disability bring. Jürgen Moltmann says it well:
There is no differentiation between the healthy and those with disabilities. For 
every human life has its limitations, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. We are born 
needy, and we die helpless. It is only the ideals of health of a society of the strong 
which condemn a part of humanity to being “disabled”.40
Realising our own vulnerability and accepting disability as part of human life will have 
the effect that we grant space to those who are equally vulnerable to also live their lives. It 
is significant that, by drawing attention to the wild animals and the sea that are all forces 
35 Habel, The Book of Job, 534.
36 McDougall (“Ag Shame”, 396) notes that one of the biggest problems with how people view disability is that 
disability is commonly understood (and portrayed) as homogenous. For instance, the whole spectrum of 
disability is often signified by the wheelchair user.
37 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, 274.
38 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 29.
39 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, 157ff.
40 Moltmann, J. 1998. Liberate Yourselves by Accepting One Another. In Eiesland, N. L. and Saliers, D. E. (eds), 
Human Disability and the Service of God: Reassessing Religious Practice. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 105-22 (110).
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and entities beyond human control, the divine speeches serve the function of extending 
both Job’s sense of self as well as transforming his understanding of just who are worthy 
of God’s attention.
Such a broader vision of one’s own self as well as one’s fellow creatures is vital when it comes 
to changing the way we think and speak and act towards people living with disability.41 
What is essential is that we learn, as Job had to do with the awe-inspiring display in the 
divine speeches, to value the “eccentric existence” of each individual by, as Kelsey (2009) 
puts it, “practicing delight in fellow creatures”. This entails “learning patience to give 
fellow creatures their own space and time in which to be themselves”.42
We said that one of the goals of our conference is to change the way we think, speak 
and ultimately act regarding people who are living with disability. As in the case of Job, 
this entails a long and often difficult process of learning a new kind of speech, taking up 
old metaphors and casting them in a new framework. Ultimately this process is neither 
peripheral nor optional. We are changed in the process. In the end, John Rogerson (2010) 
is right when he says that “we become more truly human the more that we accept others 
as being truly human”.43 
41 Gubela Mji envisions “a community where people with disabilities were not reduced to and defined by their 
disability” (Mji, G. 2006. Disability and Homelessness: A Personal Journey from the Margins to the Centre and 
Back. In Watermeyer, B., Swartz, L., Lorenzo, T., Schneider, M. and Priestly, M. (eds), Disability and Social Change: 
A South African Agenda. Cape Town: HSRC, 350‑60 (359).
42 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence, 349. Cf. Reynolds’ autobiographical excursus on love and what it means to grant space 
and time for his son, Chris, who lives with Asperger Syndrome (Vulnerable Communion, 112-17).
43 Rogerson, A Theology of the Old Testament, 193.
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Theology, language and  
human dignity
Hearing and seeing connections
Gerrit Brand1
Hearing tHe Deaf as a Language Community
The case I wish to make in this paper stems from my involvement with the Multilingualism 
Action Group (i-MAG) during the first few years after its establishment in 2003.2 I-MAG 
was established as an alliance of individuals and organisations seeking, through advocacy 
and community projects, and in the spirit of the language clauses in the South African 
Bill of Rights,3 to promote multilingualism, which can be defined as “more people using 
more languages in more registers and in more domains”.4 Central areas of concern for the 
organisation were the languages of instruction and communication in primary, secondary 
and tertiary educational institutions; the fair distribution of airtime on the television and 
radio stations of the public broadcaster; equitable language use in state organs such as 
parliament, government departments and the courts; and the interaction between different 
language communities in the country. The membership of i-MAG included speakers of 
most of South Africa’s official languages,5 but also advocates for other languages such as 
Esperanto, Nama and South African Sign Language.
Before my involvement with i-MAG I had thought of deaf people primarily as disabled – 
people who lack the ability to hear and who, because of that, cannot speak “normally” like 
1 The late Dr Gerrit Brand was Senior Lecturer in the Discipline Group of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology, 
Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
2 On the launch of i-MAG, see Multilingualism Action Group 2003. Media Statement by the Multilingualism 
Action Group (i-MAG). Online at: http://www.oulitnet.co.za/taaldebat/mediamag.asp [Accessed: 26 July 2011]; 
Multilingualism Action Group 2003. Constitution. Online at: http://www.oulitnet.co.za/taaldebat/multi.
asp [Accessed: 17 January 2012]. On the broader historical context in which the founding of i-MAG can be 
understood, see also Brand, G. 2009. The Role of “Europe” in the South African Language Debate, with Special 
Reference to Political Traditions. In Mar-Molinero, C. and Stephenson, P. (eds), Language Ideologies, Policies and 
Practices. Language and the Future of Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 58-75, esp. 75.
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996, chapter 2, section 6, pages 7-39 (8). Online at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf [Accessed: 26 July 2011]. The constitution 
gives the status of “official language” to eleven South African languages and demands, among other things, that 
“all official languages must enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equitably”.
4 On this definition of multilingualism, see Brand, G. 2003. Imagining a Multilingual Academy. Rethinking 
Language in Higher Education. South African Journal of Higher Education 17(3):26-35 (27).
5 Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Swati, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu.
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Like many hearing people, I thought that the signs in these languages were transcriptions 
of words from other languages such as Afrikaans, Xhosa or English. I had not realised that 
sign languages are languages in their own right, each with a distinctive vocabulary and 
grammar.7 Nor had I understood the implication that, for deaf people, learning to read 
coincides with learning a new language the sounds of which are, to them, inaudible and 
cannot, therefore, be easily associated with letters on a page.8 I had also assumed that 
sign languages were artificially designed, like mathematics or computer languages – not 
realising that sign languages are as much natural languages as any of South Africa’s official 
languages,9 and that therefore the differences between sign languages from various parts 
of the world10 had not resulted from a “lack of planning”, but from the very same factors 
that account for the differences between (say) French, Tswana and Papiamento, namely, 
spontaneous linguistic evolution.11
Most importantly, I learned to view sign language users (some of whom are not deaf)12 as 
primarily a language community, rather than a community of disabled people.13 There is 
nothing inherently inferior about languages based on signs rather than sounds, and like 
all languages, sign languages are celebrated for their special beauty.14 I learned that sign 
language speakers, like speakers of other languages, love their language, enjoy using it and 
want it to be respected15 – also to the point of advocating its recognition as South Africa’s 
twelfth official language and as an “indigenous” language.16 Since what they demand for 
6 On some of the misconceptions that follow, see Emmorey, K. 2002. Language, Cognition, and the Brain. Insights from 
Sign Language Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1-2.
7 Reagan, T. 2006. Language Policy and Sign Languages. In Ricento, T. (ed.), An Introduction to Language Policy. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 329-45 (330). Cf. Enabling Education Network (EENET) 1997. Services for Deaf 
People in a Rural Setting. Issues and Recommendations for Sign Language. Manchester: Initiative for Deaf Education 
in the Third World. Online at: http://www.eenet.org.uk/resources/docs/signlang.php [Accessed: 17 January 2012]; 
Perlmutter, D. L. (date unknown) What is Sign Language? Washington: Linguistic Society of America. http://www.lsadc.
org/info/pdf_files/Sign_Language.pdf [Accessed: 17 January 2012].
8 See Marschark M. and Hauser P. C. 2012. How Deaf Children Learn. What Parents and Teachers Need to Know. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 102-5.
9 Baynton, B. C. 1996. Forbidden Signs. American Culture and the Campaign against Sign Language. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 108-31.
10 See Baynton, Forbidden Signs, 108.
11 On linguistic evolution, see Emmorey, Language.
12 E.g. (hearing) “children of deaf parents” (CODA); see Padden, C. 2000. The Deaf Community and the Culture 
of Deaf People. In Adams, M. et al. (eds), Readings for Diversity and Social Justice. An Anthology on Racism, Antisemitism, 
Sexism, Heterosexism, Ableism, and Classism. New York, NY: Routledge, 350-1.
13 See Mirus, G. R. 2008. The Linguistic Reportoire of Deaf Cuers. An Ethnographic Query of Practice. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 
14-15.
14 Cf. Baynton, Forbidden Signs, 88-9. The celebration of the beauty of sign languages was central in the so-called 
“manualist” struggle for the use of sign language in the classroom against “oralism”, which insisted on the 
exclusive use of lip-reading and speech for teaching. See Baynton, Forbidden Signs, 4.
15 See Jokinen, M. 2000. The Linguistic Human Rights of Sign Language Users. In Phillipson, R. (ed.), Rights to 
Language. Equity, Power, and Education. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 203-13; Valentine, G. and 
Skelton, T. 2007. The Right to be Heard. Citizenship and Language. Political Geography 26(2):121-40.
16 Recognition of South African Sign Language as Official Language. Briefing of Deaf Federation of South Africa. 
Online at: http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070215-recognition-south-african-sign-language-official-language-
briefing-deaf-federation [Accessed: 26 July 2011]. See also Reagan, Language Policy, 331-3, esp. 333: “The 
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their language is not essentially different from what other i-MAG members demanded 
for theirs, there were very few obstacles to our working together for the common goal 
of a multilingual society. Deaf members participated in meetings like everyone else, and 
since informal interpretation was used in such meetings to allow everyone to speak in the 
language of his or her preference, the presence of a sign language interpreter hardly stood 
out. Together we attended summits, participated in debates, published press statements 
and met with people in the government and public institutions in order to state our 
collective demands.
seeing otHer marginaLiseD Language Communities  
as DisabLeD
At the very same time as I was learning, in that context, to view sign language users as a 
language community like any other, I was also learning, paradoxically, to view speakers of 
other marginalised languages as in some sense disabled – a wonderful instance of what the 
theorist of hermeneutics Hans Georg Gadamer would have called a “fusion of horizons”.17 
Whereas the politics of language, with its associated concepts such as language equality18 
and linguistic human rights,19 provided a lens through which sign language users could be 
viewed differently, the concept and phenomenon of disability provided a means by which 
marginalised language communities in general could also be seen in a new light.
Against this background it started to dawn on me, furthermore, that the concept of 
disability20 becomes virtually meaningless when applied to certain individual inabilities 
in isolation from their social context. Human existence is essentially characterised by 
inabilities, yet most of those in-abilities are not classified as dis-abilities.21 My regrettable 
inability to fly, for example, does not count as a disability. It is no more helpful to define 
the disabled as a minority, as if the rareness of a particular inability – like the inability to 
see or hear – is what makes it into a disability. After all, many inabilities that are relatively 
rare are not (or no longer) viewed as disabilities. Think of left-handedness – the inability 
to use one’s right hand as effectively as right-handed people can;22 or homosexuality – 
only instance in which ‘official’ status has been considered for a natural sign language is in the case of South 
Africa.” (I place the word “indigenous” in parenthesis when applied to certain languages, cultures or peoples 
in contradistinction to others, because of its scientific vagueness and problematic ideological implications. Cf. 
Boyarin, D. & Boyarin, J. 1993. Diaspora. Generation and the Ground of Jewish Identity. Critical Inquiry 19(4):699 
and 715.)
17 See Gadamer, H. 2004. Truth and Method. London: Continuum, xxxi, 217, 305-6, 337, 341, 367, 390, 533, 578.
18 On “language equality”, see Barua, J. 2001. Social Mobilisation and Modern Society. New Delhi: Mittal, 150-3.
19 On “linguistic human rights”, see Skutnabb-Kangas et al. (eds). 1995. Linguistic Human Rights. Overcoming Linguistic 
Discrimination. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter; and more recently Skutnabb-Kangas, T. 2009. Linguistic Rights. 
In Mey, J. L. (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics. Oxford: Elsevier, 537-9; cf. Jokinen, Linguistic Human Rights.
20 On different models for analysing the concept of disability, see Barnes, C. and Mercer, G. 2003. Disability. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
21 On “Impairment, Disability and the Body”, see Barnes and Mercer, Disability, 65-87.
22 Brym, R. J. and Lie, J. 2010. Sociology. Your Compass for a New World. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 411-12.
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the opposite sex”23 (not to mention philosophy – the inability to see the obvious without 
having to overstate it)!24
Therefore, to understand disability one has to realise that it is socially constructed25 – not 
merely in a linguistic or discursive sense,26 but also, and primarily, in the concrete political 
sense that the severe restrictions to full participation in society associated with certain 
inabilities are to a large extent a function of how society is structured.27 Many examples 
illustrate this. In a society in which it is strictly required of everyone to write with their right 
hand, left-handedness is regarded, and actually functions, as a disability, since it restricts 
many left-handed people’s access to full literacy. Similarly, if sign language speakers could 
use their language in virtually all domains of life, as (say) Swahili speakers in Tanzania can, 
their inability to hear would be much less socially restrictive than it currently is. (Imagine 
how “disabled” hearing speakers of Swahili or English would be in a society where sign 
languages were dominant.)
But does this not apply to every language that is socially marginalised? Are not speakers 
of such languages, in so far as they struggle to communicate effectively in the dominant 
language of their society,28 in some sense disabled? In this connection i-MAG has spoken 
of “the fact that language can be used either to limit or to extend access, participation and 
opportunities for the majority of South Africans who are poor and marginalised and do not 
understand English”.29 Perhaps one might argue against this comparison on the grounds 
that, since hearing people can learn to use the dominant language effectively, they are not 
condemned to the exclusive use of their mother tongue. Yet this does not distinguish them 
from deaf people. Many deaf people learn how to communicate through writing in the 
languages of the hearing.30 Some even acquire the ability to speak it audibly, although, to 
be sure, their pronunciation will always be markedly different from that of the hearing 
community.31 A small minority can effectively follow the speech of hearing people by closely 
observing the movements of their mouths.32 It remains the case, however, that such skills 
23 Singer, P. 2006. Foreword. Shopping at the Genetic Supermarket. In Rasko, J. E. J. et al. (eds), The Ethics of 
Inheritable Genetic Modification. A dividing line? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xiii-xxxii (xxi).
24 For a light-heartedly suggestive yet insightful linkage between philosophy and autism, see Martin, A. 
21 November 2010. Beyond Understanding. The New York Times. Online at: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/11/21/beyond-understanding/ [Accessed: 18 January 2012].
25 “Constructed” in this sense does not mean less real, just as the “constructed” nature of a building or a road is no 
indication of its ethereal nature. See Brand, B. 2011. Gender, Ubuntu en Geweld. (Gender, Ubuntu and Violence) 
Maandblad Zuid-Afrika. Online at: http://www.zuidafrikahuis.nl/node/237 [Accessed: 18 January 2012].
26 See Barnes and Mercer, Disability, 88-109.
27 See Barnes and Mercer, Disability, 19-41, 134-41.
28 See Brand, G. 2011. Culture, Power and Religion. Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 65(2):117-36 (126-7).
29 Multilingualism Action Group 2003. Media Statement. National Parliament Should not Regress on Language. 
Online at: http://www.oulitnet.co.za/taaldebat/magE.asp [Accessed: 18 January 2012].
30 Marschark and Hauser, Deaf Children, 108-10.
31 See Meadow, K. P. 1980. Deafness and Child Development. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 164.
32 On the principles and limitations of so-called speech-reading (or “lip-reading”), see Kaplan, H., Bally, S. J. and 
Garretson, C. 1995. Speechreading. A Way to Improve Understanding. Washington, DC: Clerc, 1-14.
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are only acquired with great difficulty, and that the exceptional natural talents required for 
some of these remarkable feats are by no means possessed by everyone.
The same applies to the predicament of linguistically marginalised hearing people. It is not 
the case that all, or even most, of them are in a situation where learning to use the dominant 
language is a realistic demand.33 In a society such as South Africa, for example, where 
English, the dominant language, is spoken as a mother tongue by a very small percentage of 
the population, the possibility of learning English through immersion in a context where 
it is used naturally is necessarily available only to a minority.34 A pool cannot be immersed 
in a drop of water. This means that the vast majority of South Africans try to learn English 
from other non-English speakers – very often a case of the blind leading the blind, to use 
an objectionable disability metaphor. Many, especially the poorest of the poor, who live 
in rural areas and informal settlements, acquire virtually no English at all, and where it is 
acquired, it is often at such a low level that hardly any doors to social mobility are opened by 
it. This is exacerbated by the use of English as the language of instruction in schools, which 
is extremely detrimental to academic development.35 Yes, a few will succeed admirably in 
acquiring the dominant language, and they will benefit greatly from it. But the vast majority 
will remain second-class citizens systematically excluded from meaningful political and 
economic participation.36 In the words of Neville Alexander: “An English-only, or even an 
English-mainly, policy necessarily condemns most people, and thus the country as a whole, 
to a permanent state of mediocrity, since people are unable to be spontaneous, creative and 
self-confident if they cannot use their first language.”37
Language DisabiLity anD Human Dignity
At stake here is a question of human dignity. In the ancient world the word dignitas 
(dignity) referred to a person’s place and role in society. One’s worth as a human being 
was determined by the status of one’s dignitas or social position.38 When the word dignitas 
was taken up by early Christian thinkers, its meaning changed radically. Dignity was now 
33 See Webb, V. 2002. Language in South Africa. The Role of Language in National Transformation, Reconstruction and 
Development. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 187-91. Cf. Park, H. 2008. Linguistic Minority Children’s Heritage, Language 
Learning and Identity Struggle. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 6-8.
34 Park, Linguistic Minority Children, 6. On immersion programmes in general, see Johnson, R. K. and Swain, M. 1997. 
Immersion Education. A Category within Bilingual Education. In Johnson, R. K. and Swain, M. (eds), Immersion 
Education. International Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-16 (2-3).
35 On the importance of mother tongue education, see Djité, P. G. 2008. The Sociolinguistics of Development in Africa. 
Frankfurt Lodge: Multilingualism Matter Ltd., 65-9.
36 See Brand, Culture, 128-9.
37 Alexander, N. 2001. Where English Can Serve but not Empower. Guardian.co.za, 11 January. Online at: http://
www.guardian.co.uk/education/2001/jan/11/tefl.guardianweekly [Accessed: 11 January 2012].
38 Soulen, K. and Woodhead, L. 2006. Introduction. Contextualizing Human Dignity. In Soulen, K. and Woodhead, L. 
(eds), God and Human Dignity. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Co., 1-25 (3).
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standing, but on the fact that he or she is an object of God’s love and concern.39
Douglas Lawrie has argued that humans should not always strive to be dignified, but rather 
undignified – human, earthly, bodily, dependent, small and vulnerable:
Always maintain your freedom and rationality? Never submit to or be the servant 
of another? Never obey any laws but your own? Avoid the monkish (slavish) 
virtues of meekness, pity and self-sacrifice? Never scream for help because you 
can no longer manage on your own? Never make a fool of yourself? C’mon, ‘ave 
a ‘eart, mate! Such doctrines are cruel, unnecessary – and inhuman. If we leave 
no room for human indignity, we deprive ourselves of the solace and succour of 
others, the joys of serving, rest from overwhelming responsibility, many forms of 
love, particularly sexual love – and practically all fun.40
I believe that Lawrie’s aim, which implicitly takes the cross of Christ more seriously than 
many appeals to human dignity, can be served without giving up the term “human dignity” 
– as long as that term is deliberately turned on its head, just as the use of words like “King” 
and “Lord” are used of the crucified One in ways that subvert their conventional meaning.41 
Precisely by speaking of human dignity in a way that runs directly contrary to the sense of 
autonomy, power and self-importance often associated with it, can those inhuman ideals 
be undermined.
Part of what is normally regarded as undignified is the kinds of dependence and vulnerability 
typically associated with disability, but also of other forms of social exclusion, like the 
linguistic exclusion that I have spoken of.
The idea of dependence on others seems almost un-American. Depending on others 
is foreign to our notion of human dignity. Human dignity means independence, 
much as national dignity is anchored in the Declaration of Independence. [...] For 
too many people dignity is totally incompatible with dependence.42
By contrast, several theologians43 have argued that dependence and vulnerability as such 
are not to be viewed as undignified, and can even be seen as profound expressions of human 
dignity. Friedrich Schleiermacher is famous for his analysis of religion as the awareness 
of “absolute dependence”,44 and of Christ as the perfect embodiment of such awareness.45 
Guus Labooy, a psychiatrist and theologian who has reflected deeply on psychiatric illness, 
maintains that, given God’s incarnation in Christ, dependence and vulnerability can be 
39 On interpretations of human dignity in early Christian though, see Soulen and Woodhead, Introduction, 3-8.
40 Lawrie, D. 2010. The Dialectic of Human Dignity and Human Finitude in the Psalms and the Wisdom Literature. 
Scriptura 105:608-20 (618). See also Lawrie, D. 2011. On Human Indignity and the Limits of Ethics. Scriptura 
106:81-92.
41 See Brand, G. 2002. Speaking of a Fabulous Ghost. In Search of Theological Criteria, with Special Reference to the Debate on 
Salvation in African Christian Theology. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 124-9, on the subversive use of a Christological title 
such as “Ancestor”, and its comparability with biblical titles such as “Lord” and “King”.
42 McCormick, R. A. 1994. Corrective Vision. Explorations in Modern Theology. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 171. 
See also pages 171-2. For a legal perspective on dignity as autonomy, see Jordaan, D. W. 2009. Autonomy as an 
Element of Human Dignity in South African Case Law. The Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law 9, 1-15.
43 Among them, the just quoted Richard McCormick; see McCormick, Corrective Vision, 171-2.
44 Schleiermacher, F. 1830. Der christliche Glaube nach den Grunsätzen der evangelischen Kirch im Zusammenhang dargestellt, 
2nd edn. Berlin, I:I, §4 (see Schleiermacher, F. 1999. Christian Faith. London: T&T Clark, 12-18).
45 Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, 374-424.
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seen as dimensions of the imago Dei, the image of God, in humanity.46 However, Labooy 
also emphasises that this should not be understood in such a way that the suffering of 
the mentally ill – and we might add: of the disabled and others who are excluded – is 
romanticised, welcomed or, God forbid, encouraged.47
I believe that, in order to understand dependence and vulnerability rightly, we should not value 
it for its own sake, but for its function within a broader, dynamic context of relationality.48 
The community of believers does not bestow dignity on its members and on every child of God, 
but is called merely to recognise, celebrate, proclaim and act according to it:
Our value as persons is bestowed on us by God. We have a sacredness and dignity 
that must be respected and can never be taken away. [...] We are given dignity 
by God. We do not earn of merit it any more than we determine its presence in 
ourselves or in another. Our role is not to say which person or group has dignity. 
Our responsibility is to recognize and respect the dignity that is already and 
always there.49
Indeed, the One who bestows dignity is God,50 and it is precisely because Christians 
regard friendship with God, amicitia Dei,51 as the only source of true happiness and joy,52 the 
primary determinant of meaning,53 that they also express their love for God by loving every 
object of God’s love.54
God’s love for us, our returning of that love (in so far as it occurs), and the love of neighbour 
that flows from it necessarily imply dependence and vulnerability.55 In this relational 
context dependence is the flipside of independence. It is precisely because your neighbour 
cannot be forced to love and befriend you – because he or she possesses the freedom and 
autonomy to embrace or refuse your love – that you are vulnerable in reaching out to 
him or her in love. This is not only an anthropological insight, but more fundamentally 
a theological one, because the God whom Christians worship is a God who, in unlimited 
freedom and power, chooses to reach out in love, thereby freely embracing the dependence 
46 Labooy, G. 2002. Freedom and Dispositions. Two Main Concepts in Theology and Biological Psychiatry, a Systematic Analysis. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 303-5.
47 Labooy, Freedom, 305.
48 See Schwöbel, C. 2006. Recovering Human Dignity. In Soulen and Woodhead, God and Human Dignity. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 46-56; Koopman, N. 2010. Human Dignity in the Context of Globalisation. In Boesak, A. 
and Hansen, L. (eds), Globalisation II. Global Crisis, Global Challenge, Global Faith. An Ongoing Response to the Accra 
Confession. Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 231-242 (231-3).
49 See Wadell, P. J. 2008. Happiness and the Christian Moral Life. An Introduction to Christian Ethics. Plymouth: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 77.
50 Schwöbel, Recovering, 49.
51 On this classical concept, see Van Asselt, W. J. 2001. The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669). Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 310-19; Geert W. 2007. Ruusbroeg. Literature and Mysticism in the Fourteenth Century. Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 133-45, esp. 138.
52 See Brümmer, V. 2005. Atonement, Christology and the Trinity. Making Sense of Christian Doctrine. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
23-37.
53 On “primary determinants of meaning” or “basic convictions”, see Brümmer, V. 1981. Theology and Philosophical 
Inquiry. An Introduction. London: Macmillan, 133-6.
54 On the relation between love of God and love of neighbour, see Brümmer, V. 1993. The Model of Love. A Study in 
Philosophical Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 206-14.
55 On what follows, cf. Brümmer, Love, 159-63, 166, 223-32.
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suffering, that God seeks, but the abundant love of fellowship with human beings,57 of 
which dependence and vulnerability – the possibility of suffering – is an entailment.58
How does viewing dependence and vulnerability as forms of the imago Dei guide us in 
dealing with the suffering of our neighbour? The very same love that entails dependence 
and vulnerability will drive us to “carry each other’s burdens” (Gal. 6:2). We are dependent 
on one another for love, and it is that love that seeks to bring relief and healing to the 
afflicted. In the eschaton (last days), the new creation prefigured in the life of God’s people, 
dependence and vulnerability will not be the occasion for senseless suffering, exclusion 
and violations of human dignity – i.e. of disability – but rather an interdependence in which 
true friendship can flourish. It will be a society, a theocratic polity,59 that is not structured 
to exclude and disable, but to include and enable, so that even the most humble members 
can have their glory recognised in the body of Christ.60
ConCLusion: impLiCations
I return to disability and linguistic injustice. The church – thus declares the Accra 
Declaration of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (now taken up into the World 
Communion of Reformed Churches)61 – may never accept existing injustices and denials 
of human dignity as unavoidable, for to maintain that there is no alternative amounts 
56 On God as “the One who loves in freedom”, see Barth, K. Church Dogmatics, Volume II. The Doctrine of God, Part 1. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, §28, 257-321. (Original German edition: Barth K. Die Kirchliche Dogmatic, II. Die Lehre von 
Gott, I. Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, §28.)
57 In contrast to Anselm of Canterbury’s answer (11th century) to the question Cur Deus homo (why God became 
human) – which focused on the need for satisfactio (satisfaction), i.e. for suffering and death on the part of 
humanity as compensation for having dishonoured God – Duns Scotus (13th century) saw the incarnation as 
flowing from God’s love, which by its very nature aims at reciprocation – with Christ, being truly divine and 
truly human, as the perfect realisation of the relational love intended by God; see Weiler, P. G. 2001, “Turm 
des Glaubens. Johannes Duns Scotus.” (Tower of Faith. John Duns Scotus) Cologne: Minoritenkloster (page 
numbers not indicated).
58 On the relation between the possibility of love between humanity and God and the possibility of evil (suffering) as 
it relates to the theodicy question, see Brümmer, V. 2006. Are Theodicy Arguments Convincing? In Brümmer, V.
(ed.), Brümmer on Meaning and the Christian Faith. Collected Writings of Vincent Brümmer. Aldershot: Ashgate, 229-34.
59 See Wolin, S. S. 2004. Politics and Vision. Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, 95-102, specifically 
96, where it is shown how Origon, as representative of an early Christian way of thinking, considers the 
church not so much as part of, or contributor to the polity, but rather as itself an alternative, and supposedly (in 
Origen’s words) more “quiet and steadfast”, polity – somewhat akin to what some contemporary theologians, 
deliberately taking leave of “Constantinianism”, like to call “a ‘contrast society’ to the state, a social body 
in its own right” (Gasgoigne, R. 2009. The Church and Secularity. Two Stories of Liberal Society. Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 47).
60 On empowering rather than dominating power, specifically with reference to divine omnipotence, see Van den 
Brink, G. 1999. Capable of Anything? In Van den Brink, G. and Sarot, S. (eds), Understanding the Attributes of God. 
Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 139-59.
61 See the WCRC’s website at http://www.wcrc.ch/ [Accessed: 20 January 2012].
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to idolatry.62 Therefore the church – expecting the “life in fullness” promised by Jesus 
(Jn. 10:10),63 and taken up anew in Irenaeus’ statement that “The glory of God is a living 
man and the life of man is the vision of God”64 – cannot acquiesce in policies, practices 
and structures that create disability, as in the case of the deaf and other speakers of 
marginalised languages. It is, to quote the title of Cornelius Plantinga’s Breviary of Sin (the 
subtitle), Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be.65 To see this is to be driven to activism and advocacy 
in society at large, but even more important is that the culture, practices and structures of 
the church itself as a community should reflect the conviction that there is, and must be, 
alternatives, and that they will include greater practical recognition of what is God’s own 
cause of human dignity.
I close with a quotation from St. Methodius (also known as St. Constantine), a 9th- century 
bishop who, together with his brother St. Cyril, initiated the Christianisation of the Slavs, 
but also developed the Cyrillic alphabet.66 When the two brothers visited Rome in the 
year 868 to request authorisation of their Slavic liturgy from Pope Hadrian II, the question 
of whether the Mass could be celebrated in the Slavic tongue caused much controversy 
– even to the extent that Methodius was, at one point, deposed as bishop and the Slavic 
liturgy banned. Only in the year 878 was he restored as bishop and the Slavic liturgy 
officially recognised by Pope John VIII. In his defence of the legitimacy of the Slavic liturgy, 
Methodius wrote (and with these words I close my case):
Does not the sun shine equally for the whole world? Do we not all equally breathe 
the air? Do you not feel shame at authorising only three languages and condemning 
other people to blindness and deafness? Tell me, do you think that God is helpless 
and cannot bestow equality, or that he is envious and will not give it?67
62 World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC). 2004. Covenanting for Justice in the Economy and the Earth. Online 
at: http://warc.jalb.de/warcajsp/news_file/doc-181-1.pdf [Accessed: 25 November 2011].
63 See WARC, Covenanting, 3.
64 Quoted in Osborn, E. F. 2004. Irenaeus of Lyons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 263.
65 Plantinga, C. 1995. Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be. A Breviary of Sin. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans.
66 On this, and what follows, see Van der Linden, S. 1999. De heiligen. (The Saints) Amsterdam: Contact, 212.
67 Fishman, J. A. 1968. Readings in the Sociology of Language. The Hague: Mouton, 589; see Das, A. K. 2004. Minority 
Language Laws in the EU, Paper: II Mercator International Symposium, Europe 27-28 February 2004, A New 
Framework for all Languages? Tarragona, 1. Online at: http://www.ciemen.cat/mercator/pdf/simp-alok.pdf 
[Accessed: 16 January 2012]. My thanks go to Flip Buys for bringing the Methodius quotation to my attention.
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Between faith and doubt
Training members of disabled people’s  
organisations in Southern Africa in  
basic research skills
Leslie Swartz1
Part of the historical marginalisation of disabled people and, indeed, part of the wider 
pattern of the violation of their dignity has been their exclusion from various forms of 
agency in their lives. Disabled people are spoken about, their bodies acted on, their lives 
the subject of a socially sanctioned expertise which they themselves do have. At the heart 
of the rise of what has come to be known as the ‘social model’ of disability studies was 
the assertion that authority and, indeed, authorship of stories about disability needed 
to be wrested away from outsider authority (chiefly medical authority) and returned to 
disabled people themselves. It is a core ideal of the disability movement internationally 
that the world moves to a situation in which disabled people themselves are those setting 
the agenda in terms of what we know about disability and what we do to improve the lives 
of disabled people. Indeed, fundamental to any project to improve the lives of disabled 
people should be the core involvement of disabled people in producing knowledge about 
disability and creating an inclusive and enabling environment.
It is no coincidence that the language of self-representation in the disability movement 
echoes strongly the language of other movements which have also gained social influence 
in policy discourse since the 1960s. Disabled people are similar to women and black 
people, for example, in demanding to write their own story in their own voice, and it is 
hardly surprising that one of the founder figures of the disability movement in the United 
Kingdom, the late Vic Finkelstein, who had to leave apartheid South Africa because of his 
anti-apartheid activities, brought to the struggle for disability rights some of the language 
and style of operation of anti-apartheid work. More recently, queer theory and postcolonial 
theory have become of interest to scholars working within disability studies and vice versa, 
not least because all of these disciplines are concerned with issues of voice and ownership 
of knowledge on the part of groups that continue to struggle to achieve equal rights and 
equal dignity worldwide.
Given the enormous power of historically valued outsider authority to shape thinking and 
practices about excluded groups, all of the movements associated with these groups have 
at different times and in different ways rejected or attempted to contain and control the 
influence of these outside voices. For example, some black liberation theorists have argued 
1 Leslie Swartz is a clinical psychologist and Professor of Psychology at Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
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people. Separatist feminism has claimed not only that women must write and speak for 
themselves, but also that it is inevitable that even in relations between women and men 
sympathetic to feminist ideals, old established patterns of male dominance will emerge 
even when they are consciously resisted by both men and women. This re-emergence of 
male dominance will occur not necessarily because of evil or retrogressive intent, but 
because of habits of centuries of exclusion and also because of patterns of socialisation 
that have historically rendered men more comfortable with articulating their views in 
public, with taking up leadership roles, with setting agendas, while women more used to 
following others and working towards consensus. So much has changed in feminist politics 
and scholarships since the height of separatism in the 1970s that women’s authority and 
leadership is far less a contested and difficult issue than it once was. The same cannot be said 
for disability politics, where it is still common for discussions about disability to exclude 
the participation of disabled people, for planning about the world and its habitability to 
be conducted without thought for the engagement of disabled people. Disability issues are 
still seen by many as an add-on, a marginal matter or a luxury when we think about the 
kinds of environments – both social and physical – that improve life for all people. Despite 
the fact that disability is far more common than many people assume (and this assumption 
of disability as very rare is in part of product of the very social exclusion, isolation and 
hiding of disability that the disability movement seeks to end), disabled people continue 
to struggle to have their voices heard about issues that affect them.2
For the purposes of this essay, it is important to highlight three important strategies that 
disabled people have adopted in the context of broader development politics in low- and 
middle-income countries to increase the possibilities that their views and needs will be 
considered adequately in development processes. The first strategy is that of mainstreaming. 
Disability scholars and activists argue that any social development activity should have a 
disability component. Campaigns for better access to services and opportunities, ranging 
from access to clean water, to microfinance, to improved health care and education, to name 
but a few, should as a matter of course consider how disabled people can contribute to and 
benefit from any planned programme. It is partly because of this mainstreaming agenda that 
there has been considerable interest by disabled people and disabled people’s organisations 
in mainstreaming disability into the Millennium Development Goals, for example.
A second important strategy used by the disability movement (to the extent that a unified 
movement can be said to exist) relates to how able-bodied people should be deployed (if 
at all) as part of the disability and development agenda. The ideal in this regard would 
be for disabled people themselves to produce all knowledge about their own situation 
and to work on an equal footing with all others creating knowledge and contributing to 
change in the development context. Because of the reality of exclusion of disabled people, 
especially in low- and middle-income countries, from access to equal education and 
training opportunities, the fact is that there are forms of expertise that very few disabled 
people have. It is important to stress that this is not on the basis of any lesser ability, but 
on the basis of social exclusion – it is the case, for example, that many secondary schools 
catering for disabled children simply do not offer the same range of training in fields such 
2 World Health Organisation and World Bank. 2011. World Report on Disability. Geneva: WHO.
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as mathematics and the physical sciences as do mainstream schools. For this reason, with 
access to mainstream schooling an important long-term goal, disabled activists in low- and 
middle-income countries need the skills some able-bodied experts have. The strategy used 
here is that of working alongside able-bodied people with these skills, but confining (or 
attempting to confine) their influence in terms of setting the agenda. Drawing on Winston 
Churchill’s dictum about scientists that they should be “on tap and not on top”, disability 
scholars and activists make a similar strategic argument about able-bodied professionals. 
Essentially, their skills are to be used, but they are not to set an agenda which only disabled 
people themselves may set. In this regard, it is useful here to quote in full the guiding 
principles for disability research set at a meeting of the Disability Knowledge and Action 
Research (DKaR) in Malawi, and used as a set of guiding principles in research work on 
disability and development issues. 
  Guiding principles for thematic research established at the Disability KaR 
Roundtable in Malawi
 Include democratic and accountable voices of disabled people
 Reflect diversity of disabled people
 Resource voices of disabled people 
 Facilitate equality of power relationships
 Conduct emancipatory research/policy development – be empowering
 Have active and equal partners
 Professionals should be “on tap” not “on top”
 Disabled people should be seen as experts in own lives/situation
 Have equal value of expertise – recognise power relations within expertise
 Benefit disabled people
 Include knowledgeable and skilled disabled people relevant to the topic 
 Be inclusive of all disabilities within the range of research topics
 Be gender sensitive.3 
These principles lead to the third strategy for disability and development work – clearly, 
if professionals (and able-bodied professionals in particular) should be “on tap and not on 
top”, and if disabled people have been excluded historically from a range of opportunities, 
it is important that the skills of disabled people be developed to maximise their capacity 
for leading disability and development research initiatives, and for becoming equal players 
in mainstream initiatives. In this regard, an important way to use the skills of able-bodied 
professionals is to deploy them to develop the capacity of disabled people towards achieving 
their more equal participation.
It is against this background that I, as an able-bodied professional, came to work as 
what was termed a ‘lead research partner’ (this is terminology used by the funder) for 
the Southern African Federation for the Disabled (SAFOD) Research Programme (the 
3 Online at: http://www.disabilitykar.net/roundtables/malawi_rt.html [Accessed: 28 May 2011].
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work in the programme, and consider the ways in which issues of faith, doubt and religion 
challenged me in my attempts to fulfil a role appropriate to my designation as an able-
bodied researcher building capacity amongst disabled people in Southern Africa.
The SAFOD ReSeARch PROgRAmme (SRP) TRAining
The Southern African Federation of the Disabled is an umbrella organisation for Disabled 
People’s Organisations in ten Southern African countries, namely Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Headquartered in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, its vision and mission are as follows:
 Vision: “A society new society [sic] where all people, including disabled people, 
women and workers, men and children, are treated with dignity, respect and on the 
basis of equality.”
 Mission: “To strengthen Disabled People’s Organisations in SAFOD member countries 
through training, research, coordination, information sharing, promotion of human 
rights and adoption of appropriate strategies for stimulating people with disabilities 
to enhance their economic, political and social development.”5
The core values of SAFOD are given on the SAFOD website as: “Participatory, Transparency, 
Accountability, Commitment, Gender Sensitivity, Empowerment” [sic].
The largest project undertaken by SAFOD recently, with the financial support of DFiD 
(UK), was the SAFOD Research Programme (SRP).6 Conducted over a period of three 
years, the programme had two main aims. First, the SRP sought to produce policy-
relevant information on disability for use in the region, largely through commissioned 
research. Second, the SRP provided a platform for basic research skills training for two 
representatives (one man and one woman) from each of the country organisations making 
up SAFOD. I was appointed Lead Research Partner to the SRP and I ran the training.
The training comprised four face-to-face training sessions a year of three days each, plus 
assignments and homework in between. The training was registered as a short course at 
Stellenbosch University and trainees who completed the requirements for the course were 
given certificates at the end of training. I have discussed the content of the course and some 
of the issues raised in some detail elsewhere.7 In the rest of this chapter I consider how 
issues of faith, doubt and religion played their part in the training.
4 I am grateful to my colleagues, friends and trainees in SAFOD for working constructively with me over a long 
period, to the funders of the SRP, Department for International Development (DFID), UK, and to the National 
Research Foundation. Melanie Basson, Margie Schneider and Richard Vergunst assisted with training. The 
views expressed in this chapter are my own, and not those of any other person or organisation.
5 http://www.safod.org/
6 Full information on the programme can be found at http://www.safod.org/SRP%20Web%20 site/index.htm
7 Cf. Swartz, L. 2009. Building disability research capacity in low-income contexts: Possibilities and challenges. 
In MacLachlan, M. and Swartz, L. (eds), Disability and International Development: Towards Inclusive Global Health. New 
York, NY: Springer, 91-103. Swartz, L. 2010. Able-bodied: Scenes from a Curious Life. Cape Town: Zebra.
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FAiTh, DOubT AnD The SRP STORy
My entry into the SRP as Lead Research Partner was not smooth for a range of reasons, 
one of which is germane to the present argument. Very shortly after I undertook the work, 
the Secretary General of SAFOD (the late Alexander Phiri, a man I admired a great deal) 
informed me that a well-placed person, influential in the disability movement in the region, 
objected to my appointment on the grounds of my being a white academic working at an 
historically racist institution. Clearly, there was more at stake in terms of identity politics 
than questions of disabled versus non-disabled identity. Race, gender and the undoubtedly 
problematic racial and political history of my own institution clearly played a part. I entered 
the work, therefore, feeling tremendously privileged to be doing it, but also worried about 
how I might be perceived, how I should deal with the issue of my own authority as a trainer, 
while at the same time respecting the sentiment of my being required to be “on tap” rather 
than “on top”. As I have discussed elsewhere (Able-bodied, 2010), I was aware of the limits 
of an over-emphasis on participation and empowerment as the only criteria for disability-
related research, and I agreed with Tom Shakespeare’s (2006) concerns about disability 
research in the UK: 
While I value the achievements that have been won through the close alliance 
of disability politics and disability research, I believe that the weaknesses of the 
British approach now outweigh the benefits. Translation of ideas and ideologies 
from activism to academia have not been accompanied by a sufficient process of 
self-criticism, testing and empirical verification.8
In short, though I wanted to be “on tap” rather than “on top”, I believed, with Shakespeare, 
that ideology masquerading as empirical research was not a good thing for realising the 
rights of disabled people. I believed (and believe) that scepticism, doubt and openness to 
changing opinions on the basis of new evidence were at the heart of good research, and 
I worried how I would reconcile this view with my positioning as a trainer in what was 
essentially an activist enterprise – developing capacity in order to strengthen SAFOD’s 
broader agenda.
As far as my engagement with SAFOD and the SAFOD trainees was concerned, many of 
my early worries proved unfounded. Overall, I was welcomed by the organisation and 
treated with great kindness and respect. Some of this hospitality, though, had another 
side to it, a side I had not anticipated. I had prepared myself for mistrust and enmity on 
the basis of my able-bodied white South African privilege, but I had underestimated the 
extent to which my position as a professor at a prestigious institution would lead to my 
being greatly respected by colleagues. There is nothing wrong with people respecting 
learning and academic achievement. Respect for academic authority, though, does not lie 
in unquestioning acceptance of what academic seniors say. On the contrary, for me, as is 
the case for many empirically-minded colleagues, respect in an academic context means 
taking the trouble to interrogate the views and conclusions of others, to put their ideas to 
the test, to treat their views with the same scepticism with which one treats one’s own. 
This is an approach to knowledge I struggle to impart to my university students, many 
8 Shakespeare, T. 2006. Disability rights and wrongs. London: Routledge, 11.
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rhetoric of the disability movement, the oft-mentioned mistrust of able-bodied people, the 
scepticism of a professional knowledge which for centuries has excluded and marginalised 
able-bodied people, and given the more immediate politics of my own positioning in this 
project, I anticipated a high degree of scepticism about me from the trainees. In fact, I was 
looking forward to this scepticism, because I believe that much of the best and deepest 
learning takes place at the interface between differing points of view – we learn, I believe, 
from being discomfited. 
It is important for the purposes of this discussion to recognise two aspects about the way 
in which I was welcomed into the SRP as an expert. At one level, I was treated with what 
I believe to be hospitality. As Derrida’s scholarship has pointed out, to be in a position to 
offer hospitality, one must be, or feel oneself to be, the master of one’s house.9 At all the 
training sessions (with the exception of the very few trainees with whom I had difficult 
relationships), I was welcomed, but, as was entirely appropriate, I was welcomed into a 
space that was defined as belonging to SAFOD and the trainees, and not to me – they 
were benign masters of the house, but masters nevertheless. When it came to what I had 
to offer as a trainer, however, it took some time for me to convince trainees that I do not 
know everything, that I make mistakes as a researcher, and that I am not an expert on 
the lives of disabled people. The process of negotiating this issue of my authority, though, 
took some time. I had to acknowledge that I did see myself as an authority on issues of 
method and epistemology as they pertain to research (and I have no doubt of my superior 
knowledge and expertise over these issues as compared to the knowledge and expertise 
held by trainees themselves). But I did not regard myself as an authority on the content we 
were discussing – issues that affect the lives of disabled people and those around them. To 
a novice researcher, I came to see, it was very hard to see the distinction between expertise 
in method (which I comfortably claimed I had) and expertise on content issues (in which 
I did not and do not believe myself to be the expert). Looking back on the training, I can 
see how I would confuse and bewilder participants early in the process by apparently in 
the same breath claiming that I did not have special knowledge about many things, and 
asserting my superiority to the trainees in engaging with issues of method. 
I began to see that our training was operating at the interface between different systems 
of faith, scepticism and doubt. As a researcher, I believe very strongly that all knowledge 
is, and should be, open to question and doubt, and indeed when one of the trainees said 
that the most important thing she had learned from the training as a whole was that we 
should take nothing at face value, I felt very gratified. I believe in the power of logical and 
systematic argument, and in the essentially democratic idea that it does not matter who is 
professing knowledge – what matters is the extent to which that knowledge is robust and 
stands up to contestation. I also believe that knowledge is provisional – when new ways of 
thinking, and new evidence come to light, we should change our views. My faith in science 
or in the methods of research more broadly understood is a faith not in the content of what 
we come to know or of who makes claim to knowledge. It is instead, a faith in the power 
of contestation. To me, empirically trained as I am, research methodology is less a set of 
9 Derrida, J. 2005. The principle of hospitality. Parallax 11(1):6-9.
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steps about how to do things, but more a systematic way in which we can scrutinise truth 
claims about the world.
The people I was training had a wide range of educational backgrounds. Some were 
studying for Master’s degrees and some had not completed high school. But I think it is fair 
to say that early on in the training with me, all had different ideas about faith and doubt 
than I did. All of them were disabled people living in highly stigmatising societies, and 
yet all of them had achieved the success that joint activism can bring – they had reached 
positions of power within their national DPOs and had been selected by their DPOs to 
undergo further training. They knew from the inside the benefits of activism and solidarity, 
and they understood the achievements that people and organisations can make on the 
basis of standing together on the basis of a shared identity and ideology. They had faith, 
in a word, in solidarity, whereas my faith lay in the scepticism which is at the heart of the 
scientific method – the belief that knowledge is open to change. But where my scepticism 
was about how we come to know things about the world, theirs was a scepticism based 
on visceral experiences of social exclusion. They had learned not to trust all sorts of 
people – especially able-bodied people and researchers from the outside who promised 
much but delivered little, they told me, in terms of changing their lives. There were some 
important exceptions in this regard, but their activist positioning enabled them to return 
frequently to discussions about the duplicity and unreliability of many able-bodied people 
and researchers.
The trainees and I were, in short, entering the world of research training from very different 
worlds of faith. I believed in some ways that the less sure disabled people became about what 
was told to them or about what they see in the world, the better researchers they would be; 
whereas they expected (understandably, and in common with many other people who enter 
research training) that the more skilled they became, the more they would know, and the 
more sure they would be about their own knowledge. It may appear from this formulation 
that my commitment as a Lead Research Partner was to a somewhat acontextual and even 
naïve view of what “research” is and does in a context like that within which the SRP was 
functioning. Was it not the case that the trainees were indeed looking for more expertise, 
more certainty, more heft in the struggles they would have with a disablist and unfriendly 
world? I am the first to agree that the simple performance of trainees’ having gone through 
a training certificated by a reputable university may be of help to them. The fact that they 
have been seen to have attended workshops and passed some tests of technical skill would 
be likely to increase the degree to which they could lay claim to authority about knowledge 
and the world in which disabled people live. Indeed, it has been gratifying to me to learn 
of trainees’ using their certificates as bargaining chips to improve their credibility as 
researchers and activists in a range of contexts. A number of trainees are now working on 
other research projects. But I believed (and continue to believe) that though it would have 
been quite possible for me to train the trainees simply in a suite of technical procedures 
about research (for example, interviewing skills, basic numeracy skills, dissemination 
skills, all of which we did cover in the training), the opportunity for genuine empowerment 
would be lost were we not to have tackled fundamental questions about knowledge. Too 
often have I seen in the Southern African context, but by no means only here (as the work 
of Shakespeare (2006) has shown), ideological statements masquerading as empirical fact. 
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disabled people are, but that do not allow for any data to be collected which may question 
that view. I have seen may questionnaires with leading questions, many reports that start 
out assuming that things are bad for disabled people, which collect data, and then return 
inevitably to the point at which they started – to conclude that things are bad for disabled 
people. Research, as Shakespeare (2006) says, has to be organised in such a way that we 
can have the capacity, however idealistic, to be surprised or even shocked by our findings. 
Repeated statements of the same ideological positions in the absence of carefully collected 
and reporting of data, including findings we did not expect and do not like, have a very 
limited shelf-life. In the admittedly highly problematic discursive world of evidence-based 
policy, volumes of research based on poor methods no longer have the influence they once 
might have had. It was not, therefore, in my view, a trivial or luxury matter to engage with 
trainees on issues of falsifiability, of doubt, of scepticism – not on the basis of identity, but 
on the basis of research methods. 
I believe that most of the trainees came to see the value of rigorously sceptical thinking 
over superficially easy solidarity in the way they engaged with research, and I regard this 
as an important (though somewhat intangible) outcome of the training. But much as 
I have spoken here about the value of discomfiting trainees about their own assumptive 
ideological worlds, I do not believe this could have happened without an equal discomfort10 
on my part, and it is to this issue which I now turn.
On be(cOm)ing JewiSh in unJewiSh PlAceS
I am a secular Jew and I am an atheist.11 Much of my engagement with the world, despite my 
not believing in God, is strongly informed by Jewish traditions. Though there is much to 
criticise about organised Judaism (and I am critical of many of its practices and ideologies), 
I believe that two of the core commitments I have come from my Jewish roots. First, there 
is a strong strain of Jewish teaching and thought which requires a commitment to social 
justice, and it is no coincidence that Jews have been strongly represented in liberation 
movements in many countries, including South Africa. Second, Jewish scholarship relies 
heavily on ideas of contestation and debate with struggles with authority – a founding 
myth for Jewish people is that of Jacob struggling with the angel (the name Jacob was 
given subsequent to this struggle was Israel – he who struggles with God). The influence 
of Jewish traditions is strong in many scientific disciplines, and certainly in my own field, 
which is psychology.
Early on in the SRP training, when discussing emotive or difficult issues, trainees would 
say things like: “We are all Christians here”, or: “As Christians, we all know ...”. At first 
10 Boler, M. and M. Zembylas. 2003. Discomforting truths: The emotional terrain of understanding difference. In 
Trifonas, P. (ed.), Pedagogies of difference: Rethinking education for social change. New York, NY: RoutledgeFalmer, 
110-36.
11 Reviewers of this chapter and others with whom I interact have expressed some incredulity at my use of this 
self-ascription. I use the term “atheist” in the sense used in the Merriman-Webster dictionary – “a disbelief in the 
existence of deity”. I do not regard this disbelief as incompatible with a respect for and interest in spirituality.
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I was reluctant to engage with these statements of solidarity in part because I would be 
drawing attention to myself. But it seemed to me as this bubble of shared identity was 
constructed around all of us (including me) that it would be simply dishonest to allow 
this issue to pass. So I told the trainees I was not Christian but Jewish, and when they 
(predictably enough) said that that was all right because I believed in God and was one of 
God’s chosen people, I told them that I did not believe in God.
This revelation on my part was greeted with a mixture of humour and disbelief, and I did 
not wish to dwell too much on the issue as it seemed to me tangential to the main business 
of the research training work. I was wrong about this. Some trainees let the matter go more 
or less immediately, but some (including many who I believed had engaged most seriously 
with the training) could not, or would not, let the matter go. We had long discussions over 
meals about issues of religion and why this was important. Some trainees were worried 
about my soul; others simply could not believe that a person who had chosen this kind of 
engagement with disabled people could not be religious. As much as in the back of my head 
I found the idea offensive that the only basis for engagement in human rights work must be 
charity or religious commitment, I felt I was missing something important about what my 
interlocutors were saying.
As we discussed these matters further over a period of months and years, and as I began 
to search out for the trainees texts on Christianity and disability, my views began 
to change. I did not become more Christian, more Jewish, or more religious, but I was 
forced to concede that questions of Christian spirituality, and of experiences of inclusion 
and exclusion from the church (some exclusionary practices seemed to me extremely 
inhumane), were central to the lives of the people with whom I was working. Not only 
that – the liveliness of debate which trainees engaged in about religion (but all within 
the shared world of them as committed Christians, and every one of them claimed to be a 
committed Christian) – seemed to me to embody much of what I valued in terms of debate 
in research contexts. They could disagree passionately on difficult theological issues, some 
of which have particular relevance to disabled people – for example, on issues of selective 
abortion, genetic screening, separate ministries for disabled people, and so on. They drew 
links between debates about homosexuality to the exclusion they had often felt as disabled 
people from the world of sexuality. Somewhat to my surprise, given what I thought to 
be high levels of homophobia in the group, some of the trainees argued that their own 
experiences of having their own sexual desire being seen as disgusting by some religious 
leaders led them to have empathy for gay men and lesbians.
As a person comfortable in the largely secular environment of the university, I had had 
no difficulty anticipating the importance of activist ideology and identity politics for the 
trainees and for how they thought about knowledge and the world. What I had completely 
missed prior to my engagement with these trainees, despite my academic knowledge that 
Christianity and religion are so important in our part of the world, was that religion was 
equally as important for them as activist ideology and identity politics. They had been 
excluded and vilified by aspects of religion, and they spoke movingly about the pain they 
felt at being seen as punishments from God, but religion also sustained them and gave them 
a sense of meaning and identity.
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amongst what I remember most fondly about the training), I realised that on the ideological 
battlefields of faith and doubt, it was not only I who was doing the discomfiting. The 
trainees paid me the compliment of helping me to be discomforted about my own notions 
of what it means to be a researcher/activist. I have no doubt that contestation is at the heart 
of research. But I have also come to believe that faith (and this was not a faith consumed 
in an authoritarian way, but a faith struggled with by people who had experienced 
religious exclusion) may be part of what sustains people, and provides a safe and nurturing 
environment for people whose lives are far more precarious than mine, to use Judith Butler’s 
phrase. Within that environment, the discomfort of what it means to be a researcher, the 
uncertainty and the temporality of knowledge, may be easier to bear.
It astonishes me now how silent much development work and scholarship on disability is 
on issues of faith and religion, apart from the rather easy rejection of religion (along with 
medicine) as a form of oppression of disabled people. I have also learned from the trainees 
with whom I worked that despite my secularity, despite my atheism, I have some way to 
go in understanding the heretofore unacknowledged influence of religion on my own life 
and practices. It is easy (and often glib) to claim that empowerment processes should be 
mutually empowering and challenging. It is another matter to sit as I now do at the end 
of what was a transformative training process for me, left with many personal challenges 
posed by the trainees, one of which is the question of where I stand on matters of religion 
and faith. The short answer is that I do not know – but given my deep commitment to not 
knowing, that may be the best answer – better than the answer I would have given years 
ago. I cannot believe any longer that issues of faith and spirituality are irrelevant to the 
training of disabled researchers – they are relevant and challenging for the trainees, but 
also, in this case at least, to the trainer.
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Through the eyes of children
Children living with severe communication 
disabilities doing theology1
Martha Geiger2
IntroduCtIon
In my work with children with severe disabilities and little or no speech, I am repeatedly 
amazed at how fervently many of these children communicate, even though they cannot 
speak. And what profound truths can be communicated by gestures, eye gaze or eye blink 
responses or grunts and squeals! There have been wonderful developments, including 
diverse sign languages, written or pictorial communication systems and the whole arena 
of computerised communication systems. These have revolutionised the participation and 
contribution of people with extreme disabilities, such as the world-renowned scientist 
and writer, Professor Stephen Hawking, among others.3 The focus here, however, is on 
those who cannot benefit from formal communication systems or assistive devices, either 
because of the severity and complexity of their disability, and/or because of poverty and 
lack of access to appropriate services. 
Cerebral palsy is the most common cause of the conditions of the children with whom 
I work. Gestures, body language, facial expressions, eye pointing, a wide range of laughs 
and cries, and moreover the timing of laughs and giggles are only a few of the forms of 
expression which these children use to communicate with others. Most of them have a 
considerably higher level of understanding than their expressive communication would 
indicate. The challenge is to find ways of connecting with the child, understanding what is 
important to the child, how she expresses this and building on her form of communication 
to create opportunities for her to convey her thoughts, desires, fears, joys and insights – 
and so to get to know the child as a unique person.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. On an academic level, it aims to add to discussions 
about the spiritual and theological realities of children with severe disabilities. On a practical 
level, it aims to encourage those who have not had opportunities with such children and 
who lack confidence or are even fearful of where and how to begin with interactions with 
1 This chapter has also been published in Journal of Religion, Disability & Health (2012) 16(1):102-13. Republished 
with permission.
2 Martha Geiger is Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies, Faculty of Health Sciences, 
Stellenbosch University, and a speech therapist, engaged in community-based training of caregivers of children 
with severe disabilities.
3 Hawking, S. 2011. Foreword. In WHO. 2011. World Report on Disability. Geneva: World Health Organisation and 
World Bank, ix.
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potential, the spiritual wealth and the theological realities of these children. 
refleCtIons from theory and PraCtICe 
Interacting and communicating with others is part of the essence of being human. The 
practice of speech therapy – or rather communication therapy, considering that I work with 
children who cannot speak – opens opportunities to learn about personalities, personhood 
and human relationships in many ways. In the tradition of reflective practice4 I have 
collected, reflected upon and learnt from observations and experiences with the children 
and have included some of these here, to illustrate and expand upon the documented 
developments in the areas of disability in general and communication disabilities in particular, 
as well as in the culture and attitudes to persons with diverse communication disabilities, and 
children and theology. 
  Disability 
Disability constitutes an extremely complex issue. Early understandings of disability 
were rooted in supernatural explanations of otherwise inexplicable phenomena.5 The 
development of popular knowledge about disability mirrors the accessibility of scientific 
knowledge and the acceptance of medical discoveries regarding the nature and causes 
of disabilities. Resultant concepts and definitions have evolved from diverse histories, 
through to the comprehensive World Health Organisation classification of 2001, which 
is helpful in explaining disabilities in terms of their interrelating impairments, activity 
limitations and participation restrictions.6
According to this definitive classification, impairment refers to the underlying problem of 
physical structure or function. Examples may include the neurological damage to the lower 
brainstem acquired during the prolonged labour and birth of a child with cerebral palsy, or 
the hereditary auditory nerve damage causing deafness7 in another (deaf or deafness with a 
lower case relates to audiological, severe to profound hearing loss, as opposed to capitalised 
Deaf, referring to Deaf culture and the Deaf community). These two impairments could 
cause very different activity limitations in the affected children’s daily lives; the child with 
cerebral palsy may not walk, talk or eat independently, but may understand everything as 
her intelligence is unaffected, while the deaf child learns physical independence quickly but 
cannot understand spoken language and does not learn to speak. The third level addressed 
by the WHO classification is that of participation.8 This concerns environmental and social 
4 Schön, D. A. 1995. The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. Aldershot: Ashgate.
5 Ross, E. and Deverell, A. 2004. Psychosocial Approaches to Health, Illness and Disability: A Reader for Health Care 
Professionals. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
6 WHO. 2001. International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps (ICF). Geneva: World Health 
Organisation; WHO 2011. World Report on Disability. Geneva: World Health Organisation and World Bank.
7 WHO, ICF, 18. WHO, World Report.
8 WHO, ICF, 18. WHO, World Report.
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factors which either help or hinder the person’s involvement in family, peer and general 
community life. Environmental factors enabling participation include a school which 
embraces diversity and has made structural alterations (e.g. ramps and wider doorways) 
to include the child with cerebral palsy. Barriers may include the family of the deaf child, 
who feel strongly that she must learn to speak and discourage the use of gestures and signs 
as a way of communicating, at the cost of her developing functional communication for 
participation at all. 
Viewing disability as a medical issue affecting the individual is characteristic of the earlier 
‘medical model’ school of thought.9 As a result of this, many children with severe disabilities 
were (and still are) institutionalised and cared for as ‘sick’ children; being fed, cleaned 
and medicated in high-sided hospital cots – albeit with much love and dedication, but 
with little or no stimulation. Among disability theorists and policy makers, the proverbial 
pendulum then swung to the other extreme and the ‘social model’ emerged in which 
people were seen as being disabled by society rather than by their bodies. Terminology has 
evolved intertwined with such views.10 At the risk of over-simplification, the term person 
with a disability is generally accepted in international policy contexts and is intended to 
reflect a respectful person-centred or people-first approach.11 This is critiqued, however, 
as being impairment-orientated by disability activists preferring the human rights-based 
term disabled person, which needs to be understood against the view that the environment or 
society is considered the disabling factor and not the person’s body or impairment.
As with all theoretical models, both the medical and the social models have their 
limitations. Disability is most certainly not merely a medical issue as there are countless 
environmental and social factors that can increase or decrease the impact of the disability.12 
However, even if all the best possible environmental and social supports are in place to 
facilitate participation in their communities à la social model, persons with disabilities 
often still experience disabling problems directly related to their health condition – for 
example, chronic pain. A helpful compromise then is the bio-psycho-social model.13 The 
interrelationship of biological (or physical) factors, psychological (or emotional) factors 
and social (or environmental) factors is particularly clear in communication disabilities, 
the essence of communication being interaction and relating to others.
  Communication disabilities
Arguably, disabilities which limit a person’s ability to communicate and to interact 
with others present additional challenges, beyond those of other disabilities. The quote 
attributed to the American statesman and orator, Daniel Webster, sums it up: “If all my 
possessions were taken from me with one exception, I would choose to keep the power 
of communication, for by it I would soon regain all the rest.”14 Among those with severe 
9 WHO, World Report.
10 WHO, World Report.
11 United Nations. 2008. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Online at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/
default.asp?id=259 [Accessed: 6 May 2011].
12 WHO, World Report.
13 Ross and Deverell, Psychosocial Approaches. 
14 Daniel Webster Quotes. Online at: http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/31180 [Accessed: 24 June 2011].
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they cannot speak) are less ‘disabled’ in terms of participation in interactive relationships 
and in their environments than those who cannot (or are not given the opportunity to 
communicate.
The distinction between speech, language and communication is critical in understanding a 
child’s abilities and disabilities. Speech constitutes only one way – next to writing, etc. – of 
transmitting a formal language system such as English, isiXhosa or Afrikaans. Examples of 
non-verbal languages or systems developed to facilitate communication where speech is 
not possible include South African Sign Language and, for people who cannot speak nor 
form complex hand signs, picture communication systems such as PCS15 and Minspeak.16 
Communication is the actual interaction, the sending and receiving of messages between two 
or more people, whether it is by means of a universally understood facial expression such as 
a smile; a more specific gesture such as a head shake for ‘no’ or by a formal language system 
such as South African Sign Language or a picture communication system or a spoken 
language such as English. 
As mentioned earlier, augmentative and alternative communication, or more usually just 
the abbreviation AAC, refers to “an area of clinical practice that attempts to compensate 
either temporarily or permanently for [...] people with severe speech, language and/or 
writing impairments”.17 AAC includes strategies using a range of communication aids 
(from home-made cardboard picture boards to high-tech speech synthesisers) as well as 
the whole range of ‘unaided’ systems including gestures and signs. International and local 
developments in the specialised field of AAC have delivered revolutionary possibilities for 
people with severe communication disabilities18 – if they live in environments where they 
can access them. 
Referring back to the opening sentence, most children with severe disabilities and little 
or no speech have surprising potentials to communicate – even without speech. Examples 
include facial expressions, body language, learned eye-blink or eye-pointing responses to 
spoken questions (one blink or look upwards for ‘yes’ and two blinks or look aside for ‘no’ 
etc.), voicing (though not able to articulate words, the voice can express much through 
differently intoned sounds!) – to name but a few. Eye pointing in particular is a very 
powerful and often used expression, picked up and developed most effectively by observant 
and ‘listening’ caregivers and communication partners! In pointing out these possibilities, 
I do not wish to diminish or play down the impact and the frustration of communication 
disabilities, or the affliction of not being able to speak or communicate easily.
Any potential forms of expression such as those mentioned above depend upon the people 
in the child’s environment responding and/or providing opportunities to use them. In 
one of the residential special care centres where I regularly work, visitors and volunteers 
15 Mayer-Johnson, R. 1990. The Picture Communication Symbols. Volumes I, II and III. Solana Beach, CA: Mayer-Johnson.
16 Baker, B. 2001. Semantic Compaction Systems. Online at: http://www.minspeak.com [Accessed: 23 June 2011]. 
17 Beukelman, D. R. and Mirenda, P. 1998. Augmentative and Alternative Communication. London: Baltimore, MD: Paul 
H. Brookes, 3
18 Alant, E. 2005. Cultural and socio-economic influences on communication. In Alant, E. and Lloyd, L. L. (eds), 
Augmentative and Alternative Communication and Severe Disabilities: Beyond Poverty. London: Whurr, 95-107.
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were often seen trying to make contact with the children, most of whom spend the day 
in a wheelchair or buggy, with a lap tray in front for activities. Seeing the frustration on 
both sides, we wrote a short individualised introduction for each child and stuck these 
laminated, brightly coloured introductions on the children’s lap trays so that any visitor 
can know where to begin. 
Examples include: “Hello, my name is Nikiwe. I can look up for ‘yes’ and I blink for ‘no’. 
Please ask me short questions and give me time to respond!” or: “Hello, my name is Emmy. I am 
sleepy because of my medication. I smile when I like something and I close my eyes if 
I don’t. Hint: rub my hands gently and see!” It has been wonderful to see how empowered 
visitors are in beginning a conversation, and how much easier it is for them to get to know 
individual children in this way. Caregivers’, visitors’ and other communication partners’ 
responses to the child depend upon their attitudes to, and expectations of, the child. Some 
will experiment and encourage the child to do more and more and the lap tray introductions 
have only been the trigger to wonderful friendships. Others cannot get over the idea that 
it is a very sick child, and while love and care are not lacking, the child is not expected to 
do or learn anything.
  Culture and attitudes 
Over time, changes in the understanding of and attitude to disability have mirrored 
the evolution of the medical, social and bio-psycho-social models, described earlier. In 
addition, attitudes and responses to people with diverse disabilities vary widely across 
and even within cultures.19 Most attitudes and responses are rooted in beliefs about the 
causes of disabilities – which in Southern African indigenous cultures are predominantly 
attributed to spiritual or supernatural sources.20 Reports have been published of both 
negative responses to disability including ostracism, abuse and even killings, as well as 
positive stories of non-discriminatory community values and caring inclusion of people 
with disabilities.21 A discussion of the range of cultural attitudes in southern Africa alone 
is beyond the scope of this paper, but a first-hand observation in Botswana may suffice to 
illustrate the extreme variations in attitudes and responses from within a single community. 
It also underlines the danger of making any generalisations. 
While working at a children’s rehabilitation centre in Botswana, my therapist colleagues 
and I did follow-up home visits to children who spent school terms at the centre and 
returned to their home villages for vacations. During one vacation two boys with similar 
forms of cerebral palsy, the same level of physical and intellectual impairment and benefiting 
from similar stimulation programmes at the centre during term time were visited at their 
respective homes in a single village, representing a single language, tribal and cultural 
19 Helman, C. G. 2002. Culture, Health and Illness. 4th ed. London: Arnold.
20 Chataika, T. 2011 Cultural and Religious Explanations of Disability: A Call for a Rights-based Approach and 
Fostering of Inclusive Communities. Paper presented at the Theology, Disability and Human Dignity Conference, 
Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, 18-20 May 2011; Merriweather, A. M. 1992. Puisanyo ya Bongaka ka 
Sekgoa le Setswana: Medical Phrasebook and Dictionary. Gaborone: Botswana Book Centre.
21 Geiger, M. 2010. Using cultural resources to build an inclusive environment for children with severe 
communication disabilities: A Case Study from Botswana. Children’s Geographies 8(1):51-63; Ingstad, B. 1997. 
Community-based Rehabilitation in Botswana: the Myth of the Hidden Disabled. New York, NY: Edwin Mellin; Ross and 
Deverell, Psychosocial Approaches.
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family circle and participated, albeit passively, in social activities such as receiving visitors 
– while in the other home, the disabled son was found tied to a tree behind the family hut. 
Thankfully changes in attitudes over time are predominantly positive – as is the end of 
this particular story: the village chief became a passionate advocate for the human dignity, 
appropriate treatment and inclusion of the second boy and supported his family further. 
Among the many different culturally determined responses to specific communication 
disabilities,22 one is of particular relevance here. It is the perception that someone who 
cannot speak, can also not hear or understand. In spite of many positive developments, 
this belief is particularly persistent over time and seems to occur widely across several 
cultures, as illustrated by the following two experiences, among many. The first one 
occurred in a day-care centre for children with severe mixed (physical and intellectual) 
disabilities. During one of my sessions there, a caregiver and I were encouraging a young 
partially paralysed boy, who cannot speak, to choose and point to one of several pictures as 
a means of answering our questions. As we were asking the questions, the young boy was 
slowly but accurately indicating the answers by pointing to the correct picture. A visitor 
from the community, who knows the children well, joined us and exclaimed: “Why are you 
talking to him – he can’t talk!” The second experience happened with a young Xhosa boy 
with a sharp mind and a wonderful sense of humour – but locked in a body profoundly 
impaired by cerebral palsy. Lack of resources and no early interventions meant that his 
body had become fixed in a pattern of contractions, and his only voluntary movements 
were eye blinks, ‘pointing’ with his eyes and a smile. His mother and caregivers had learnt 
to communicate with him by reading his ‘yes’ and ‘no’ eye-blink responses to their normal 
speech communication. He had been hospitalised for pneumonia and his mother and I sat 
by his hospital bedside, each massaging one of his hands, talking to him and also singing 
Sunday school songs and praying with him. Several nurses came in at different times to 
check on him and without exception each one either asked why we were talking to him or 
commented that it is useless talking to him as he “cannot answer”. Each time his mother 
patiently explained that he could indeed understand everything and that his eye blink 
responses were amazingly accurate – if one knew what to look for. 
It was sobering to consider that even some health care workers were under the widespread 
impression that no speech means no understanding. 
  Children and theology
A regular children’s Bible class in the rehabilitation centre in Botswana (mentioned earlier) 
was profoundly changed when one young boy, who was able to speak albeit with great 
difficulty, one day announced very authoritatively that “bana ba ba sa bueng, ga ba na mowa” 
(= the children who cannot speak do not have a spirit). This caused an outcry of anger 
and distress from those unable to speak – there were screams of protest and extremely 
panicked physical, facial and other responses. Needless to say the rest of the session was 
spent comforting and assuring the children that this is not so – and also comforting the 
young boy who had made the statement as he was merely passing on a very commonly held 
22 Battle, D. E. 1998. Communication Disorders in Multicultural Populations. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann; 
Merriweather, Puisanyo.
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perception, a kind of theology which is sadly prevalent in traditional contexts in Africa and 
elsewhere. This prompted a journey of enquiry into making the children’s Bible class more 
relevant to this particular group of children.
Biblical and especially New Testament themes of children and childhood can be understood 
in three groupings.23 Firstly, there is the theology of childhood, including child-parent 
analogies, references to child innocence and ‘spiritual naivety’. Secondly, there is child 
theology, following the directive of Jesus to put the child in the centre and what this does 
to our beliefs and the way we conduct church and mission. Thirdly, there is the issue 
of children doing theology.24 This refers to children’s awareness and articulation of their 
relationship with God, which is more than children’s spirituality, which has been described 
as children’s awareness of God’s existence.25 While all three are of relevance here, it is 
the third, children doing theology, that is to be highlighted through some of the severely 
disabled children’s own expressions.
Swinton et al. have described what it means to know God even when, intellectually, one 
might not know anything about God.26 A repeated observation in working with children 
with disabilities is that they fit quite easily into a “knowing without understanding” faith, 
which calls into question the earlier schools of teaching children biblical truths as if they 
were Renaissance-type mini-adults.27 Relationship is central and a further example from 
conversations with children illustrates how communication barriers are overcome and why 
the young boy’s proclamation that “children who cannot speak do not have a spirit” caused 
such an outcry. Connie, a 13-year-old girl with cerebral palsy which paralysed one side of 
her body, a severe ‘drooling’ problem and no speech, was a particularly active participant 
in the Bible class mentioned earlier, although in society she was an outcast. One day, 
she overheard me speaking German to someone and with her very expressive frown, and 
signing with her one functional hand, she asked how many languages I speak. I responded: 
“Four: Setswana with you, English with some people, Afrikaans with others and German 
mostly with my family.” She pondered this and then broke into a wide and mischievous 
smile, signing that she too uses four languages! She indicated her one-handed signing as 
language number one, her pointing to pictures on her communication board as number 
two and her unarticulated but expressive voice for crying, grunting, squealing, laughing 
and a whole range of other emotive expressions as her third language. Then she paused, 
and with a triumphant smile she pointed to her head (for ‘thoughts’) and then upward and 
a ‘Number One’ sign (for God). Her silent communion with God was her fourth language – 
particularly poignant in the African culture, where prayer is a part of the oratory tradition 
and silent prayer is seldom known. Yet Connie needed no speech to express her clear 
theology! With such profound lessons to be learnt from the Connies out there, much is 
23 Hay. D. and Nye, R. 2006. The Spirit of the Child. (Revised Edition). London: Jessica Kingsley; Privett, P. 2009. 
Prologue: The Thirtieth Anniversary of the Year of the Child. In Richards, A. and Privett, P. (eds), Through the Eyes 
of a Child: New Insights in Theology from a Child’s Perspective. London: Church House.
24 Privett, Prologue, xix; Hay and Nye, The Spirit of the Child.
25 Hay and Nye, The Spirit of the Child.
26 Swinton, J., Mowat, H. and Baines, S. 2011. Whose Story am I? Redescribing Profound Intellectual Disability in 
the Kingdom of God. Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 15(1):5-19.
27 Csinos, D. M. 2011. Children’s Ministry that Fits: Beyond the One-size-fits all Approaches to Nurturing Children’s Spirituality. 
Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock.
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attitudes preclude the recognition of our fellow travellers with severe disabilities.
Another place of such learning for me is a special care centre where I regularly spend time 
encouraging communication and training the care workers who lovingly and sacrificially 
care for nearly 100 children and young people with the most severe disabilities and who 
have been abandoned by society. Most of these children and young people have multiple 
disabilities: the severest forms of cerebral palsy, epilepsy, intellectual disabilities, blindness, 
deafness and several mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and severe depression are all 
represented here, often in some combination in a single person. The biggest frustration is 
the lack of time, human and other resources to implement any really effective programme. 
Much of my time as the only speech therapist involved there is to visit, greet and 
briefly interact with each child, giving the caregivers ideas on how to encourage more 
communication with each child or young person.
As I go around amid squeals and grunts and smiles and cries, it strikes me repeatedly 
how, in this community, the values are not about who can do what, or who owns what, 
or who has achieved what, or who is attractive and who is not; all that counts is the person 
imprisoned inside that body. This stripping away of all else, has triggered many thoughts 
about what Heaven must be like. Others – notably Henri Nouwen – have written about 
this awareness and experience of the theological life lessons received with and from people 
with severe disabilities.28 I can only imagine how much is lost because I cannot understand, 
or in my impatience do not make the time to understand, these fellow travellers and their 
attempts to share glimpses of their spiritual wealth.
  Church community – the hermeneutic of the Gospel?! 
Newbigin describes the church community as “the hermeneutic of the Gospel [...] that place 
where the gospel is lived out and interpreted to the world through the actions and character 
of its participants”. 29 For sure, our community responses are the only interpretation of the 
Gospel that others may ever see; even more so for children with severe disabilities to whom 
the ‘normal’ channels of hearing and reading the Bible message are not accessible. Gaventa 
and Coulter30 also describe the need for ‘hermeneutical competence’. The ability to engage 
and commune with children (and adults) with severe disabilities and little or no speech 
does indeed require more than learned skills: an attitude of acceptance and a desire to 
know the other are fundamental. 
In contrast to the imperatives for inclusion and participation based on human rights 
mandates such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,31 
the voices from the field of theology are calling for and committing to real relationships of 
28 Nouwen, H. 1997 Adam, God’s beloved. New York, NY: Orbis.
29 Newbigin, L. cited by Swinton, J. (ed.). 1990. Critical Reflections on Stanley Hauerwas’ Theology of Disability. 
Binghampton, NY: Haworth Pastoral, 6.
30 Gaventa, C. and Coulter, D. 2001. Spirituality and Intellectual Disability: International Perspectives on the Effect of Culture 
and Religion on Healing Body, Mind and Soul. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Pastoral.
31 United Nations, CRPD. 
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mutuality32 and encourage us towards a thinking and a terminology grounded in values 
such as human dignity.33 Our theology of a God of love and the essence of the Christian 
Gospel lights the way in welcoming the Connies out there to our fellowships as valued 
participants and as contributors. But how?
The terms we use to describe our efforts can be quite counter-productive and should be 
re-thought: for example, having a plan or strategy to learn to work with (not for) individual 
children regardless of ability, rather than a programme for children with disabilities.34 
A growing conversation35 is probably the best – and only – way to proceed, and Möller36 
sums it up well as “a reciprocal learning process of inclusion and enhancing the role of 
people with disabilities in the faith community”. Learning from one another presupposes 
an expectation that the other has something to teach, to contribute. As pointed out several 
times during the conference, being allowed to contribute is something that many disabled 
people rarely get the opportunity to do. It can only be assumed how much benefit is missed 
where the richness to be given cannot be given – as was illustrated by some of the examples 
of children who have limited ways of expressing their theological insights.
ConClusIon 
The dual purpose of this paper was to add to discussions about the spiritual and theological 
realities of children with severe disabilities, and to encourage a positive expectancy of the 
relational, spiritual and theological contributions that these children can make. Testimonies 
of some of these children’s insights add to earlier academic and theological discussions 
about children doing theology and hopefully illustrate the richness of communication and 
the enjoyment of participation that is possible, even when speech and formal alternative 
language systems are lacking. This underscores the role that such children can play in 
challenging stereotypes and affirming the contributions they make to society, and thus put 
to rest the fears that people sometimes have when coming into contact with persons with 
severe communication disabilities.
Children, and by implication adults with severe disabilities and little or no speech, pose a 
particular challenge for inclusion and participation, because the very essence of interaction 
– that is communication – is affected. Health and other care workers engaged with these 
children – and in fact all potential communication partners – can be equipped and prepared 
with practical skills and a hermeneutical competence beginning with a positive expectancy, to 
32 Reynolds, T. 2011. Theology and Disability – Changing the conversation. Keynote address presented at the 
Theology, Disability and Human Dignity Conference, Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, 18-20 May 2011.
33 Claassens, J. L. 2011. Job, Theology and Disability: Moving Towards a New Kind of Speech. Paper presented at the 
Theology, Disability and Human Dignity Conference, Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, 18-20 May 2011.
34 Pierson, J. 2010. Inclusion: Easy and Natural. In Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 14:182-5.
35 Claassens, Job, Theology and Disability.
36 Möller, E. 2011 The Experiences of People with Disabilities in Faith Communities: A Social Work Perspective. 
Paper presented at the Theology, Disability and Human Dignity Conference, Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch 
University, 18-20 May 2011.
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faith communities, and in society at large. 
There remains a need for further exploration – whether as formal research or documented 
life stories in the tradition of Henri Nouwen’s Adam.37 In addition to the attitudinal 
issues discussed here, practical strategies need to be explored for care workers across 
the disciplinary spectrum to be empowered to discover, know and then build upon the 
communicative abilities and the theological realities of children with severe disabilities. 
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Disability and  
biomedical enhancement
Conflict or co‑existence?
Anton van Niekerk1
Must Disability anD EnhanCEMEnt bE sEEn as inCoMpatiblE?
What are generally regarded as developments – some would prefer the term “advances” 
– in the field of new biomedical enhancement technologies, including those operative at 
the genetic level, are often not welcomed or applauded by people with disabilities, or by 
bioethicists who concern themselves with the situation of physically and mentally disabled 
people.2 The reasons for this are obvious. Not only disabled people, but all sensible human 
beings are to this very day haunted by the memory of the dehumanisation that vulnerable, 
particularly disabled, people suffered at the hands of the Nazi perpetrators of so-called 
“biomedical experiments” in the death camps during the Holocaust. Much can be said of 
these crimes that available space will not now allow me to embark upon.3 What cannot 
be denied, however, is that these atrocious acts sent a clear message to the disabled 
communities of Western and Eastern Europe at the time. That message was that disabled 
people were regarded by the Nazi authorities and their supporters as inferior, unwanted 
human beings that it would be preferable to rid the world of, and that the best use that 
could be made of them is to exploit their vulnerability in order to experimentally test the 
limits of human endurance, and to try and establish how a superlative, physically perfect 
super-race can be created – a race from which they, in principle, would be banned.
The negative reaction to the very idea of human enhancement is therefore perfectly 
understandable. I would, however, argue that, as a general moral response to the possibility 
of human enhancement, also by means of new biotechnologies, it is unwarranted and 
unsustainable. As a general moral reaction, it commits the fallacy of conferring guilt by 
association, since it uncritically and therefore unjustifiably assumes that every effort to 
enhance people, including researching ways and means of limiting or preventing disability, 
is motivated by negative attitudes towards disability and disabled people. It also assumes 
that research of this nature will, of necessity, be characterised by a lack of informed consent, 
as was overwhelmingly the case with the Nazi experiments. But that is not necessarily 
the case. 
1 Chair, Philosophy Department and Director, Centre for Applied Ethics, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
2 See, for example, Bradshaw, H. G. and Ter Meulen, R. 2010. A Transhumanist Fault Line around Disability: 
Morphological Freedom and the Obligation to Enhance, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35:671.
3 See in this regard Miklos, N. 1962. Auschwitz: A Doctor’s Eye-witness Account (Trans. Kremer, T. and Seaver, R.). 
London: Panther, and Posner, G. L. and Ware, J. 1987. Mengele: The Complete Story. London: Futura.
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enhancement, which is not a new phenomenon and has been around as long as we can 
remember,4 and disability are not irreconcilable concepts. In fact, I would like to argue that 
much of what happens on the front of the development of new enhancement technologies, 
also of a biomedical (including genetic) nature, confers significant possibilities for the 
situation of some disabled people.5 This argument is informed throughout by the strong 
conviction that the search for a cure for, or a relief from, conditions or dispositions that are 
universally experienced as restrictive, painful or discomforting, does not imply negative 
attitudes towards the individual people who live with these conditions. 
I wish to make it clear that by constructing such an argument, I am in no way expressing 
any negative attitude towards, nor am I in any sense questioning the humanity of, 
disabled people or their right to life and to care. In, for example, Eva Kittay’s dispute with 
bioethicists such as Jeff McMahan6 and Peter Singer7, I accept Kittay’s arguments about 
the fundamental difference between a disabled human being and a chimpanzee. Although 
I do think that many animals, particularly the higher primates, have significant moral 
status, that status is lower than that of a severely mentally disabled child.8 When I will 
deal, later in the article, with an issue regarding d/Deaf9 people, their humanity and rights 
are accepted unconditionally.
I believe that enhancement technologies can (and ought to) spring from motives and 
the application of principles that are both morally and theologically grounded. Morally 
speaking, the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are obviously applicable: the 
idea to better people is motivated by the commitment to do good and to prevent harm. 
Theologically speaking, enhancement technologies are quite compatible with the hope of 
the renewal of creation that is promised on the basis of faith in God’s redemptive work 
in Christ, a redemption that transcends the idea of a mere spiritual reconciliation of God 
and humankind, and includes the promise of cosmic renewal, to the point of the eventual 
termination of all kinds of suffering in the world.
4 Cf. Buchanan, A. 2011. Beyond Humanity: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-33.
5 Cf. Okarma, T. B. 2001. Human Embryonic Stem Cells: A Primer on the Technology and its Medical Applications. 
In Holland, S., Lebacqz, K. & Zoloth, L. (eds), The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 3-26.
6 See McMahan, J. 2003. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7 See Singer, P. 1996. Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of our Traditional Ethics. New York, NY: Macmillan.
8 See Kittay, E. F. 2009. The personal is philosophical is political: a philosopher and mother of a cognitively 
disabled person sends notes from the battlefield. Metaphilosophy 40(3-4):606-27. See, in particular, her recorded 
interchanges with McMahan and Singer on pages 621-2 of her article. 
9 I will respect the custom of using “deaf” (with a lower case d) for people who do not associate with other 
members of the deaf community, strive to identify themselves with hearing people, and regard their hearing loss 
solely in medical terms. I will use “Deaf” (with a capital D) for people who identify themselves as culturally deaf 
and have a strong deaf identity. Deaf (capital) will therefore be used for all aspects of deaf culture, and a lower 
case deaf will be used when speaking solely about the hearing loss. When I’m unsure, I’ll use d/Deaf. See in this 
regard McLellan, F. 2002. Controversy over deliberate conception of deaf child. The Lancet 359:1315.
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thrEE MEanings of Disability
What do I mean by “disability”? It is very difficult to agree on a single, all-encompassing 
definition of this problematic term. It seems to me as if the literature offers, broadly speaking, 
three kinds of definition, viz. a medical, social and (what I, for lack of a better term) would 
like to call a “philosophical” definition. In terms of the medical definition, disability might be 
looked upon as a condition resulting from the malfunction of a part or parts of the human 
body or mind. This might have been caused by genetic inheritance, illness or accident. It 
is the kind of condition in which, as Glover formulates it, “some physiological or chemical 
system might be missing or atrophied [...]. The absence or malfunction of such a system 
results in the person having impaired abilities to cope with life”.10
The second kind of definition of disability is social. Here disability is understood as a social 
construct, i.e. an alleged adverse condition, but one that exists relative to the way in which 
society, by its interpretations and provisions, creates the condition. Take the inability to 
walk. This could be seen as a “disability” in a society where there is minimal provision for 
wheelchairs and wheelchair access to buildings, elevators, trains, buses and the like. In a 
society well provided for in this respect, the “disability” of not being able to walk becomes 
much less of an issue. 
In the literature the situation of an 18th-century community in the USA known as Martha’s 
Vineyard is often used to illustrate this point.11 Shapiro writes in this regard:
For 250 years deafness was commonplace on Martha’s Vineyard. The first deaf 
resident, a fisherman named Jonathan Lambert, settled there in 1694. He carried 
a recessive gene for deafness and, as a result of intermarriage among the isolated 
islanders, this trait spread through generations of Lambert’s descendants [...]. By 
the middle of the 19th century, one in 25 residents of Chilmark was deaf, and in 
one neighbourhood the ratio was one in four [...]. The result was [...] the entire 
community learned to use sign language [...]. Hearing fishermen would use it to 
communicate from one distant boat to another. By mid-1800s, greater mobility 
slowed the pace of intermarriage, and the genetic anomaly that created the deaf 
community disappeared.12
Here, clearly, what would be regarded unequivocally as a “disability” in other communities 
was regarded as an entirely non-significant attribute (like blue eyes) because of the kind 
of compensatory social interaction that was fostered within this community. Deafness as a 
“social construct” was, in fact, “deconstructed”.
This example, interesting as it is, nevertheless remains quite exceptional. Disability cannot 
always be looked upon as a mere social construct that can be radically adjusted simply 
if enough effort is made by society. Not all disabilities can be overcome, even though it 
must be admitted that science and technology, as well as sensitivity and will power in 
society, can achieve a lot to improve the quality of life of disabled people. The fact remains, 
10 Glover, J. 2006. Choosing Children: Genes, Disability and Design. Oxford: Clarendon, 6.
11 See Groce, N. 1985. Everyone Here Spoke Sign Language: Heredity Deafness on Martha’s Vineyard. London: Harvard 
University Press.
12 Shapiro, as quoted in Marks, D. 1999. Disability: Controversial Debates and Psychosocial Perspectives. London and New 
York, NY: Routledge, 78-9.
106
C
H
A
N
G
IN
G
 P
R
A
C
T
IC
E
S however, that irrespective of social context and irrespective of practices of social inclusion 
or exclusion, impairments affect people’s lives. No amount of social inclusion will enable 
a blind reader to browse the hard-copy texts in an archive in the same way that sighted 
people can, for example, and even if we accept the argument that it is the existence of stairs 
rather than ramps or lifts in the built environment that excludes people with mobility 
impairments, there is a reality to not being able to use one’s legs to walk unaided.
That brings us to, in the third instance, the philosophical conception of disability.13 Disability 
must always be understood in terms of real limitations that are experienced in bodily and/
or mental functioning. In this sense disability is significantly different from allegedly 
socially constructed disadvantages like ethnicity or skin colour. A hermit who is unable 
to walk is disabled, irrespective of the fact that he lives entirely on his own and not in a 
society. A limitation or failure of functioning, however, is only a disability if it amounts to 
the impairment of human flourishing. 
Aristotle identified flourishing (eudaimonia) as our telos as human beings.14 This refers to our 
capacity to make choices, set goals and exert ourselves physically and mentally to our full 
potential. It could, of course, be argued that disabled people can, in this sense, also flourish. 
Blind people may not be able to see, but that does not mean that they cannot set goals for 
themselves as well as exercise and fulfil potential. 
What must be added for a complete understanding of the notion of “disability” is some 
understanding of what for convenience may be termed “normal functioning”, since we 
regard functional limitations as disabilities only when there is a contrast with the usual 
range of human functioning. The distinction between “normality” (in itself a very elastic 
term) and disability is notoriously difficult to adumbrate unequivocally. Glover rightly 
remarks that “the normality that is contrasted with disability is a hybrid of the numerical 
and the normative”.15 By this he means that normality is first of all numerically determined; 
“its possession by a reasonable sized group is needed if something is to count as normal 
functioning [...]. The central idea seems to be that of a benchmark of human potentiality, 
demonstrated by some sizable past or present population”.16 
What the norm for “normality” is, is much more difficult to establish uncontroversially. 
Glover in this respect refers to the view of John Harris: “disability is a condition that 
someone has a strong rational preference not to be in”.17 This is not satisfactory, since I, for 
example, have a strong rational preference not to be bankrupt, and yet bankruptcy does not 
constitute disability. Harris’s formulation has to be adapted to include reference to some 
bodily or mental condition. My suggestion would be: disability is a physical or mental condition, 
characterised by significant functional impairment, that most people have a strong rational preference not 
to be in. Of course, some disabled people (members of the Deaf community particularly come 
to mind) do not look upon their impairment as a “disability”; they regard their Deafness 
13 For this discussion, I draw strongly on Glover, Choosing Children, 8-16.
14 Aristotle, 1955. The Ethics of Aristotle – The Nicomachean Ethics. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 66-89.
15 Glover, Choosing Children, 12.
16 Glover, Choosing Children, 12.
17 Harris as quoted by Glover, Choosing Children, 13.
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as what is “normal” for them. But I do argue that that position is the exception, and that 
we encounter almost insurmountable problems if we want to reach an acceptable notion 
of “disability” without any reference to some sense of “normality” that most people hold.
EnhanCEMEnt
This brings us to the second central concept that, for the purpose of my argument in this 
paper, requires clarification, viz. enhancement. There is a tendency, the moment this notion is 
introduced, to conjure up alarmist ideas that allege that enhancement is morally abhorrent 
since it refers to the possibility of biomedically induced eugenics, i.e. the creation of 
some super-race that has mental and physical abilities which far supersede what we are 
accustomed to, and that might well represent entities that are no longer human but must 
rather be regarded as “post-human”. This kind of alarmist grandstanding is very unhelpful 
in this whole debate. What we must first of all understand is that enhancement is an 
inherent characteristic of our species and a natural outcome of our evolution. One of the 
most significant ways in which we differ from other species is the fact that we have, since 
our earliest origins, always impinged on our so-called “natural abilities” in order to improve 
ourselves. Two of the earliest and most influential mechanisms of enhancement that were 
created by our species are literacy and institutions. Literacy is our capacity to write and 
read, i.e. to externalise our thoughts, critically reflect on them and thereby to achieve 
considerable cognitive enhancement – a capacity that is unique to our species on this 
planet.18 Institutions represent our capacity to act, not only as individuals, but collectively 
(e.g. through the state), thereby enhancing our capacity to ascertain resources, ensure 
security, develop moral intuitions and live in peace – things that were impossible in our 
original “state of nature”.19 The point is: we have been “improving ourselves” since time 
immemorial. Enhancement is what has come out of our process of evolution. Enhancement 
need therefore not be looked upon as the quest for perfection; it is very often no more than 
the outcome of the process of change that is inherent to our species.
The enhancements that are the topic of this paper, however, are not of this general and 
societal nature, but specifically biomedical enhancements. By “biomedical enhancements” 
I mean, following a definition of Allen Buchanan, “deliberative interventions, applying 
biomedical science, which aim to improve existing capacities that most or all normal 
human beings typically have, or to create a new capacity, by acting directly on the body or 
the brain”.20 Buchanan also points out that five types of enhancement are widely discussed 
in the literature on biomedical enhancement: 
18 For this point, see Macdonald, G. and Pettit, P. 1981. Semantics and Social Science. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 14-105. On the significance of writing for human development, see Ricoeur, P. 1981. Hermeneutics and the 
Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 145-9.
19 See Hobbes, T. 1946. Leviathan, or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a commonwealth, ecclesiastical and civil. (Introduction 
by Michael Oakeshott). Oxford: Blackwell.
20 Buchanan, A. 2011. Beyond humanity?, 23.
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endurance; (2) improvements in cognitive capacities, such as various aspects 
of memory, information processing and reasoning [it is in this respect that the 
debate about performance-enhancement drugs such as Ritalin is pertinent]; 
(3) improvements in affect, emotion, motivation or temperament [anti-
depressants, and, more particularly, the question as to the extent to which 
they ought to be made available to the general population, is very relevant in 
this respect]; (4) improvements in immunity or resistance to diseases; and 
(5) increased longevity.21
Buchanan’s notion of biomedical enhancement and the examples just quoted suggest that 
the notion of “enhancement” only applies to those technologies that take us beyond what 
is species-typical. In other words, Buchanan’s notion of enhancement seems to apply only 
to interventions that transcend what would be regarded as “normal” functioning in human 
beings without any obvious disabilities. The implication would be that technologies that 
enhance the ability of disabled people to manage in their environments would not be 
regarded as “enhancements”, but only as technologies that are therapeutic or restorative. 
To my mind, this is too restrictive a notion of enhancement. I would like to argue that our 
notion of biomedical enhancement should also include the interventions that transform 
the “normal functioning” of people that are generally regarded as disabled. I therefore look 
upon a wheelchair as an enhancement of the normal mobility of a person with paraplegia, 
and upon cochlear implants as an enhancement of a person whose normal hearing capability 
is zero or very close to zero. The examples are instances of enhancements in the sense that 
they improve the sensory, physical and mental abilities of people whose sensory, physical 
and mental abilities are impaired relative to what is regarded as “normal function” in 
society. In that sense, the notion of “enhancement” can and does apply to disabled people.22
CasE stuDy: DEaf parEnts rEquEsting DEaf ChilDrEn
I would now like to illustrate the relevance of emerging enhancement technologies for 
disabled people by developing a case study based on the widely discussed phenomenon of 
Deaf parents requesting a Deaf child. There are two available technologies for achieving this. 
The first is prenatal diagnosis (PND) with pregnancy termination (i.e. induced abortion) 
if the foetus has not inherited the genetic mutations(s) that will result in deafness.23 
Since induced abortion is part and parcel of this technology, and abortion is morally quite 
controversial, I will not consider this technology any further in this paper. The second 
21 Buchanan, Beyond humanity?, 25. For a riveting (and controversial) discussion of the possibilities of increasing 
longevity, see also Harris, J. 2007. Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making People Better. Princeton, NJ and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 59-71.
22 My thanks to an anonymous referee for impressing upon me the need to make this point clearer.
23 Mand, C. et al. 2009. Genetic Selection for Deafness: The Views of Hearing Children of Deaf Adults. Journal of 
Medical Ethics (35):722-8.
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applicable technology is pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to have a Deaf child.24 
First, something more about this technology. 
  Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis
PGD is a recently developed technique to determine genetic defects in embryos created by 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) prior to the implantation of an embryo into a uterus for gestation. 
The diagnosis occurs at the 6-10 cell stage of embryonic development. One to two cells are 
then removed from the embryo and its cellular DNA is then tested for any chromosomal 
“abnormalities or mutations”.25 This kind of test can determine whether the embryo would 
be d/Deaf if allowed to develop to term. Embryos carrying disease are generally discarded 
or frozen indefinitely, whereas those free from disease are generally implanted. PGD can 
nowadays be used as an alternative to traditional techniques for prenatal disease, such as 
amniocentesis or CVS. As a technique it enables prospective parents to “prevent abortion”, 
since conditions that, when discovered in the foetus later in pregnancy and would 
constitute grounds for abortion, are by this technique diagnosed before implantation. The 
risk of abortion is thus significantly reduced. 
The technique, however, also has its limitations. It is perfect for establishing the sex of 
the embryo, but cannot as yet identify certain other conditions such as spina bifida and 
anencephaly. It cannot therefore abolish the occurrence of abortion when these other 
conditions are diagnosed later in pregnancy. PGD also of necessity requires IVF, which 
is a burdensome, risky and expensive technique, requiring the co-operation of an entire 
medical team and without any guarantee of success.
  The “disability challenge”: Selective abortion
What is often called the “disability challenge” is often regarded to be the main moral 
problem with PGD. The fact is that this technique is not primarily used in order to prepare 
parents for the fate of having a disabled child. Its much more common use is to prevent the 
birth of a disabled child. It is, so it is argued by an author like Adrienne Asch,26 on a par 
with the moral objection, not to abortion in general, but to selective abortion, i.e. abortion of 
a foetus purely on the basis of its impairment. Only, in the case of PGD, what would later 
on in pregnancy establish the basis for a selective abortion27 is undercut or prevented by 
the fact that the impaired embryo is ab initio not implanted and therefore not given the 
opportunity to develop to a point where it can either be born or aborted. That factuality 
amounts to inherent and morally unacceptable discrimination against disabled people; it 
24 As pointed out by Mand, C. et al. 2009. Genetic Selection for Deafness, these requests are not very prevalent, but 
do occur from time to time. A prominent case was the request in 2001 by two Deaf lesbians from Bethesda, USA, 
Sharon Duchesnau and Candace McCullough. For their case, see McLellan, Controversy.
25 I greatly rely for my discussion of the PGD on Steinbock, B. 2002. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and 
Embryo Selection. In Burly, J. and Harris, J. 2002. A Companion to Genethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 175-90.
26 Cf. Asch, A. 1988. Reproductive Technology and Disability. In Cohen, S. and Taub, N. (eds), Reproductive Laws for 
the 1990s. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 69-124.
27 For an excellent discussion of the moral problematic related to selective abortion, see Hall, S. 2008. Difference, 
Disability and Discrimination: A Philosophical Critique of Selective Abortion. Unpublished MA thesis, 
Stellenbosch University.
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effort to reduce their numbers significantly.
  PGD and elective deafness
The more interesting scenario made possible by PGD, however, is that to which I alluded 
in terms of the case study that I want to discuss. This is the situation where Deaf parents 
express the wish that PGD be used, not to prevent the birth of a disabled child, but particularly 
to ensure the birth of a Deaf child. The argument developed in this regard is based on the claim 
to the reality of what is increasingly called Deaf culture.28 By this is meant the fact that 
congenitally Deaf people do not necessarily think of their impairment as a disability at all. 
Since they have never been part of the hearing world, they are not aware of an alternative 
reality and prefer to live in the world as they know it – a world without sound. They 
experience much more trouble communicating with hearing people than with fellow Deaf 
people. What is more, when Deaf people marry or enter into stable relationships and wish 
to procreate, their express desire sometimes is to have a child that will also be Deaf. Thus 
it is ensured that the child will share their life experience and will most easily become part 
of their own culture. That deafness is regarded as a serious impediment by hearing people 
is of no consequence to these Deaf people, since they cannot form any realistic notion of 
the world of the hearing. All they want is a child that forms part of their everyday living 
environment and experience.
What, if any, is the moral problem with this seemingly problematic (and for some hearing 
people even shocking) wish of Deaf people? The significant moral concern in this regard 
seems to me to be the issue of harm.29 Would compliance with the prospective Deaf 
parents’ wish not confer an undeserved and easily preventable harm on the child born 
from the union of his/her Deaf parents? The prevention of harm is a fundamental principle 
in biomedical ethics that could and should not easily be overruled by sympathy with the 
preferences of parents, even if they are disabled.
  Is harm done to a deaf child selected by PGD?
If we are dealing with a situation where a normal embryo would be deliberately impaired 
in the sense that its hearing function would be deliberately removed in order to meet the 
prospective parents’ desire, I do think that there would be a serious moral problem. That 
problem first and foremost stems from two questions: (1) What would be in the best 
interest of the child? (2) What would have been the preference, not of its prospective 
parents, but indeed of the child himself or herself – the person who will have to live with 
the auditive handicap? We can of course not ascertain the wishes or obtain the informed 
consent of an embryo or foetus, but that very eventuality ought to caution us against lightly 
embarking on any action that could be construed as harmful to the prospective child.
28 For this notion see Dolnick, E. 1993. Deafness as Culture. The Atlantic Monthly, September 1993:37-53, and 
Tucker, B. P. 1998. Deaf Culture, Cochlear Implants and Elective Disability. Hastings Center Report, 28(4):6-14.
29 For a profound and highly influential analysis of the notion of harm, see Feinberg, J. 1984. Harm to Others. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. See also Steinbock, B. and McClamrock, R. 1994. When is Birth Unfair to the Child? 
Hastings Center Report 24(6):15-21.
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However, if the selection of the embryo is done by PGD – the best currently available 
technique in this regard – it is not correct to claim that harm is deliberately done to the 
embryo if an embryo that will develop into a deaf child is selected. The simple reason for this is 
that nothing is done to that embryo to impair its potential hearing ability. All else being 
equal, the choice will be between an embryo that will one day be able to hear, and one 
that will never be able to hear. The parents could well argue that the choice is similar 
to a choice often made by non-disabled parents who select embryos thorough PGD: the 
choice namely between a boy or a girl. Sex can conclusively be established by PGD, and 
parents therefore have such a choice if their reproduction is administered through PGD. 
The issue is therefore not whether the embryo is harmed; the issue is whether or not the 
deaf embryo is selected. If it is selected, it will grow into a d/Deaf child, and nothing can 
at that stage of development stop that occurrence. The baby is therefore not harmed by 
what the parents chose or did, unless it could be argued that the d/Deaf child is harmed by 
being brought into existence at all, since deafness is allegedly such a “terrible condition”. 
I would nevertheless want to argue that “wrongful life” in the case of a child thus born 
would clearly be an absurd claim or accusation. It is surely unfounded to argue that the life 
of a d/Deaf person is intolerable. The d/Deaf child is not harmed by being selected and by 
being born; if it is selected, also if it happens on the basis of adhering to the parents’ wishes, 
that child will be d/Deaf; it has not and cannot be harmed by incurring d/Deafness on a 
child that would otherwise have been hearing. The reproach that such a birth would have 
been “unfair on the child” therefore also is not valid. 
Note that this claim is disputed by John Harris. According to him, “a harmed condition 
obtains whenever someone is in a disabling or hurtful condition, even if that condition is 
only marginally disabling and even though it is not possible for that particular individual 
to avoid the condition in question”.30 Note also Glover’s claim that Harris and Rebecca 
Bennett, who took issue with Harris on this point, use two different notions of harm. 
Bennett’s position seems closer to the conventional understanding of harm, i.e. the 
deliberate withholding of legitimate opportunities or the deliberate infliction of bodily 
or psychological distress, discomfort or malfunction. This is the notion of harm that 
I espouse. For Harris, on the other hand, “anyone in any disadvantageous position is 
harmed by whoever caused him or her to be in that condition. Because all of us have some 
disadvantages, we have all been harmed by the parents who caused our birth”.31 I find this 
an unacceptable argument. To illustrate:32 a starving person on the point of death who is 
fed may nonetheless be a poor person. The one who fed the starving person is the cause of 
that person being alive, and so is the cause of a living person who is poor, even though he 
is fed. Surely the person who fed the poor person did not harm that person. Being poor and 
alive is better in general than either being starving or being dead.33
30 Quoted by Harris, J. 1998. Clones, Genes and Immortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109. 
31 Glover, Choosing children, 25.
32 I thank an anonymous referee for the example that I use here.
33 For an argument that to bring any person into the world is necessarily to harm that person, see Benatar, D. 
2006. Better Never To Have Been: The harm of coming into existence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. I cannot respond 
critically to that article here and have done so elsewhere.
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do it in spite of the fact that, had they chosen to have a “normal” child, the possibility 
for that “normal” child to become part of both their world and the world of the hearing 
emphatically exists; the normally hearing child has the option of learning sign language 
and associating as much as possible with the culture of the Deaf. That possibility, i.e. of 
being part of both worlds, does, however, not exist for the child selected for birth on the 
basis of his or her d/Deafness. I am not disputing the right of the Deaf parents to make the 
choice for the impaired child on the basis of the concerns expressed earlier; I only caution 
that this consideration ought to be part of the set of reasons that they consider for their 
eventual decision. This concern, however, does not alter my claim that I do not think that 
the d/Deaf child has been harmed purely on the basis of having been selected.
  Complication: Cochlear implants
This prima facie positive evaluation of the moral status of requests to select for d/Deaf 
children is, however, complicated by the possibility of cochlear implants.34 A cochlear 
implant is 
a surgically implanted device that is capable of restoring hearing and speech 
understanding to many individuals who are severely or profoundly deaf. 
Numerous studies show both the ability of profoundly deaf individuals to hear 
speech with cochlear implants and the ability of implanted deaf children to 
develop age-appropriate spoken and receptive language skills.35 
It is claimed that cochlear implants are sometimes not entirely successful, although there 
is growing evidence that they are yielding excellent results. Tucker quotes a report of 
the Advisory Council of the National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication 
Disorders in the USA as claiming: “It has now been demonstrated that the long-term 
benefits of cochlear implants in children are not limited to speech recognition but extend 
into dramatically improved language learning and language skills”. She also refers to a 
recent survey in which 
parents of 176 implanted children perceived that: (1) 44% of the children had 
greater than 70% open speech discrimination (using sound alone with no visual 
clues), (2) 61% of the children had greater than 50% of open speech discrimination 
and (3) 84% of the children had greater than 40% open speech discrimination.36 
In a situation where there are serious misgivings about the success of cochlear implants, a 
decision of Deaf parents not to seek such a procedure for their child may be understandable. 
But the figures I have just quoted indicate that the success of the procedure is growing 
significantly. What is the moral thing for Deaf parents to do in a situation where the 
doubts about the success of cochlear implants are irreversibly receding? Can a decision to 
withhold one’s child from such a procedure in those circumstances be morally defended? 
That hardly seems to be the case, because in such a situation the only concern for the 
parents cannot be their wish to include the child in their Deaf culture. The moral concern 
34 This complication is also pointed out by Glover, see his Choosing Children, 25-6.
35 Tucker, Deaf Culture, 6-14. See also Verhoef, S. 2001. Tegnologie en gestremdheid – filosofies-etiese perspektiewe. 
Unpublished MPhil. thesis, Stellenbosch University. [English: Technology and disability: philosophical and 
ethical perspectives]
36 Tucker, Deaf Culture, 6.
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must also and always be what is in the best interests of the child, particularly when the 
child is still incompetent to participate in the decision.37 Can it cogently be argued that to 
remain d/Deaf while the real possibility of attaining hearing exists is in the best interest 
of the child? Is there not, at least prima facie, a very strong case to be made that to be able 
to participate in both the cultures of the Deaf and the hearing is more in the interest of 
the child than to exclusively contain the child in the culture of the Deaf? Glover rightfully 
remarks in this respect: “The view that deafness is a disability supports the view that 
parents who can give their child hearing should do so. If that is accepted, the choice of a 
deaf child becomes self-defeating.”38
It may seem that I am contradicting my earlier support for Deaf parents’ right to choose 
deafness for their child. What I am arguing is that the possibility of cochlear implants 
complicates the moral right to elective deafness for a child considerably. Cochlear implants, 
as was pointed out, are not always successful. They are also not always available to all deaf 
parents and their children, particularly if these families are poor and find themselves in 
developing countries. Sometimes the decision about cochlear implants can only be taken 
at a time when the child is old enough to also grant assent. The child may turn out to be 
dead against such an intervention, in which case it would certainly be morally problematic 
to coerce the child into such a procedure.
Two important insights arise from this discussion. The first is that, in spite of Deaf parents’ 
right to elect deafness for their child, the possibility of cochlear implants complicates that 
right. If such implants are available to Deaf parents, the implication of elective deafness 
might well be that the parents initially select a deaf embryo via PGD, and yet at some future 
point find it necessary to reverse their choice of complete deafness for their child by opting 
for a cochlear implant in order to optimise the child’s choices and to enable the child to 
manage in both the hearing and Deaf cultures. That would be a problematic situation since, 
if the child’s ability to manage optimally in both worlds is a prime moral concern in our 
understanding of the child’s best interests, the considerably easier option for the parents 
would have been to elect a hearing embryo from the start.
The second important insight emerging from this discussion is the fact that a cochlear 
implant is an instance of enhancement, in line with the extended meaning of enhancement 
that I discussed earlier, i.e. the sense in which something like a cochlear implant can indeed 
be regarded as a biomedical enhancement of a deaf person. In addition, it should be noted 
that we, in this case, have to do with an enhancement that in no way reeks of eugenics or 
similarly morally dubious practices, or in any way substantiates the suspicion of negative 
attitudes towards disability or disabled people. Here we are clearly dealing with an 
enhancement with beneficial intent, aimed at the improvement of auditive function.
37 For a comprehensive discussion and grounding of this moral principle, see Buchanan, A. E. and Brock, D. W. 
1990. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision-making. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 122-33. 
The authors write in this regard: “The best interest principle is clearly patient-centred because it focuses 
primarily on the current and future interests of the incompetent individual. As such it must take into account 
quality-of-life judgments. Whether a particular treatment is in a patient’s interest depends upon how it affects 
that patient’s life” (123, their emphasis).
38 Glover, Choosing children, 26.
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ConClusion
It is therefore my contention and conclusion that the conventional suspicion amongst 
disabled people and some disability advocates toward enhancement technologies is 
not always justified. There need not be conflict between the culture and experience of 
the disabled and the unstoppable drive towards enhancement, which is not so much the 
outcome of a cogent modern or postmodern and morally dubious cultural project, but is 
much rather the outcome of our natural evolution and a fundamental disposition of our 
species. Efforts to avoid disability in the world or to improve the quality of human life are 
not expressive of negativity towards the existence or rights of disabled people. Disability 
and enhancement can find a cogent co-existence, to the undoubted benefit of the disabled 
community.39
39 My thanks to my research assistant, Andrea Palk, for her assistance in finding relevant literature, commenting 
on and proofreading this paper. Thanks also to Leslie Swartz for his comments and suggestions about relevant 
literature, as well as his final editing of my language. I also thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments 
and advice.
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Cultural and religious explanations 
of disability and promoting inclusive 
communities in Southern Africa
Tsitsi Chataika1
Making SenSe of Culture and religion
One’s cultural and religious beliefs, rituals, customs and practices that direct thinking, 
decision-making and actions in a patterned way are the sum total of cultural and religious 
beliefs.2 Hensley and Schott define culture as: “A shared set of values, assumptions, 
perceptions and conventions, based on a shared history and language, which enable 
members of a group or community to function together.”3 
Consequently, culture is a social practice that is a mirror through which we view the world 
and make sense of it, and eventually it influences our actions and relationships.4 Religion 
also shapes one’s belief systems and practices.5 Thus, cultural and religious beliefs are 
capable of explaining why some people are disabled, how they should be treated, and what 
rights and responsibilities they are either entitled to or deprived of.6 However, within every 
culture and religion there are diverse sub-cultures and sub-religions, with many beliefs, 
values, attitudes and behaviours.7 
Despite the emergence of the social model and the rights-based approach to disability, 
culture and religion still influence the understanding of disability in many societies.8 
Therefore, the inability to understand these concepts in relation to disability is to disregard 
crucial reference points for fostering inclusive communities. For example, words used 
in the Zimbabwean Shona and Ndebele languages for a disabled person, such as chirema 
and isilima respectively, have been used to mean inability to function and stupidity. In 
1 Tsitsi Chataika is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies, Stellenbosch 
University, South Africa and a Research Fellow in the Centre for Global Health, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
and the Research Institute for Health and Social Change, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. 
2 Kisanji, J. 1995. Growing up Disabled. In Zinkin, P. and McConachie, H. (eds), Disabled Children and Developing 
Countries. London: MacKeith, 183-99.
3 Hensley, A. and Schott, J. 1999. Culture, Religion and Patient Care in a Multi-ethnic Society: A Handbook for Professionals 
London: Age Concern England.
4 Mpofu, E. 2002. Psychology in Africa: Challenges and prospects. International Journal of Psychology 37:179-86. 
5 Reynolds, T. E. 2008. Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality. Wheaton, IL: Brazos.
6 Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association: Culture, religion & disability: An introduction. (MMDA) 
Online at: http://www.mdaa.org.au/publications/ethnicity/information.html [Accessed: 8 May 2011].
7 MMDA. 
8 Reinders, H. 2011. Is There Meaning in Disability? Or Is It the Wrong Question? Journal of Religion, Disability & 
Health 15(1):57-71.
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conceptualisation of disability seems to suggest that a disabled person is on the borderline 
of being a human and an animal, lacking in clear social role functions; the same perception 
has been reported in other African countries.9 Divlieger describes this phenomenon as “role 
marginalisation” and Murphy conceptualises it as “social liminality”.10
Cultural and religiouS explanationS of diSability
There has been a gradual global paradigm shift on the aetiology of disability to medically 
related causes and accidents. However, in many communities, with specific reference to 
Southern Africa, most attitudes and responses are rooted in beliefs about the causes of 
disabilities, which in indigenous cultures are predominantly attributed to spiritual or 
supernatural sources.11 Reports have been published of negative responses to disability 
including ostracism, abuse and even killings, as well as positive stories of non-discriminatory 
community values and inclusion of disabled people.12 Geiger’s observations in Botswana 
illustrate the extreme variations in attitudes and responses within a single community.13 
Consequently, there is a danger of writing a single story, or making generalisations about 
attitudes to disability. However, some of the following cultural and religious explanations 
for the occurrence of a disability have been documented. 
  Disability and spirituality
Some people still look at disability as a form of punishment by some ancestral spirits who 
are unhappy with the family or a particular individual, or as a result of witchcraft where 
scores have to be settled.14 In either case, the target of the punishment is the family and 
the person who becomes disabled “suffers” on behalf of the family to appease the spirits. 
In Southern Africa, for instance, some people still believe that witchcraft is a contributory 
factor to the occurrence of a disability. For example, in a study conducted in South Africa 
most mothers strongly felt that their disabled children had been bewitched, as indicated 
by one of them:15 
Because my husband chose to marry me instead of their daughter, they decided to 
make me barren. I have only this one child who they also bewitched. He cannot 
9 Divlieger, P. J. 1998. Physical Disability in Bantu Languages: Understanding the Relativity of Classification and 
Meaning. International Journal of Rehabilitation Research 21:51-62.
10 Divlieger, Physical Disability.
11 Divlieger, Physical disability.
12 Geiger, M. 2010. Using Cultural Resources to Build an Inclusive Environment for Children with Severe 
Communication Disabilities: A Case Study from Botswana. Children’s Geographies 8(1):51-63.
13 Geiger, M. 2012. Through the Eyes of Children: Theological Lessons with and from Children with Severe 
Communication Disabilities. Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 16(1):102-113.
14 Kisanji, Growing up disabled; Addison, J. 1986. A Historical Survey of Facilities for Handicapped People in 
Zimbabwe. National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped Jan:1-38.
15 Masasa, T. Irwin-Carruthers, S. and M. Faure. 2005. Knowledge of, Beliefs about and Attitudes to Disability: 
Implications for Health Professionals. South African Family Practice 47(7):40-4.
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talk or walk. They put the medicine in me when I was pregnant. My body was full 
of that medicine and it passed on to my child.
Similar experiences have been reported elsewhere in Africa. In 2009 the Uganda Pulse 
(newspaper) reported on a disabled girl who believed that she had been bewitched by 
her stepmother.16 It was reported that the girl broke into tears when Uganda Pulse asked 
her about the cause of her disability as the question brought back memories of her “evil” 
stepmother. The disabled child informed the reporter that her mother told her that her 
stepmother had bewitched her because she hated her. In addition, the girl narrated how 
the stepmother would brag to neighbours about causing her disability. This was despite 
the attempt by the Public Relations Officer of the Uganda National Action on Physical 
Disability to explain to the family that accidents and other health-related factors, and not 
witchcraft, cause disability.17 This and many other stories are common in most African 
communities. As such, certain cultural beliefs may be so intense in people’s minds such 
that no amount of explanation can make them change their minds. 
Rituals and spiritual ceremonies are usually held to cleanse the “disabled person” and to 
dispel the evil spirits from the family; hence relatives attend such functions in an attempt 
to solve a family problem.18 Below is an example of how a disabled person underwent a 
“cleansing ceremony” in Zimbabwe:
I was taken up a mountain and I was left overnight on the mountain on my own. 
They were to collect me the following morning, traditional rituals were performed. 
It was expected that was the way of really helping me out. It was terrible.19
Consequently, the birth of a disabled child is viewed as a punishment or a taboo, capable 
of bringing bad luck to the family, if rituals are not carried out.20 Therefore, some family 
members come to support a family with a disabled child only if there are rituals to cleanse 
the disability in order to remove the bad omen.21 This suggests that family members are not 
supportive of the disabled child; but rather are more interested in the desire to eliminate 
the bad omen (disability). 
When people have congenital impairments and the cause cannot be explained, this is 
usually seen as God’s plan, or as God’s reaction towards people’s unbecoming behaviours.22 
Miles conducted a comparative analysis of Hindu, Buddhist and Islamic historical contexts 
and established that responses to impairment are similar to those in Christianity.23 For 
16 Nyanzi, W. 2009. Uganda Pulse. Uganda People News: Ugandans believe disability is a result of witchcraft. Online 
at: http://www.ugpulse.com/articles/daily/news.asp?about=Ugandans+believe+ disability+is+a+result+of+witc
hcraft&ID=11666 [Accessed: 15 April 2009].
17 Nyanzi, Uganda Pulse.
18 Chimedza, R. 2001. Context of Deaf Education in Zimbabwe: Teaching and Learning. In Chimedza, R. and 
Peters, S. (eds), Disability and Special Educational Needs in an African Context. Harare: College, 134-59.
19 Chimedza, Context of Deaf Education, 157.
20 United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF]. 2001. A Study on Children and Adolescents with Disabilities in Zimbabwe. 
Harare: UNICEF.
21 UNICEF, A Study on Children, 76.
22 Monk J. and Wee, J. 2008. Factors Shaping Attitudes Towards Physical Disability in and Availability of 
Rehabilitative Support Systems for Disabled People in Rural Kenya. Asia Pacific Disability Rehabilitation Journal 
19(1):93-113.
23 Miles, M. 1995. Disability in an Eastern Religious Context: Historical Perspectives. Disability & Society 10(1):49-69.
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does in a previous life) promotes the belief that disability is caused by an individual’s 
past transgressions.24 Therefore, some religions suggest that disability is a punishment. 
However, John 9:2-3 suggests that blindness has nothing to do with sin, as when Jesus was 
asked by his disciples:
“Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?” Jesus 
answered: “It was not that this man sinned, or his parents, but that the works of 
God might be displayed in him.” 
A common belief in the Jewish tradition was that “calamity or suffering was a result of 
some great sin”.25 However, in this case, Jesus used the man’s ‘suffering’ to teach about 
faith and to glorify God. The contradictory messages make it difficult for people to have a 
common understanding of the biblical causes of disability. For instance, when Jesus healed 
a man with paraplegia in Mark 2:1-12, he ended by saying: “Son, your sins are forgiven”. 
Literally, the text might make some readers assume that this man was more sinful than 
others, despite Jesus acknowledging that we are all sinful. Another example is the Shariah 
law, which is an Islamic code of conduct. The practice has been that if someone stole 
something, his/her hand would be cut off as retribution for the crime committed. Similarly, 
in the Bible, Mark 9:45 indicates that if one foot causes one to sin, it is better to cut it off 
in order to enter heaven. In such circumstances, if people see a person with an amputated 
arm or foot, for instance, they might conclude that he/she deserves to be disabled because 
of the ‘sin committed‘. Yet he/she might have had the limb amputated for medical reasons. 
  Disability as contagious
The idea that a disability is contagious and can therefore be caught is fairly common in 
many countries. This results, mostly, in actions to protect pregnant women from seeing 
or touching disabled people, including their assistive devices.26 This belief implies that 
pregnant women should avoid exposing themselves to disabled people, lest, they might 
give birth to one: 
Then sometime last year in the afternoon, my pregnant secretary was brave 
enough to ask me a straightforward question. “Mr X, what chances do I have in 
giving birth to a disabled child since I am working with disabled people?” She was 
simply trying to crosscheck the truth in the belief that when a pregnant woman 
comes across a disabled person, she must spit at her tummy so as not to give 
birth to a disabled child. My secretary could not imagine spitting at herself every 
time disabled people visited the office. She was also aware that our association 
regularly held workshops and seminars with disabled members. Therefore, could 
she always spit at herself at every workshop? Such dangerous beliefs in our 
culture are a thorn in the flesh for our modern society. It is good that some of our 
colleagues are slowly becoming free.27 
Thus beliefs can be transmitted from one generation to another, but can slowly change 
with new ways of understanding disability. Ndebele, however, argued that the first 
24 MDAA. 
25 Life Application Bible (New International Version). 1992. Eastbourne: Kingsway, 1887.
26 MDAA. 
27 National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped [NASCOH]. 2002. Disability and Exclusion, 
NASCOH News 48 (Jun), 2. Online at: http://www.nascoh.org.zw [Accessed: 3 May 2011].
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challenge that a parent of a disabled child faces is that of accepting the child’s disability.28 
She noted that n’angas (traditional healers) and ‘prophets’ are often consulted to reverse the 
condition. This was also confirmed by a disabled student in Chataika’s study:
The family tried to get a cure for the deafness. We went to some faith healers, 
doctors, and even n’angas [traditional doctors]. Eventually, my parents stopped 
when they had exhausted all the avenues.29 
By implication, from early childhood young disabled children may get the message that 
they are unclean, inferior and unworthy, and therefore require ‘cleansing‘.
Mythical beliefs are hard to eradicate, as they easily become the crystallised opinions and 
attitudes of society.30 In Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries, for example, there 
is a general belief that one should not laugh at a person with a disability lest the curse is 
transferred to the scornful individual.31 In a way this has resulted in society being more 
tolerant of disabled people, because of the fear that the disability might be shifted onto them, 
hence the proverb Seka urema wafa [Laugh at a disabled person only when you are dead]. 
  Blaming
Families have been torn apart by the birth of a disabled child, as reported below:
I grew up in a family, but it was not a smooth sailing journey. I lost my sight 
because of measles. Family siblings always found themselves in a dilemma having 
me as their brother and my disability. They did not want to be associated with 
a blind brother, but at the same time, they wanted a blood relative, who in their 
eyes was a “normal” person – separating the two became difficult.32 
Seventy-five per cent of the disabled children I was teaching in 1995, for instance, came 
from single mothers who had been divorced because they were being blamed for causing 
the disability, especially if no such thing had ever happened before in the family lineage. 
Divorce is common amongst families of disabled children in most African countries. In 
Zimbabwe, for example, it is a common practice for the man’s relatives to blame a woman 
who has given birth to a disabled child. 
If the wife is lucky not to be divorced, the family might decide to hide the disabled child as 
a way of coping with the affliction and retaining social equilibrium:
Often these children are excluded from society. They might be hidden away at 
home if they look different because of fear and superstition [...]. Often their 
needs are not recognised and they are thought to have little to contribute to their 
community. But this exclusion reduces children’s opportunities to learn, grow 
and develop.33
28 Ndebele, A. 2003. The Challenges of Being a Parent of a Child with a Disability. NASCOH Advocacy Bulletin 6 
(Sept). Online at: http://www.nascoh.org.zw/ [Accessed: 19 April 2011].
29 Chataika, T. 2007. Inclusion of Disabled Students in Higher Education in Zimbabwe: From Idealism to Realism 
– A Social Ecosystem Perspective. Unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Sheffield, UK, 167.
30 Tilstone, C. and Rose, R. (eds). 2003. Strategies to Promote Inclusive Practice. London: RoutledgeFalmer. 
31 Mpofu, E. 2000. Rehabilitation in International Perspective: A Zimbabwean Experience. Disability and 
Rehabilitation 23:481-9.
32 Chataika, Inclusion of Disabled Students, 153.
33 UNESCO, Overcoming Exclusion, 10.
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team responsible for identifying school-aged children with visual impairment in rural 
communities. In some cases the family would deny that they had a disabled child. In an 
effort to establish the truth, we would go through the local chiefs and schools. In other 
situations we would find the children hidden in granaries. Stigmatisation does not end 
with family members or at community level; it can also extend to professionals, who might 
be quick to make an HIV diagnosis and yet might be another medical condition:
The constant visits to the hospital also made the medical staff to think that he 
was indeed HIV positive, so test after test of HIV as well as TB [Tuberculosis] 
were carried out on both me and my child. Finally, my child was labelled an FTT, 
which means ‘failure to thrive’ as he was not responding to medication.34 
Not all mothers lose hope when faced with such challenging situations. Instead, the experience 
can turn them into strong and bold “super-mums” who defy all negativity:
All this process made me bolder and eventually asking myself the question: “Why 
not me?” – as this was God’s gift, and He could have given it to anyone else. 
Anyway, my child to me was just a child and the fact the he had Down Syndrome 
and a congenital heart defect would not change that.35
Thus, Ndebele’s religious conviction enabled her to draw strength to accept her disabled child. 
  Disability as a test/learning
Most of the religious teachings seem to suggest that disability exists so that a learning 
process can occur, either for the person who has the disability or the family. For example, a 
Mexican mother commented about her disabled child: “It’s a test. I think that by giving you 
a little more than you can handle, [God is] testing you, to see how you’re going to face it.”36 
Hence, a child is viewed as a litmus test that God sends to parent to measure their religious 
conviction. If parents pass the test, the disabled child would have enabled them to become 
better Christians. In trying to solicit public opinion on the religious explanations of 
disability, I posted a question on a social network on 24 May 2011. Some of the responses 
are listed below:
(a) A test from God of one’s faith, I guess.
(b) I think God is all mercy, ever loving; but some things do occur such as disability. 
He never intends to inflict pain on any of His flock. But that said, it tests our faith; 
our relationship with the Lord; and our resolve to stay steadfast on our path; to 
seek all Godly things without wavering in our deep belief. God never wants us 
to suffer. 
The above quotations illustrate how, even today, some Christians still believe that 
disability occurs so that God can ascertain their faith. One of the basic principles of Islam 
is to believe in the wisdom of the Allah, who does not create anything in vain. Also, Allah 
does not decree anything in which there is not some benefit.37 By His wisdom, Allah tests 
34 Ndebele, The Challenges, 3.
35 Ndebele, The Challenges, 3.
36 Skinner, D., Rodriguez, P., and D. B. Bailey (Jr). 1999. Qualitative Analysis of Latino Parents’ Religious 
Interpretations of their Child’s Disability. Journal of Early Intervention Fall 22:271-85.
37 MMDA.
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parents through having a disabled child. Hence, society should recognise the blessing 
bestowed upon disabled children, and give thanks for Allah’s blessing and pray for good 
health.38 The following biblical text is not specifically referring to disability, but it does 
describe the concept of suffering to become a better person:
More than that, we rejoice in our sufferings, knowing that suffering produces 
endurance, and endurance produces character, and character produces hope, 
and hope does not put us to shame, because God’s love has been poured into our 
hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.39 
The idea here is that the more we endure, the more we become better people. 
  Disability as a gift/blessing
Some religious texts and practices seem to suggest that a disability is a gift or a blessing. 
Thus God would have recognised the parents as special individuals capable of raising 
such a “gift”:
God gives you this type of the child because He loves you and trusts you. He 
presented us with this precious angel to show His love to us [...]. [She] is a 
blessing to our family [...] without her, we feel empty.40
Reinders also established that some Christians believe that God must love some people so 
much that He finds it befitting to give them a “special task to fulfil”.41 Disabled people are 
then signified as reflecting the ‘suffering Christ’ and are often perceived to be of angelic or 
beyond-human status to be a blessing for others. For example, in 2005 there was a media 
frenzy around a story of a baby girl born in India with four arms and four legs. The baby 
was joined to a headless parasitic twin who had stopped developing in her mother’s womb. 
She became an object of worship as villagers believed that she was the reincarnation of the 
Hindu goddess of wealth and fertility, Lakshmi, which later became her name.
Both cultural and religious explanations of disability, embracing notions of sin, impurity, 
test, blame, holiness, gift, learning and witchcraft, have formed the dominant bases of 
conceptualisations of, and responses to, disabled people. Most of these beliefs systems 
have the potential to create the binary distinctions of them/us, normal/abnormal, cursed/
not-cursed, sinner/non-sinner – thus increasingly excluding disabled people in community 
and national development activities. However, there are other aspects that impinge on 
the lives of disabled people. Here I am thinking, for example, of issues of authority, the 
role of women and men in society and the wider political/decision-making systems within 
cultural and religious settings.42 Africa has strongly patriarchal beliefs, which in many 
ways disadvantage women, and in particular, women with disabilities who experience 
double marginalisation – being a women and having a disability. Of importance now is to 
bridge the gap between these binaries and cultivate inclusive communities.
38 MMDA.
39 Romans 5:3-5.
40 Masasa, T. Irwin-Carruthers, S. and M. Faure. 2005. Knowledge of, Beliefs about and Attitudes to Disability: 
Implications for Health Professionals. South African Family Practice 47(7):40-4.
41 Masasa et al., Knowledge of, Beliefs about, 59.
42 Lopi, B. et al. 1999. Reporting Gender in Southern Africa: A Media Guide. Harare, Bellville, Lusaka: Women in 
Development and SARDC.
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When we work with narrow definitions of culture and religion, we are bound to exclude 
a large percentage of people. In relation to disability, society will barely understand the 
cultural and religious understanding of disability of certain communities. The implication 
is minimal or total lack of acceptance of disabled people. Yet, the world cannot afford 
to turn a blind eye to an estimated population of one billion disabled people across the 
world, the majority of whom live in low-income countries.43 Hence the need to understand 
the diverse religious and cultural groups in order to establish a base line from which to 
engage in a meaningful advocacy role of re-educating communities on the actual causes 
of disabilities.
Negative cultural views of disability militate against inclusive practices. An effect of such 
beliefs is avoidance of direct contact with disabled people.44 An analysis of some indigenous 
terms (e.g. “chirema”, meaning lacking competence) used for disabled people suggests that 
they are subhuman. The indigenous-traditionalist views about the origin of disability that 
equates it to a type of misfortune from the spiritual world, and the use of terms that deny 
the essential ubuntu or beingness of disabled children, would add to attitudinal barriers to 
their inclusion in family and community settings.45 
How an individual or society defines disability impacts on the intervention strategies 
employed. Earlier on I explained how a grandmother believed that her granddaughter had 
been bewitched. Therefore the family sought a cure for the deafness from faith healers 
and traditional doctors, thus perpetuating the medical model that sees a defective body 
as needing corrective measures to bring it back to “normal”. This may imply that to be 
disabled means to be imperfect, hence the need to find ways of reversing the “imperfection”: 
From what I have heard, there was a problem and they [parents] thought, ‘Let’s 
try and sort it out’ So, I went through long operations.46
The dynamics of families are not always transparent and traditional stereotypic attitudes 
that regard disabled children as a misfortune may overshadow individual families. A 2001 
UNICEF Report points out that some family members saw the birth of a disabled child 
as an act that indicated a bad omen to the family.47 As a result they sought supernatural 
powers to eject the bad spirits from the disabled child. For instance, a cleansing ceremony 
was described above.48 The urgency to “sort out the problem”, as in the cases reported 
in this article, illustrates how disabled children are pushed into the deficit model, where 
they have to be constantly reminded that they are not “normal”. On the other hand, not all 
communities still view the birth of a disabled child as a bad omen. For instance, a study 
conducted in Zimbabwe among one of the most deprived ethnic groups – the Tonga people 
– reported no indications of purposely hiding or neglecting children with disabilities, 
43 United Nations and the World Bank. 2011. The World Disability Report. Geneva: WHO.
44 Mpofu, Psychology in Africa, 179-86. 
45 Kisanji, Growing up Disabled.
46 Chataika, Inclusion of Disabled Students, 163.
47 UNICEF, A Study on Children, 76. 
48 Chimedza, Context of Deaf Education, 157.
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as their attitudes towards disability had changed to become more positive.49 The study 
indicated that parents did their best and displayed much love for their disabled children. 
Rather, when expecting a child, most Tonga people were more worried about whether or 
not the child would survive rather than whether it would have an impairment. Disability 
was seen as secondary as illustrated in the proverb, Kocilema kunywigwa maanzi (It is better to 
be disabled than dead). With the high mortality of children among the Tonga, the sentiment 
among mothers was that they should be grateful to have a living child. Similar findings 
have been documented among the Tswana.50 
Some communities attribute religious significance to disabled people; that is, they are a gift 
from the Supreme Being. It becomes necessary to examine what “special” or “gift” means 
and to understand that “special” rarely means equal.51 For example, a common response 
to dealing with the educational needs of disabled children continues to be to segregation 
through a special school system. They question now is: How special is special? Does it mean that 
disabled children have to be segregated in order to preserve the “specialness”? Does this kind of arrangement 
promote inclusive communities? Certainly not; instead, it denies disabled people their right to 
participate in mainstream activities.
The socio-cultural beliefs and attitudes of families and communities in which disabled 
people live may inevitably contribute to converting impairments into disabilities. Families 
and communities are very strong cultural institutions, particularly in most global countries 
of the South. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the concepts of “kubatsirana” (help each other/
sharing of burdens) and “ukama” (relationships) are more or less representative of the cultural 
version of inclusion. These concepts tally well with the concept of interdependence.52 In 
Chataika’s study one of the disabled students used a quotation from Luciano De Crescenzo 
to sum up the concept of interdependence and its benefits: “We are each an angel with one 
wing and we can only fly by embracing each other.”53 
The Bible is clear that we are all made in the image of God, as noted by Bob Brooke, a 
chaplain for people with learning disabilities.54 This says something very important about 
the high degree of worth that God attributes to each human being, regardless of their race, 
religion, gender or ability. It therefore implies that disabled people are not a distortion or 
an inferior image of God. Their impairments are part of their human identity. Hence, none 
of us is a surprise, accident or a mistake, and certainly not an embarrassment to God. 
Similarly, Ortberg argues against the illusion of normalcy,55 which entails that we endlessly 
attempt to fix and control disabled people. Rather, Ortberg stresses that when dealing 
with human beings, it is like going to the “‘as-is’ corner of the universe”, where everyone 
49 Muderedzi, J. and Ingstad, B. 2011. Disability and Social Suffering in Zimbabwe. In Eide, A. E. and Ingstad, B. 
(eds), Disability and Poverty: A Global Challenge. Bristol: Policy.
50 Muderedzi and Ingstad, Disability and Social Suffering.
51 MMDA. 
52 Nyamukapa, C. and Gregson, S. 2005. Social Science & Medicine 60:2155-67.
53 Chataika, Inclusion of Disabled Students, 190.
54 Brooke, B. 2009. The Theology of Disability – A Starter. Online at: http://www.communitymission. org.uk/resources/
disability_resources/the_theology_ofdisability_a_starter.aspx [Accessed: 7 May 2011].
55 Ortberg, J. 2003. Everybody’s Normal Till You Get to Know Them. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
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and fallen short of the glory of God.”56 Thus, suggesting that having an impairment signals 
misfortune, punishment or a gift is what Reinders prefers to call “cheap theology”.57 
Reinders suggests that cheap theology is based on the assumption that the universe is 
governed by a moral geometry such that for every bad outcome, there must be a bad cause; 
and every good outcome is a result of a good cause. 
Reynolds reflects theologically on the kind of place the church should be in the light of the 
kind of human vulnerability which is manifested in disability. He claims that “disability 
is an often overlooked and contested ‘site’.”58 Reynolds also argues that disability has 
the theological power to raise issues of difference, normalcy, embodiment, community and 
redemption. Hence, changing the paradigm upon which disability is understood effects a 
transformation where disability ceases to be seen as a tragedy. The most important issue 
here is to promote cultural and religious aspects that encourage inclusive communities, 
and discard aspects that undermine inclusivity. In that way disabled people will be able to 
enjoy the rights enshrined in the UNCRPD, and the doors of cultural and religious activities 
will become more open to disabled people, enabling them to nurture their cultural and 
religious needs without discrimination.
It is important, however, to acknowledge the positive contribution made by early 
missionaries to the individual lives of disabled people through services such as education, 
health and social support.59 Although there has been criticism of institutionalisation, the 
introduction of special schools, for instance, has enabled disabled people to access some 
form of education, an aspect that cannot be underestimated. What is important is to draw 
lessons from the system and find ways of promoting inclusive education. Thus, failure to 
identify the actions that could be taken to replace mistaken beliefs and the potential drivers 
that will lead to cultural changes will be an injustice to disabled people. Therefore, actions 
around advocacy and empowerment of disabled people and their families within religious 
communities, awareness raising and education among religious communities become 
essential if we are to change the attitudes of communities towards this marginalised 
group. At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge best practices that promote inclusive 
communities, as reported in the study of the Tonga people of Zimbabwe, lest we run the 
risk of not capitalising on the gains already achieved. Thus any advocacy and lobbying 
activities should aim at eliminating negative cultural and religious beliefs, and promote the 
positive cultural and religious aspects that promote inclusive communities.
56 Ortberg, Everybody’s Normal, 13; Romans 3:23.
57 Reinders, Is there Meaning, 59.
58 Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion, 13. 
59 Peresuh, M. and Burcham, B. 1998. Special Education Provision in Zimbabwe. The Journal of Special Education 
25(2):75-80.
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The experiences of people with disabilities 
in faith communities and suggestions to 
enhance their inclusion 
Erna Möller1
introduction
A group of people with disabilities in Pietermaritzburg, called disAbility ConneXion, were 
looking for contextually appropriate guidelines to help South African churches include 
people with disabilities. The researcher agreed to undertake a research project from which 
such guidelines could be developed. This research project was undertaken during 2009 
and 2010.
A qualitative research approach was followed (based on the description by Creswell2), 
including characteristics such as conducting research in the natural setting of participants, 
and using multiple interactive methods. Individual interviews and focus group interviews 
were conducted with 43 people with disabilities regarding their experiences of exclusion/
inclusion and with 32 church leaders regarding their views on the inclusion of people with 
disabilities. Three of these church leaders themselves had disabilities. 
Criteria for inclusion in the sample were people with different types of disability, males 
and females equally represented as far as possible, people from Afrikaans, English and 
isiZulu language groups, and different church groups, namely, mainline, charismatic 
and African independent churches. Data collection took place in the Pietermaritzburg/
Msunduzi municipal area where disAbility ConneXion is based. A core group of disAbility 
ConneXion members were involved in identifying possible participants.
The data analyses followed the steps suggested by Tesch,3 whereby the transcriptions of 
interviews are read several times in order to identify themes and sub-themes in the responses 
of participants. Responses belonging to each theme, with its identified subsections, were 
categorised and thus presented in the research report.
The experiences of people with disabilities in faith communities are set out in the 
following section.
1 Erna Möller is a social worker at the Leprosy Mission in Johannesburg. This article is based on her research 
for a MA degree in Social Work and an earlier version was published in 2012 as Experiences of People with 
Disabilities in Faith Communities: A Journey. Journal of Religion, Disability and Health 16:154-71.
2 Creswell, J. W. 2003. Research Design, Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Approaches. Second Edition. London: 
Sage, 181. 
3 Tesch, R. 1990. Qualitative Research: Analysis Types and Software Tools. New York, NY: The Falmer, 142.
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experiences of exclusion of people with  
disabilities in faith communities 
Two themes emerged during the research: 
 The inaccessibility of the physical structure of the church;
 Experiences of people with disabilities of others’ ideas of disability and healing. 
Theme one: Experiences of (in)accessibility 
  Physical barriers 
Various barriers present challenges for people with disabilities who want to participate in 
the faith community. 
Accessible transport is almost non-existent, especially in less developed communities, 
where participants said: “We wish transport could be arranged at least once a month, so that we can 
attend services.”
Entrances to church buildings seldom have ramps and are too narrow for people who use 
wheelchairs. “Not many churches are accessible. I often have to be carried in my wheelchair into a church 
building”, said a man who is eager to be part of a faith community. A young woman agreed: 
“Whenever I find stairs and narrow entrances, they are telling me, the people don’t want me here [in my 
wheelchair]. They have not thought about me.” 
Inaccessible toilets are a source of inconvenience for wheelchair users or other people with 
disabilities. An elderly person with a mobility impairment, stated: “I have to use a catheter 
when I go to church. I can’t get into the toilets.”
Seating arrangements in the worship service are often not conducive to participation. 
Wheelchair users may have no choice but to sit in the aisle, where they are conspicuous 
and regarded as “different”. When other worshippers stand in front of them while singing, 
wheelchair users cannot see the words of hymns on electronic boards. Other challenges are 
sloping auditorium floors and insufficient space to turn wheelchairs.
People with hearing loss who are dependent on lip-reading find lighting inadequate and 
are unable to lip-read when preachers move around. 
People who use hearing aids find it hard to participate in singing: “In some churches the music 
is too loud. I can’t cope with it.”
Times of services and meetings are sometimes inconvenient for people with disabilities. 
“The 8 o’clock service is so early, my body is so stiff, it is hard for me to get there by 8 o’clock”; “People with 
poor eyesight can’t see well in the evening, so if the Bible study is at 18:30, it is not helpful for them”, were 
some of the comments of participants.
People with disability say that the church is unaware of their needs. Participants gave examples of 
lack of awareness. Decision makers do not prioritise accessibility. “They are slow on the uptake, 
they may make plans, but by Friday they have forgotten all about it”; “It takes a paradigm shift, otherwise 
nothing changes.”
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People with disabilities are not consulted when structural changes are made, resulting 
in inappropriate alterations being done. Some church leaders argue that they do not have 
people with disabilities amongst their members and therefore they do not see the need 
to make structural changes. They are unaware of the needs of people who may visit the 
church for special occasions. “But what should we do when visiting there, finding that we can’t get in?” 
was the comment of a wheelchair user who is a keen church-goer. 
It appears that church leaders are not aware of the National Building Regulations,4 which 
describe the requirements for people with disabilities. Consequently, church buildings do 
not meet these accessibility requirements. 
Theme two: Experiences of others’ perceptions of disability and healing
Church members’ perceptions of disability affect the extent to which people with 
disabilities feel included. The following are examples of exclusionary perceptions, related 
to biblical interpretations and practices. 
  Biblical interpretations that have an oppressing influence on people with 
disabilities 
This theme includes ideas about ‘normalisation’, prayer and sin in relation to disability. 
When other people view them as abnormal, people with disabilities feel that they have 
to be ‘normalised’ and that their disability should be healed. They become victims of 
prayer practices, for which they do not ask, and feel compelled to be healed. The following 
comments attest to these experiences:
“They always want to ‘fix’ you, it seems [as if] my disability is not acceptable.”
“I like to visit different churches, but when prayer time comes, everybody is on 
top of me, assuming that I want to be prayed for healing of my disability, which 
may not be the case.”
“They prayed for me, without asking my permission, took off the footrests of my 
wheelchair and started pushing and shouting at me, WALK!”
These practices have a detrimental effect on people with disabilities. A women expressed 
it like this: “Out of respect I say yes [when they ask to pray for me] but nothing happens, and you 
begin to hate yourself.”
Treolar5 states that the confusion about prayer for healing of disability has its roots in 
interpretations of biblical texts. These interpretations are associated with outdated 
attitudes toward disability as well as with ideas about Divine judgement and faith and 
miraculous healing.
Whilst some people with disabilities understand this confusion, and have developed 
their own views, the negative effects of some interpretations of the Bible are widespread. 
A middle-aged woman, a wheelchair user working in the government service for people 
4 Standards South Africa. 2010. National Building Regulations Part S: Facilities for disabled persons. Pretoria: South 
African Bureau of Standards (SABS).
5 Treolar L. L. 2000. Spiritual beliefs, response to disability, and the church – Part 2. Journal of Religion, Disability and 
Health 4(1):5-31.
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like to go to church [since they are despondent with the church].” 
Another interpretation is that disability is seen as a punishment for sin and confession 
is required for healing. Some responses were: “They [church leaders] say people are disabled 
because of their sins, or their parents’ sins or God is punishing them for [...] doing bad things, that is why 
they are disabled, God is punishing them.” A mother of a disabled child brought her offering and 
was told: “You must confess your sin, why is the child disabled? Your offering will not be accepted until 
you confess.”
Bowers6 confirms that some people do hold the view that disability is a consequence of 
sin. She points out a case of parents who had a baby with disability. Their own immediate 
reaction, as well as that of their friends, revolved around a notion of retribution. They 
asked: “Who was guilty? Who was at fault?”
  Practices in faith communities that hamper the inclusion of people with 
disabilities 
Practices in faith communities that hamper the inclusion of people with disabilities include 
lack of respect for the person, lack of effort to understand disability and patronising 
attitudes and behaviour.
Many people with disabilities say that they are not respected as persons. They feel that 
non-disabled people respond to them according to stereotypes that are out of touch with 
reality. These stereotypes are expressed in several ways.
 Labelling and generalising: “We are identified by our physical appearance. ‘Oh Sarah, the 
disabled lady’, is the way people refer to me”; “All wheelchair users are lumped together, as if we all 
have the same needs.”
 Regarding people with disabilities as incompetent and not recognising their 
competencies: “Some people overreact and want to do too much for you.”
 Using offensive terminology: People with disabilities do not like to be referred to 
in terms such as “the crippled”, “the handicapped”, since these terms define them 
by their disability and not their unique personhood. A further example of these 
derogatory terms is the Zulu word for a blind person, “impumphuthe”, derived from 
the verb “phuphutha” which means to fiddle around without direction. People with 
disabilities report that these terms are used in the church, making them feel worthless 
and unaccepted.
Watermeyer7 refers to this as “othering”, which is a way of classifying people according to 
their physical appearance and as different to a self-constructed norm.
The lack of effort by non-disabled people to know and understand disability is demonstrated 
by the following experiences of disabled people. 
6 Bowers, F. 2004. Who sinned? The Bible In Transmission, Spring, 1.
7 Watermeyer, B. 2006. Disability and psychoanalysis. In Watermeyer, B., Swartz, L., Lorenzo, T., Schneider, M. 
and Priestly, M. (eds), Disability and Social Change. A South African Agenda. Pretoria: HSRC, 33. 
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 There is a perception that people with disabilities are unable to do anything for 
themselves: “I am treated as an imbecile, as if I can’t think for myself” (a woman who had a 
professional career). 
 There is the view that church leaders are not open to learning about the disability: 
“In my church, the leaders just don’t understand disability, they treat you as if you are fragile.” 
A pastor admitted: “We get too busy and don’t slow down to really listen to people”, and another 
church leader: “If pastors do not have the answers, they feel incompetent [and thus do not admit 
their ignorance].” 
 Non-disabled members of churches make no effort to understand and accommodate 
the needs of a person with hearing impairment. “My Bible study leader does not consider 
my need that he should speak up clearly, he fiddles with his papers, and talks down to himself” – this 
was the experience of a woman with hearing loss in her Bible study group where she 
struggles to feel included. With regard to this lack of effort to understand disability, 
Carter8 says that churches struggle to relate to unfamiliar situations, but challenges 
the church to be inclusive and willing to learn from people with disabilities.
Watermeyer9 points out that individuals are unaware of their unconscious motivations 
for doing certain things. In the case of non-disabled people interacting with people with 
disabilities, fears of vulnerability are projected onto the disabled person. This fear may be 
expressed by simply looking away from the person or overreacting to their disability.
People with disabilities experience patronising attitudes and behaviour from non-disabled 
people. Practical examples include unwanted sympathy: “They pity me, they think my mind is 
also disabled”; being insincere: “People can be very patronising, telling me: ‘Oh, you are so wonderful’, 
I avoid such people”, and making assumptions about the person’s needs and wishes: “I don’t 
want people to think for me.” The latter comment came from a woman who knows that she is 
dependent on others in some ways, but is confident in making her own decisions.
In his psychoanalytic perspective on this problem, Watermeyer10 writes about how non-
disabled people respond in terms of their anxiety, and unconsciously assume certain 
things about living with a disability. For example, when meeting a person with a disability 
in society, an assumption is that the person needs help, based on the supposition that 
the person is dependent, has poor self-esteem, or feels unattractive and shameful. These 
assumptions influence the interaction between a disabled and non-disabled person.
8 Carter, E. 2007. Including People with Disabilities in Faith Communities. Baltimore, MD: Paul H. Brookes, 32.
9 Watermeyer, Disability and psychoanalysis. 
10 Watermeyer, Disability and psychoanalysis, 34.
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suggestions to enhance inclusion of people  
with disabilities in faith communities 
Besides their experiences of exclusion from faith communities, people with disabilities 
have suggestions to enhance their inclusion. These suggestions are grouped according to 
four themes outlined below.
Theme one: Strategies for inclusion
This theme includes sub-themes like the unconditional acceptance of people with 
disabilities, ways of relating to them, providing practical support and changing beliefs and 
practices regarding disability. 
  Unconditional acceptance of people with disabilities in the faith community
Participants in the study gave some indicators of unconditional acceptance:
 Being allowed to be involved on their own terms: “I go to church to thank God for my life, not 
to be healed from my disability.”
 Display confidence in their abilities: “A group of people with intellectual disabilities are part of 
our team who do maintenance of our buildings.”
 Enable people with disabilities to take leadership roles: “After my accident I came back to 
the church as a person with paralysis. The church made adaptations, and I could continue with my 
role as a deacon.”
 Create awareness of disability in all situations: “We include people with disabilities in 
the sacraments and rituals of the church. With this we say, we are all vulnerable, anyone can 
become disabled.” 
 Exercise patience: “A person with a speech problem likes to give his testimony in church, they wait 
for him, until he finds his words, and he continues to testify.”
 Practise hospitality through interaction and communication with the person with 
disability. A pastor said; “We want people to feel at home with us, tell us what we can do to let you 
feel comfortable. If you need a better chair, let us find you one.” 
Referring to unconditional acceptance, Carter11 mentions the importance of self-determination 
for people with disabilities and the interdependence of believers on each other’s gifts. The 
invitation of the church to society can never be diminished by disability. Such acceptance 
leads to hospitality that goes beyond greetings and remembering a name once a week. It is 
instead demonstrated in authentic and substantial gestures like spending time together, 
celebrating successes, coming alongside one another in difficult times and nurturing close 
relationships.
11 Carter, Including People, 23. 
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  Relating to people with disabilities as people with abilities and not helpless 
people
Relationships between disabled and non-disabled people should be cultivated and built on 
each person’s contribution. A woman with severe physical disabilities, who is dependent 
on others for mobility, says: “If you can get to know me, you will learn a lot from me.” She is confident 
that because of her maturity, she can contribute a meaningfully to a friendship.
Participants also described meaningful relationships as reciprocal friendships. “I am their 
friend for who I am, they don’t see my wheelchair anymore.”
In this context of relationship, friendship and reciprocity, Carter12 emphasises that a church 
that wants to be inclusive will work for a balance where people with disabilities are not only 
recipients of services, but also have a chance to serve others. Clapton13 describes this as re-
figuring relationships between people with disabilities and the church. Such relationships 
provide a rich medium for exploration which embraces new relationships with God, one’s 
body and with “different” others.
  Providing practical support without being condescending 
Support to people with disabilities should be respectful, based on their dignity. When 
offering help to people with disabilities, it is important to bear in mind their abilities. 
“I am not able to carry all my bags myself, so when you help me, please don’t make me feel that I am totally 
helpless” was the comment of a mother with mobility impairment.
Carter14 says that people with disabilities should be included in existing support systems, 
rather than creating separate services.
  Changing beliefs and practices regarding disability
Several beliefs about disability need to change. These are:
 The belief that disability is abnormal and unacceptable. People with disabilities feel 
that their different life styles are simply part of the variety of life. “That word ‘normal’, 
you better check what that means.”
 The belief that people with disabilities do not have any abilities. This should change 
to an understanding of their different abilities. “A vote of confidence in me gave me the 
opportunity to take on more responsibilities.”
 Unfounded perceptions of the cause of disability. These need to be replaced with 
approaches that do not blame the person with disability, but liberate him/her to live 
to his/her full potential. One suggestion was: “The Ubuntu philosophy has much potential to 
enhance inclusion and brotherhood.”
12 Carter, Including People, 33. 
13 Clapton, J. 1997. Disability, inclusion and the Christian church: practice, paradox or promise. Disability and 
Rehabilitation 19(10):420-6.
14 Carter, Including People, 120. 
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spiritual nourishment, as expressed by a young Zulu-speaking woman: “I come to church 
for my soul to be saved, not to be healed from my disability.” 
 Replacing views that blame the person with disability, e.g. the belief that sin is the 
cause of disability, with a liberating acceptance of the person. Meaningful spiritual 
help should be given to a person with disability by listening sensitively and giving 
support that liberates the person to find his/her unique purpose. “It is about finding one’s 
purpose, finding how I [as a person with disability] can be creative.”
Theme two: Suggestions for user-friendly buildings and liturgy
This theme includes suggestions for accessible buildings and disability-friendly worship 
services. 
  Develop awareness of the impact of an inaccessible physical environment
When churches become aware of the impact that the inaccessibility of the church 
environment has on people with disabilities, it is more likely that action will follow. 
Inaccessible buildings result in people with disabilities feeling “I am not thought about at this 
church.” Asking people with disabilities what they need will avoid incorrect changes being 
made. “Next time you make your place wheelchair friendly, you contact me” was the comment of one 
participant. Churches need to understand the frustration that people with disabilities 
experience in an inaccessible environmentas expressed by a motivated person: “Many 
changes are not insurmountable; the holdup is that accessibility is not regarded as a priority.”
  Ensure physically accessible buildings by implementing the necessary 
changes
Participants suggested that buildings be adapted in such a way that people with disabilities 
can enter the church and uses its facilities independently. This includes parking areas, 
entrances, doorways, cloakrooms, etc. that should be wide enough for people who use 
assistive devices. These suggestions are described in the National Building Regulations 
Part S: Facilities for disabled persons,15 to which all buildings must adhere.
  Accommodate the needs of persons with disability in the worship service
The following suggestions will enhance the participation of people with disabilities in 
worship services. Wheelchair users should be able to choose where to sit, have space to 
turn their wheelchairs and be able to see words on electronic boards when others are 
standing while singing.
People with hearing loss need sufficient lighting and must be able to see the preacher at 
all times in order to lip-read. The preacher should not turn his back or walk around the 
podium. Also, these needs of people with hearing impairment need to be borne in mind 
when lights in the auditorium are dimmed.
15 Standards South Africa, National Building Regulations.
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People with visual impairment also need good lighting. Blind people who use Braille 
hymnbooks need time to look up hymns in the Braille books. 
People with intellectual impairments will benefit when the use of language in sermons is 
adapted to accommodate them. 
Theme three: Suggestions on how to create awareness about disability
Suggestions for creating awareness included methods to use and the required knowledge 
about disability that will bring about inclusion for people with disabilities in faith 
communities. 
  Methods that facilitate interactive processes between people with 
disabilities and non-disabled people
The suggestions for creating awareness and changing attitudes correspond with the 
views of Paolo Freire on conscientisation (as described by Hope and Timmel16). These 
include the use of dialogue, recognising the equality of all participants and allowing space 
for transformative processes. The following paragraphs refer to the key principles of 
Freire’s work.
Opportunities for dialogical processes between disabled and non-disabled people need to 
be established. Participants emphasised the importance of dialogue to bring about change: 
“If we want enduring change, it will take a lot of dialogue.” This implies an interchange of views and 
bringing deep-rooted beliefs into the open. A participant commented: “Let us get together and 
talk straight about these things.”
Hope and Timmel17 present Freire’s key principles of critical awareness in society. One 
of these principles is finding “generative themes”, which are things that people feel 
strongly about. When brought to the surface, these issues release energy to work towards 
change. Disability in the church may be a topic that non-disabled people hardly speak 
about because of their feelings of uncertainty and fear. This means that their deep-rooted 
beliefs remain unchanged. On the other hand, people with disabilities may feel powerless 
and will suppress their feelings of not being respected and considered. Once a space for 
discussion is created, these views of both disabled and non-disabled people can be brought 
to the surface. This may release the energy that is needed to change attitudes, reconcile 
relationships and transform interaction.
The equality of all participants in the dialogue needs to be recognised. In order for this 
dialogue to bring the expected change, it needs to be understood that nobody is totally 
ignorant and nobody totally knowledgeable, and therefore all views are valuable for the 
debate. A participant who is a church leader with much experience of social issues pointed 
out that both disabled and non-disabled people may want to withdraw from such dialogue 
“[...] because of feelings of insecurity from their respective perspectives”.
16 Hope, A. and Timmel, S. 1996. Training for Transformation. A handbook for community workers. Book 1. Gweru, 
Zimbabwe: Mambo.
17 Hope and Timmel. Training for Transformation. Book 1, 17.
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that draws on the insights of all those concerned in a matter is required to bring about 
permanent change. 
A further requirement for this interactive process is allowing space for transformative and 
challenging processes. Participants suggested that both disabled and non-disabled people 
need to make paradigm shifts when it comes to inclusive faith communities. A person with 
a disability spoke about the “lack of emotional maturity of people with disabilities”, which needs 
to change in order for them to participate in the inclusion process. Another referred to “the 
pride of some church leaders, thinking that they cannot become disabled.”
These problems have to be overcome. “We all have to grow past our embarrassment and frustrations, 
towards embracing the realities of living together as human beings” was the suggestion of a woman 
who has much experience in efforts to bring about social change. 
This calls for a deep level of change in the thinking of all stakeholders, which corresponds 
with Freire’s view of radical transformation.19 For Freire transformation is based on the 
hope that life can change for the better, towards a more just society. However, radical 
change means going to the roots of problems and addressing the values held by society that 
cause suffering for others. Values such as greed, control and power over people need to be 
transformed into cooperation, justice and concern for the common good of all. It is also 
significant for faith communities that Hope and Timmel call this transformation process a 
spiritual process.20 
  Knowledge required and important for understanding the reality of people 
with disabilities 
The implied suggestion of participants is that non-disabled people in faith communities 
should learn more about the reality of disability. This would include a basic understanding 
of the different types of disability, e.g.:
 Communication impairments: speech or voice impairment that effects communication;
 Sensory impairments: including loss of sight or hearing;
 Physical impairments: including the limited use of upper and lower limbs, or chronic 
pain, which restricts independence; 
 Intellectual disability: including difficulty in learning and/or understanding;
 Psychological disability: including emotional conditions or a mental illness where the 
person may experience problems in the way they think, feel or behave. 
A recurring suggestion was that terminology used when referring to people with disabilities 
should respect their dignity. The person with disability should be emphasised more 
than the disability. This can be done by stating “the person” first, for example, “a person 
with paraplegia”, or “a person who is a wheelchair user” rather than the “paraplegic”. 
18 Hope and Timmel. Training for Transformation. Book 1, 17.
19 Hope and Timmel. Training for Transformation. Book 1, 16. 
20 Hope and Timmel. Training for transformation. Book 1, 16.
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Mackelprang21 emphasises the “person-first” language as an important mechanism to re-
define disability and embrace people with disabilities.
Theme four: Suggestions on how people with disabilities  
can contribute to their inclusion
People with disabilities can create awareness of disability and of their spiritual gifts. 
  People with disabilities can be agents in (enhancing) their inclusion
Many of the people with disabilities participating in this study were open about their 
prejudices and fears, realising that these also need to change: “If we are to give turning point 
education to non-disabled people, we are responsible for making it work.” Others admitted that fear 
and a miserable attitude are not helpful to anybody. “[We have to] outgrow our own nonsense, 
don’t get upset”; “Engage with people in a friendly way and take charge of the situation.”
  People with disabilities have to take the initiative and contribute to creating 
awareness about the reality of disability
In a group discussion a woman who is a leader in the disability community said: “We as 
people with disabilities need to get past our hurt and be ready to teach the church what they need to know 
about disability. This was confirmed by an older lady: “I used to get angry about the silly things that 
people ask you, but then I realised, I was also ignorant about disability before my accident. The only way 
they will learn is if I talk to them directly.”
  Faith communities have to recognise the contribution of people with 
disabilities
Having people with disabilities amongst the leaders of a church can bring a special 
dimension to the church. A comment was “We need their sharp senses to represent the viewpoints 
of the disability voice”; and a young man with mobility impairment said: “Other people with 
disabilities in the church may relate more easily to a pastor with disabilities.”
With regard to the role of people with disabilities in their inclusion in the church, 
Carter22 makes an important statement about their self-determination. Putting people 
with disabilities at the centre of their own life decisions is a key indicator of high-quality 
approaches. At best, others can support them to become assertive and skilful in presenting 
themselves to the faith community. This can lead to congregations being places “where 
people with disabilities and people without, are woven together in common community”.
21 Mackelprang R. W. 2010. Disability controversies: Past, present, and future. Journal of Social Work in Disability 
and Rehabilitation 9(2):87-98.
22 Carter. Including People, 23.
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conclusion and recommendations
The main conclusions reached through the research is that the inaccessibility of church 
buildings and worship services leaves people with disabilities feeling excluded. The 
National Building Regulations23 that prescribe standards of accessibility are often ignored 
by church leaders and not enforced by regulatory bodies.
Some biblical interpretations and practices in faith communities have an oppressing effect 
on people with disabilities and make them feel excluded. A concerted effort is needed to 
change these ideas and practices.
Referring to the origin of this research, namely the need for contextually appropriate 
guidelines for South African churches to include people with disabilities, the findings 
contributed to materials published on a website towards the end of 2011. 
Recommendations are: 
 Faith communities should take cognisance of the experiences of people with 
disabilities in order for church leaders and task teams to accommodate people with 
disabilities; 
 Guidelines should include a document that indicates all requirements for accessibility 
for people with disabilities, including the legal requirements of the National Building 
Regulations;24 
 These guidelines should include practical suggestions for an awareness programme in 
faith communities, such as: 
 Dialogue and interaction strategies as methods
 The content of an awareness programme including information on different kinds 
of disability and some of their impacts on the lives of people with disabilities
 The role that people with disabilities can play in an awareness programme and 
enhancing their inclusion in the church. 
Including people with disabilities in faith communities can be seen as a journey. This 
research and the implementation of its recommendations presented an opportunity for 
church leaders, members of the congregation and people with disabilities to journey 
together. This journey can become a pilgrimage where we journey “as pilgrims, not as 
tourists; as learners, not as teachers; as receivers, not as givers; as listeners, not as talkers”,25 
in the interaction between disabled and non-disabled people, implementing a commitment 
to listen, learn from each other and journey together with one another. Journeying in this 
way is, I believe, a positive response to the inclusive invitation of Jesus in Mathew 11:28: 
“Come to me, all of you who are struggling and burdened, and I will give you rest.”26 
23 Standards South Africa, The National Building Regulations. 
24 Standards South Africa, The National Building Regulations.
25 Hudson, T. and Kotzé, D. 2002. Journeying, a life-giving, ethical spirituality. In Kotzé, D., Myburg, J. and Roux, J. 
(eds), Ethical ways of being. Pretoria: Ethics Alive. 
26 The Complete Jewish Bible. Online at: http://www.biblestudytools.com/cjb/matthew/11-28.html [Accessed: 
24 June 2011].
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The complexity of the life of a  
disabled person as she/he navigates 
the journey towards reclaiming  
dignity and full citizenship
Gubela Mji1
IntroductIon 
As the Director of the Centre of Rehabilitation Studies of Stellenbosch University (CRS), 
I want to introduce in this essay three case studies to demonstrate the complexity of the 
life of the disabled person as she or he navigates the journey towards reclaiming dignity 
and full citizenship. 
case study 1:  
the GuGulethu church communIty
The Centre of Rehabilitation Studies of Stellenbosch University (CRS) was invited by a 
minister of a church in Gugulethu, Cape Town to assist with the integration of disabled 
people into church life and activities. The minister was aware that there were members of 
his congregation who had disabled family members who did not accompany their family 
to Sunday services. He wanted to understand the underlying reasons for the absence of 
disabled people in church activities. He wondered whether the reasons were structural 
or attitudinal. 
The CRS approached the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Disabled People South 
Africa (DPSA) for assistance, and one of the DPSA activists joined the CRS/DPSA team. 
Several meetings were held with the church leadership to strategise an approach that 
would elicit the following information from the congregation:
 Were members of the congregation concerned that disabled people were absent from 
church’s activities?
 If the absence of disabled people was a concern, what were the reasons for their absence?
 What steps could be taken by the church leadership to address the reasons why 
disabled people were absent?
1 Gubela Mji is head of the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
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there was to be an open discussion with the congregation, focusing on the above three 
questions. Both the service and open discussion proved successful, with the congregation 
identifying the general reluctance of families to bring their disabled family members to 
church. The congregation was enthusiastic about raising awareness about disability 
within the church through participation in small group discussions with the youth group, 
the women’s group and the deacon’s group. 
A question arising out of this open discussion highlighted the issue of societal attitudes 
towards the disabled people. One of the deacons asked what should be done with disabled 
people who get drunk and fall all over in beer halls. This was an opportunity to discuss 
how disabled and non-disabled people engage in similar activities and behaviours. This 
led to a discussion about the general attitudes of humanity to itself, and how we tend to 
approach each other from a deficit critical standpoint rather than from an asset affirming 
one. People commented that when greeting others, we say, for example: “Hello, I have not 
seen you for a while. Oh, why have you gained so much weight?” or: “You look like you are 
frustrated, I can even see how out-of-colour you are”, as opposed to saying: “Hello, I have 
not seen you for a long time and I have missed you so much. How is life?”
The church minister indicated his concern regarding the damage that is done through this 
deficit critical standpoint and pointed out that if this was damaging to the able-bodied, 
how much more so to the disabled person. An understanding was beginning to develop 
within the congregation that the families of disabled people and disabled people themselves 
might be justified in isolating themselves from others so as not to have to confront negative 
attitudes, even in situations when people were (or should be) welcoming and inclusive, 
such as in the church. Together with the church leadership, it was decided that the CRS/
DPSA team would provide a short course on disability rights for the church community. 
The CRS/DPSA team felt that it was important not to undermine the fellowship of the 
church by advocating ideas contrary to its theology, and thus decided to invite the SU 
Faculty of Theology to join the team. 
case study 2:  
the younG dIsabled bomvane man
While undertaking disability research in the Eastern Cape on the extent of disabled 
people’s access to health services, I interviewed a young disabled man from Bomvaneland 
on the Wild Coast.2 The young man had fallen from a truck while returning from work and 
had sustained injuries which had left the lower parts of his body completely paralysed. He 
lived with his mother and two sisters, one of whom was older than him. As I approached 
his hut I realised what a struggle it must be for him to get to his home, as he lived up a 
hillock. Furthermore, in order to reach his hut he would have to negotiate uneven ground, 
strewn with stones. During the interview he spoke about only being able to use his new 
wheelchair inside the hut, as the outside terrain and his physical environment prevented 
2 This included conducting qualitative interviews in the homes of disabled people. 
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him from visiting friends and engaging in community-based activities. I wondered to 
myself how he was addressing his faith needs, or was he experiencing exclusion similar to 
the disabled group from the Gugulethu church? 
He was also facing challenges on the legal front. The lawyer who had handled his case with 
the Road Accident Fund had disappeared with the R75,000 which the young man had been 
awarded as a result of his disability arising from the accident. Despite this, the young man 
had started a small business selling a few grocery items from his hut. 
He explained his health challenges, including his struggle with pressure sores. His mother, 
a widow, praised her daughters for taking care of their brother, changing him and making 
sure he did not develop more pressure sores. She ended by saying that her daughters had 
become ‘the men of the family’. This was difficult for the young man to hear, because by 
cultural and birthright he was supposed to be the man of the family, but his disability has 
robbed him of this. 
As I left this household I was concerned about the health and rehabilitation needs that 
the young man was struggling with. I also wondered if the lawyer who had disappeared 
with his money had received any orientation training with regards to disability and human 
rights during his years of study and in his work. It occurred to me that more than one 
discipline should have been involved in providing a collective response to the overall needs 
of this young man. 
I believe that the newly-developed CBR guidelines would be the best tool to assist him in 
his plight, if they can be implemented in a collaborative manner in Bomvaneland.3
case study 3:  
the relentless younG man from Ghana 
It was during my research and educational visits to the Kwame Nkrumah University of 
Science and Technology (KNUST) in Kumasi, Ghana that I had the privilege of being 
exposed to this relentless disabled young man from Ghana. 
Born in rural Ghana in 1977 without his right tibia, he explained to Sports Illustrated (2004) 
magazine that “in [this] deeply superstitious country [...] when you are a deformed child, 
people think your mother sinned”.4 His father was so ashamed of his new-born’s disability 
that he immediately abandoned the family. His mother was urged by others to kill her 
baby, but this proud woman had a deep sense of human dignity and was determined to 
nurture her son.
His family lived in a poverty-stricken home, which lacked the basic amenities of electricity 
or plumbing. His bed was the dirt-packed floor. Despite this, as a Ghanaian he had access 
to free public education. Disabled children rarely took advantage of this opportunity, but 
3 World Health Organisation (WHO). 1994. Community Based Rehabilitation and the Healthcare Referral Services: A Guide 
for District Health and Rehabilitation Managers. Geneva: WHO/RHB; World Health Organisation. 2010. Community 
Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines. Geneva: WHO.
4 Sports Illustrated. 2004. November. South Africa. 
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become a great man.”5 His mother carried him two miles to and from school every day until 
he was old enough to go by himself, hopping on one leg. Of the 240 students, he was the 
only disabled child, and he endured the taunts and bullying of the able-bodied students. 
At the age of 13 years his mother became ill and he dropped out of school against her wishes. 
He travelled to Accra, Ghana’s capital, to earn money and rather than join the disabled 
beggars, he decided to set up a shoeshine box and earned about R14.00 a day. 
But this young man had a bigger vision for his life – with just one good leg, he decided that 
he would pedal around Ghana in an effort to make others aware that disability does not 
mean inability. His 380-mile journey made him an international celebrity. He featured in a 
documentary and was given a new prosthetic leg. He has since dedicated his life’s journey 
to transforming the lives of Ghana’s estimated 2 million disabled people.
In 2009, he was invited to give the keynote address on issues of human dignity and 
spirituality at the AfriNEAD symposium that was held in Cape Town. In his talk he 
emphasised the need of parents to affirm their disabled children’s abilities rather than to 
reinforce their disabilities. 
dIscussIon and recommendatIons
Case study one demonstrated the need of the faith-based community to be exposed to 
skills which would help them to better integrate disabled people into their activities. 
Faith-based leaders should have benefited from having an awareness of how to deal with 
disability and human dignity issues at curriculum level during their training. Failing 
this, the challenge for rehabilitation professionals working with the faith-based leaders 
is the lack of theological understanding that would enable them to work within or even 
challenge the parameters of the fellowship of the church/faith. The case study illustrated 
the overcoming of these challenges through a collaborative effort involving the church 
leadership, members of the congregation, various faculties from Stellenbosch University, 
and activists from an NGO. 
The second case study demonstrated the vulnerability of disabled people at both 
societal and human dignity levels. The young man from Bomvaneland’s situation clearly 
demonstrated the need for an interdisciplinary approach when dealing with disability, 
both in the community as well as at curriculum level during the training of professionals.
It was encouraging to note how the young man from Ghana blossomed under the tutorship 
of his mother. However, the reality is that not all mothers or parents of disabled children 
are able to overcome the negative attitudes that they are subjected to after giving birth to 
a disabled child. A key informant from Ghana informed me that the negative prejudice of 
some community members towards the disabled child resulted in many mothers choosing 
to abandon their disabled children in the forest or drown them in a river.6 
5 Sports Illustrated, November 2004. 
6 Key informant, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana 2008.
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The community is the interface where abilities and disabilities become evident. Within 
this context, it is a matter of concern that the WHO CBR guidelines (2010) do not directly 
acknowledge these negative societal attitudes towards the disabled people, or the need 
for the re-establishment of their dignity by humanity.7 Disabled people as a collective have 
expressed their concern about the response of society towards the disabled body and its 
needs. They see this response as alternating between complete exclusion, on the one hand, 
and the desire to infantilise disabled people and take over the functioning of their lives, 
on the other. According to Mji et al. (2009), the following core statement reflects the role 
of society in further disadvantaging or disabling persons with disabilities: “In our view it 
is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on 
top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
participation in society.”8
To reclaim their voice, the disabled community have coined the expression, “Nothing 
about us without us”. Judge Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
describes this expression as referring to persons with disabilities reclaiming the space of 
“democracy, human rights and human dignity”, not only for themselves, but for “the whole 
of humanity”, especially those who have been marginalised. “Nothing about us without us” 
is about all of us, as we are all struggling to find our humanity and gain an understanding 
of the structures that allow some to have so much, while others are struggling to put just 
one meal on the table.9 
The three case studies demonstrated the need for the training of people to skill them to 
work with disabled people both at physical and emotional levels. It is important that this 
know-how should be underpinned by principles of hope, human dignity and human rights. 
The young man from Ghana has shown the importance of parental support. Many parents 
of disabled children are faced with insurmountable challenges. As a social response the 
SU needs to ensure that its students graduate with an understanding of how to relate 
to a disabled person and as future leaders they need to know how to facilitate equal 
opportunities for disabled people. An interdisciplinary discussion needs to be facilitated 
by disciplines that are already involved in the disability curriculum regarding which key 
concepts should be included in a curriculum that is disability responsive. The three case 
studies show the direction for what should be included in a social response curriculum 
that brings hope to all people.10
7 WHO, Community Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines, 2010. 
8 Mji, G., Gcaza, S., Melling-Williams, N. and MacLachlan, M. 2009. Networking in Disability for Development: 
Introducing the African Network for Evidence-to-Action on Disability. In MacLachlan, M. and Swartz, L. (eds), 
Disability and International Development towards Inclusive Global Health. New York, NY: Springer, 69-89.
9 Sachs, A. 2008. Keynote address delivered at the Friday Mavuso Lecture, School of Health and Rehabilitation 
Sciences, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Cape Town on 31 July 2008.
10 Acknowledgements: Participants in the three case studies; DPSA person who was part of the first case study; 
the staff members at the Centre for Rehabilitation Studies.
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My body and my faith  
belong together
A spiritual journey
Pieter van Niekerk1
The understandable but regrettable distinction made between body and soul has deep roots 
in a philosophy that is removed from my understanding of the Bible, being particularly 
prevalent in the neo-Platonic (200-270 BC) and gnostic (200-400 AD) worldviews.2 “The 
mind/body dualism that has long pervaded Western society has also found its way into 
the church. Such dualism in the church leads to an ignoring of the needs, abilities, and 
disabilities of peoples’ bodies.”3 
People’s faith is as vulnerable as their bodies are. The biblical writer, Paul, uses two 
metaphors to describe a person: cracked earthen vessel and an earthly tent.4 He does not 
distinguish between body and soul, but refers to a single entity. Our bodies are prone to 
disease and disability; they are fragile and mortal. Likewise, faith is unstable and shot 
through with doubt. Faith is not cast in certainty, but received in doubt.
Since my diagnosis with a chronic condition five years ago I have gained a new perspective 
on faith: the fragility of my body emphasises the fragile quality of my faith; brokenness is 
the essential fabric of both. 
1 Dr Pieter van Niekerk is a part-time minister of a small URCSA congregation and a research associate of 
SUSTEN at the Stellenbosch University. 
2 Neo-Platonism is “a type of idealistic monism in which the ultimate reality of the universe is held to be an 
infinite, unknowable, perfect One” (Schaufenberg, G. W. 2011. Building Blocks of Western Civilization: “What the 
founders did not tell us.” Dartfort: Xlibris, 51). According to this philosophy, “The most perfect being was the least 
physical, and had the least to do with the physical; that the way of salvation necessarily leads from the body, 
from the earthly-historical, to a realm of pure spirit” (Berry, D. 1982. Seeking a Theology of the Finite. Christian 
Century 99(29):953‑6). Gnosticism rejected the body and saw it as a prison for the soul and rejected “the doctrine 
of the incarnation. It declared that Christ could not possibly have a body: (1) because the absolute cannot enter 
into a real union with the finite; and (2) because matter is evil, and the spiritual world is ever in conflict with it” 
(Heick, O. W. 1965. A History of Christian Thought. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 72).
3 Harren, J. 2009. Bones and Bread: Knowing God in our Bodies through the Communion Table. Journal of Religion, 
Disability & Health 13(3-4):274-292 (274).
4 He reveals his “weakness, lack of eloquence, ordinariness, fragility, suffering, and hardships [...]. While Paul’s 
application of the image may have seemed outlandish, the image itself would have been familiar to Paul’s 
audience. Cheap, fragile, often unattractive, and readily discarded, clay jars were part of everyday life – much 
like the plastic container of today.” Ashley, E. 2008. The scandal of weak leadership: Paul’s defense of ministry. Online 
at: http://www.lutterworth.com/pub/on%20eagles%20wings%20ch5.pdf [Accessed: 9 May 2011]. Our body is 
vulnerable, exposed to the powers of nature, wind and weather; bodies that could be contaminated with viruses 
and venom. 
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25 years younger than he was. It seems unfair to me that I should endure a so‑called old‑age 
condition at the comparatively young age of 50.
When I was about 40 years old I first became aware that I trembled when pronouncing 
the benediction to strangers. My brother, also a minister of religion, suggested a natural 
tranquilliser. A friend, a medical practitioner, did not seem to consider my symptoms in a 
serious light. After thousands of rands’ worth of diagnostic tests (without the benefit 
of a medical fund) my conviction that the symptoms were not psychosomatic was proved 
to be correct: I was “labelled” with the disease.
My nightmare started with radiology. Unable to master the intricacy of tying the strings 
at the back of the theatre gown and unaware of the dressing gown behind the door of the 
cubicle, I sat on a bench for an hour with my entire backside showing through the open 
garment. The task-orientated staff moved up and down past me, seemingly unaware of my 
predicament. In the tunnel I had to lie like a mummy in a catacomb. Having fortunately 
survived that ordeal, I received the report three hours later – only after my account had 
been paid. It was a copy of the original, stamped: “NOT PROOF READ”! I had not even seen 
the radiologist – only the radiographer and the friendly cashier. The letter that I wrote to 
the radiologist later to complain about the impersonal service I had received, was not even 
dignified with a reply.
To top it all, I was subjected to a situation that bordered on the farcical during a Christian 
camp that I attended. At a session, the main speaker called those who wanted to be healed. 
A friend of mine tried persuading me to step forward. I refused. He really wanted to see 
me healed and told the faith healer about my condition. I then stood up and allowed him 
to pray for me. He laid his hands on me and prayed for total recovery – from Alzheimer’s. 
I whispered that it was Parkinson’s. No wonder no miracle happened, he prayed for the 
wrong condition. I realised more than ever before, illness, disability, chronic conditions, 
these are not necessarily things that can or should be healed by faith or the health sciences, 
and that suffering is not always to be explained or to be understood; sometimes you just 
need to accept it as part and parcel of life. 
I think we need hugs or soft touches from dear ones, and solidarity from our friends, from 
fellow human beings their unconditional love and acceptance, and from God compassion – 
a partnership with everyone.
Sometimes this partnership comes in funny ways. The other day I went to an end‑of‑season 
sale at Woollies and tried on some clothes. I went out of the fitting room struggling to close 
my zip. A concerned assistant asked me innocently if she could help me. I felt the faith 
healer had viewed me as an object. Being treated as a patient and not as person by most 
medical professionals often makes me feel inferior. But the Woollies assistant’s concern left 
me with a smile. 
(My) church is a source of sadness to me. I am not angry with God, but I am frustrated 
at my own “disability” and upset with the church, or rather the representatives of the 
church. I am white, Afrikaans speaking, middle aged and am afflicted with a condition 
that adversely affects my chances to obtain permanent employment. I am too white for 
153
M
y b
od
y a
nd
 m
y fa
ith b
elong together: A
 sp
iritu
a
l jou
rney   |   P
ieter va
n N
iek
erk
“my” mainly black church and am considered too light-weight for the mainly white church. 
Moreover, my tremor requires explanation. 
My personal experience seems to indicate that the Belhar Confession, which I confess and 
practise, does not apply in my case. In my experience God, who is uniquely the God of the 
needy and who appeals to the church to follow His example, by supporting and assisting 
the destitute, is not embodied by the church. 
I am considered good enough to share my knowledge and experience with the church 
ministries and theological institutions without any compensation. Clearly, I shall not 
easily find gainful employment; of course, there are certain posts that other candidates are 
better qualified for. However, the “thorn in my flesh” torments me. Sometimes I deal with 
it inadequately and my faith trembles.
Having faith does not imply that the faithful never doubt. Julian Muller writes in Om te Mag 
Twyfel – ’n Gelowige se Reis (2011)5 that his faith is vulnerable and shaky, wavering between 
conviction and terror, completely honest and tentative. The combination of a broken body 
and vulnerable faith leaves the door wide open to a spirituality of imperfection.
The body is not merely a container in which the soul is incarcerated. “To discover who I am 
and who God is, is part of the same process, and who I am, is bound up with my body,” 
according to Vivien Naylor in The Theology of Touch (1996).6 It is for this reason that Eckhardt 
Tolle advises: “Do not fight against the body, for in doing so you are fighting against your 
own body. You are your body.”7 The established writer Nancy Mairs with MS writes: 
I am somebody. A body. A difficult body to be sure, almost too weak now to 
stand, increasingly deformed, wracked still by gut spasm and headaches and 
menstrual miseries. But some body. Mine. Me. In establishing myself as writer, 
however modest my success, I have ceased to be nobody. I have written my way 
into embodied self, and here I am at home.8
My body says more than words. Dorothee Sölle writes: 
My body tells me that I am in pain, hungry, have sexual needs. It is through my 
body that I know it is not so very good here on earth. The wrong way to relieve 
this tension is to deny and to suppress the body and its needs in favor of affirming 
an idealistic spirituality cleansed of all bodily desires. An idealistic spirituality is 
the enemy of a creational spirituality. It is based on the dualism of self and body, 
body‑spirit dichotomy that we inherited from Greek philosophy (1984:29‑30).9
The devaluation of human experience with no positive religious value and the emphasis on 
a “theology of the infinite” has a strong influence in Christian traditions. A theology of the 
infinite refers to “an inquiry into the identity and existence of divine beings, divine activity 
in history and nature, the purpose and destiny of human life as these are revealed by a being 
called ‘God’ to others called ‘persons’.”10 This dualism is antithetical to the reality of Christ, 
who had a body himself. 
5 Cape Town: Tafelberg. (To be allowed to doubt. The journey of a believer.)
6 Online at: http://www.franciscanarchive.org.uk/1996jan‑naylor [Accessed: 22 February 2011].
7 Tolle, E. 2005. The Power of Now. A Guide to Spiritual Enlightenment. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 96.
8 Mairs, N. 1989. Remembering the Bone House. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 271.
9 Sölle, D. 1984. To Work and To Love: A Theology of Creation. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress, 29-30.
10 Berry, Seeking a Theology of the Finite, 953.
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away from it. He points out the significance of the fact that Jesus never relinquished His 
body. He ascended to heaven with it. Although, according to him, this is a myth with a 
“hidden meaning”. 
According to Isherwood and Stuart, the traditional Christian view of the body is “viewed 
as something to be overcome in order to receive the joys of heaven. This is paradoxical 
since probably the most important article of Christian faith is that God became man”.11 It is 
against the gospel of Emmanuel – Jesus is God‑with‑us.
The great mystery of God becoming human is God’s desire to be loved by us. By 
becoming a vulnerable child, completely dependent on human care, God wants to 
take away all distance between the human and the divine. Who can be afraid of 
a little child that needs to be fed, to be cared for, to be taught, to be guided? We 
usually talk about God as the all‑powerful, almighty God on whom we depend 
completely. But God wanted to become the all‑powerless, all‑vulnerable God 
who completely depends on us. How can we be afraid of a God who wants to be 
‘God‑with‑us’ and needs us to become ‘Us‑with‑God’?12 
Eiesland refers to God as disabled: 
In the resurrected Jesus Christ, they saw not the suffering servant for whom the 
last and most important word was tragedy and sin, but the disabled God who 
embodied both impaired hands and feet and pierced side and the imago Dei.13
I need to learn to accept my condition and to let go of my frustration in order to find peace 
and my body at home.
Willem Nicol uses the term “faith of the body” when he refers to silence with, and peace in, 
God. Your perception of your corporeal self is heightened.14 You realise that it is not only 
sensations of fright, tension and surprise that are partially experienced on a bodily level, 
but also awareness such as trust and peace in God. The peace that faith in God brings is felt 
not only in your heart, but also in your body. In this sense you experience God’s bestowal 
of faith to both the heart and to the body. You feel the working of God’s spirit in your body, 
from where it emanates to your heart.
The priest‑professor Henri Nouwen’s theology of weakness and powerlessness – a spiritu‑
ality of imperfection – is a good description of my faith. His journey of faith took him 
along situations that revealed his faith to be vulnerable and cracked. His pastoral ministry 
to mentally disadvantaged people who have to deal with the limitations their condition 
imposes on them lends credibility to his theology. Nouwen recognises the hope in, and 
spiritual importance of, the human body: 
In Jesus, God took on human flesh. The Spirit of God overshadowed Mary, and 
in her all enmity between spirit and body was overcome. Thus God’s Spirit was 
united with the human spirit, and the human body became the temple destined 
to be lifted up into the intimacy of God through the Resurrection. Every human 
11 Isherwood, L. and Stuart, E. 1998. Introducing Body Theology. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic.
12 Nouwen, H. 2007. God’s powerlessness. Cf. online at: http://helenl.wordpress.com/2007/03/02/gods-powerlessness-
by-henri-nouwen/ [Accessed: 26 July 2011].
13 Eiesland, N. L 1994. The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability. Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 99.
14 Nicol, W. n.d. Dring sy Allesdeurdringendheid tot my deur. Kruisgewys 3(3):38-9.
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body has been given a new hope, of belonging eternally to the God who created 
it. Thanks to the Incarnation, you can bring your body home.15
With this in mind, he later wrote: “A new spirituality is being born in you. Not body 
denying or body indulging but truly incarnational. You have to trust that this spirituality 
can find shape within you, and that it can find articulation through you.”16
A fragile faith, human weakness and a disabled body make a theology of vulnerability and 
finitude relevant. Donald Berry refers to a “A body theology” that 
must, in short, include, in a non-masochistic way, a theology of pain and 
suffering, a recognition that time and the healing powers of nature are not always 
efficacious; indeed, that in the final analysis, they are never more than temporarily 
successful.17
I regularly go to the gymnasium. I am dependent on chronic medicine daily; without it 
I will not be able to live a life of dignity. But medicine and medical interventions are not 
necessarily a cure for healing. The outcome of prayer is not always in our favour. By the 
way, my faith is sometimes shaking like the tremor in my hands. 
The spirituality of the body embodies imperfection. It is a faith that deals with growth 
and development, illness, degeneration and ageing. It nevertheless summons vulnerable 
believers to lead lives of faith, hope and love. 
15 Nouwen, H. 1998. The Inner Voice of Love. A Journey Through Anguish To Freedom. New York, NY: Doubleday, 19.
16 Nouwen, The Inner Voice, 32.
17 Berry, Seeking a Theology of the Finite, 953.
156
C
H
A
N
G
IN
G
 L
IV
E
S REFERENCES
Ashley, E. 2008. The scandal of weak leadership: Paul’s 
defense of ministry. Online at: http://www.
lutterworth.com/pub/on%20eagles%20
wings%20ch5.pdf
Berry, D. 1982. Seeking a Theology of the Finite. 
Christian Century 99(29):953-6.
Eiesland, N. L 1994. The Disabled God: Toward a 
Liberatory Theology of Disability. Nashville, TN: 
Abingdon.
Harren, J. 2009. Bones and Bread: Knowing 
God in our Bodies through the Communion 
Table. Journal of Religion, Disability & Health 
13(3-4):274-92.
Heick, O. W. 1965. A History of Christian Thought. 
Philadelphia, PA: Fortress.
Isherwood, L. and Stuart, E. 1998. Introducing 
Body Theology. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic.
Mairs, N. 1989. Remembering the Bone House. New 
York, NY: Harper & Row.
Mji, G., Gcaza, S., Melling‑Williams, N. and 
MacLachlan, M. 2009. Networking in 
Disability for Development: Introducing the 
African Network for Evidence-to-Action 
on Disability. In Disability and International 
Development towards Inclusive Global Health (eds 
MacLachlan, M. and Swartz, L.). New York, 
NY: Springer.
Muller, J. 2011. Om te Mag Twyfel – ’n Gelowige se 
Reis. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
Naylor, V. 1996. The Theology of Touch. Online 
at: http://www.franciscanarchive.org.
uk/1996jan‑naylor
Nicol, W. n.d. Dring sy Allesdeurdringendheid 
tot my deur. Kruisgewys 3(3):38-9.
Nouwen, H. 1998. The Inner Voice of Love. A Journey 
Through Anguish To Freedom. New York, NY: 
Doubleday.
Nouwen, H. 2007. God’s powerlessness. Online at: 
http://helenl.wordpress.com/2007/03/02/
gods-powerlessness-by-henri-nouwen/ 
Schaufenberg, G. W. 2011. Building Blocks of 
Western Civilization: “What the founders did not 
tell us.” Dartfort: Xlibris.
Sölle, D. 1984. To Work and To Love: A Theology of 
Creation. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress.
Tolle, E. 2005. The Power of Now. A Guide to Spiritual 
Enlightenment. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
World Health Organisation (WHO). 1994. 
Community Based Rehabilitation and the 
Healthcare Referral Services: A Guide for District 
Health and Rehabilitation Managers. Geneva: 
WHO/RHB.
World Health Organisation (WHO). 2010. 
Community Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines. 
Geneva: WHO.
13
157
Cerebral palsy and a  
South African university 
A life between smiles, tears and  
dilemmas of faith
Tatjana Metzger1
IntroductIon
Only just very recently, early on a Monday morning, I wrote an e-mail. It was a desperate 
one, voicing immense frustration and calling for help. In the heat of the moment I strung 
together words. Most of them upset and appal me now, but some of them ring with 
truth. It is true that when I first decided on a university degree, when I first applied and 
when I first came to study, I did not think. I believed. Had I thought, had I reasoned, had 
I known, I would have certainly come to the conclusion that it was just better, easier, not 
to study at all.
As my brothers and I grew older, tertiary education was often mentioned and talked about 
in our home. Back then, it never occurred to me that I should not have one. Even though 
I have Cerebral Palsy, I have almost always been to a mainstream school, mainly for lack 
of another option in Namibia where I grew up. Also for lack of another option, I became a 
boarder at age seven. I fought my way through school and boarding school with minimal 
support. I finished my schooling in South Africa and by the time I reached Matric, I was 
a quite independent person, who felt pretty invincible. I felt there was nothing left to 
prove: I had mastered my life 1,600 km away from my family. I had passed Matric with a 
distinction. What more could people want? Who could bring me down now? Surely Ihad 
shown them all and they would finally leave me be! Little did I know ...! But be that as it 
may, at the time, going to university seemed like a natural step, the next thing in line, the 
right thing to do.
LIfe At unIversIty
So there I was in late January 2007, lined up to start my orientation weeks. Ready, or rather 
not so much, to start my life as an Education student at Stellenbosch University. Not only 
was I a student, I was an international one. I had left my support network in Namibia and 
was suffering through pointless initiation in one of the woman’s residences. Many people 
1 Tatjana Metzger is a primary education student at Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
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that could have happened to me at that point. It was the last little weight that caused the 
scale of my life to tip and fall out of balance. Here I was faced with real, pressing problems: 
I had to learn how to drive my new electric mobility tool, my Shoprider scooter. I had to 
find accessible routes, all the while battling my very unique special orientation problem 
caused by my brain damage. Card readers were too high, ramps, if they existed, were too 
narrow and doors, for various reasons, were not conducive. The list goes on. Problems 
everywhere you look. In no time I was worn out on every imaginable level and lectures 
had not even started yet. As if my real problems were not enough, I was met by House 
Committee members who acted stern and unapproachable. From my point of view, they 
were wasting my precious time by telling me to paint banners and fold paper flowers. They 
drained my valuable energy with their fast-paced programme that continually accounted 
for almost every minute of my day.
It did not take me long to find out that my residence was utterly unaware of and unprepared 
for my disability. Apparently, when I first walked in on my crutches, I was thought to 
have broken my leg, even though I lacked a Plaster of Paris- or a moon boot. This lack 
of knowledge and preparation really perplexed me! I had done a lot of communicating 
beforehand. Over the previous months I had stated my needs in every which way. It seems, 
though, that these communications were lost in the mesh of hierarchy and the paper jungle 
that inevitably comes with an institution this size.
In terms of the residence, I did not need a lot of adaptations. I managed living upstairs, for 
instance. But, when after an exhausting day I got into the shower, things went from bad to 
worse. On my first day in the shower, I looked for the taps in a mad frenzy. I finally spotted 
them mounted to the roof of the shower, looking down on me at a 90-degree angle. Oh, 
great! Not even in my most perfect dreams would I be able to reach those. It was enough to 
have me melt down right there and then. Instead of bringing the taps down, people insisted 
on building me my very own disability bathroom downstairs. For the next three months, 
until I could finally move to my new room and bathroom, I had no choice but to co-ordinate 
my showers very carefully, as I always had to ask somebody to turn the water on and off. 
Elsewhere on campus, things were hardly any better. I struggled with inaccessible faculties 
and lecture halls. I was overwhelmed by the vastness of campus and its human traffic jams. 
Above all, I had a very full timetable and never seemed to have enough time for anything. 
I slept little, did not eat much and regular bathroom stops were also a problem, mostly for 
lack of time and conducive facilities.
Late one Friday afternoon, it must have been late February or early March, I had a memorable 
meeting at the university’s Centre for Student Counselling and Development. We came to 
the conclusion that what I needed most was more time in my day – time to eat, sleep and 
relax. It was decided that if I was to keep my sanity, I had to do fewer modules a year. So 
two psychologists and I went to see my course co-ordinator. That was another memorable 
meeting in the very worst sense!
I stepped out of that meeting knowing that I was at a crossroads in my life. Would I take 
heed of the course co-ordinators implicitly stated suggestions to leave the course, or would 
I become a teacher after all? I was hurt, I was angry, I was sad and then I became very, 
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very calm. I decided to stay. How many people had left before me? And if I was to leave 
as well, this faculty would never learn. Besides, one person cannot decide for an entire 
faculty. Somehow I knew that this was about so much more than just me and my little 
degree. Words of principle like “right and wrong”, “fairness and discrimination”, rang hard 
in my ears.
Now we are a good five years down the line and a lot has changed for the better since the 
day I decided to stay. I am still busy with my bachelor’s degree at the Faculty of Education 
and graduation is in sight. I have excelled academically. I have become part of disability 
awareness on campus. I have given motivational talks. I have touched many lives and the 
smiles have come back into mine. This is not to say that I do not head butt with Stellenbosch 
campus on a daily basis, but campus has shown me its beautiful side as well. 
MAtters of fAIth
In all fairness, one has to say that I was raised by atheist parents. Nevertheless, through my 
broader surroundings and my circumstances I was exposed to the Christian religion at a 
fairly early age.
Over the years I have had the recurring, peculiar experience that once you show signs of 
disability, many people automatically jump to the conclusion that you must be deeply 
religious. I reckon that this comes, at least in part, from the fact that so many disabled 
people are indeed very religious. They take much of the courage and strength needed to face 
their days from their vivid relationship with God. I have often thought that it would be a 
relief to have God in my life – a higher power to rely upon, to share with and to collapse 
before. However, the issue of religious healing continues to wedge itself between me and 
God. It creates a dilemma, which to me is so unbridgeable that it keeps me from converting 
to the Christian faith.
To me, religious healing is not a distant, faded something that happens to other people. 
In my reality and over the years, it has become more and more real. It has gotten flesh, as 
people continually try to use religion to cure me of my Cerebral Palsy. Picture this: 
I am having lunch in the Neelsie, the University’s student centre. All of the sudden a 
complete stranger sits next to me. By the way the person behaves and by what the person 
says, I already know where this conversation is headed. We eventually get to something 
like: “You know that Jesus can make you walk. He can heal you. Should we pray to start 
the process?” This is when I really start to struggle for every ounce of self-control within 
me. All the while boiling on the inside, outwardly I calmly reply something to the effect of: 
“Thank you, but no thank you.” I then look for ways to end the conversation fast and with 
as much politeness as I can. After all, these people truly believe that they are doing me a 
favour. Of course I could argue my point, but I am not up to it. You cannot win every battle, 
I am too agitated, and I really want to have lunch.
I will, however, argue my point now. Cerebral Palsy has been with me ever since the moment 
I was born. That was almost 26 years ago and by now my disability has infiltrated even the 
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S smallest niche of my being. This is by no means an invitation to think that I am just and 
only my disability. I am a person with hopes, dreams, desires and ambitions, and yet I am 
a person with Cerebral Palsy. With time, the two have become inseparable. There is no 
telling where Tatjana ends and Cerebral Palsy begins. Now, if you were to take Cerebral 
Palsy away, if you were to heal me, I would no longer know who I am. By the same token, of 
course, there are days when I want out, when I want Cerebral Palsy to vanish into thin air. 
But then again, show me one able-bodied person who feels great all the time, every time! 
Having bad days is part of life, for all of us. 
Secondly, the last I checked, we only heal or cure flaws, never assets. Or have you ever had 
someone walk up to you and say: “Excuse me, ma’am, can I heal your happiness?” Why is 
disability so commonly seen as a flaw? I am human, therefore of course I have flaws, but my 
disability at large is not one of them. On the contrary, my disability has given me direction 
and a unique perspective and I have employed it as my asset, to do good for others, many, 
many times. My disability is my asset. On most days, I do not want to get rid of it. On most 
days, I have absolutely no desire to be healed by any higher power, as I feel valuable just the 
way I am. And even more so, precisely because of the way I am.
concLusIon
My disability is integral to my identity and it is my asset. For most people to agree with me 
on this, society needs a significant paradigm shift. And so do our major religious doctrines. 
In my opinion, religion or its followers should not, in any way, intend to belittle or heal my 
disability. The way I see it, religion has to fully accept me, before I accept religion. Until 
such time, even though having God in my life would probably be a relief, and an enrichment 
considering my circumstances, I cannot let Him in. 
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On her blindness
Reflections on being blind in the world  
and associated issues of faith
Michelle Nell1
A young blind teenage girl sits on a chair in a large room, surrounded by a significant number 
of individuals, including her hopefully expectant parents. Looking onto this seemingly 
intimate gathering are the remaining members of a charismatic congregation, excitedly yet 
respectfully holding their collective breath while the pastor of the congregation, his hand 
on the young girl’s forehead, sounds the inevitable: “Do you truly believe, with all your 
heart and soul, that God will heal you of your blindness?”
Tension mounting, the eager congregation continues to wait with bated breath for her 
answer to break the unremitting silence. The pastor, assuming the girl to be understandably 
shy or possibly hesitant, reiterates his question: “Michelle, do you truly believe ...?”
A quiet, barely audible sob interrupts: “I’ll try, but ...” 
IntRoductIon
In his 1985 publication entitled Being Blind in the World, author William Rowland puts the 
following phenomenological query: “[...] what in the life of a blind person is to be regarded 
as the result of blindness as such, and what, to the contrary, as the effect of nurture or 
circumstance?” Subsequent to this question, he explains that sometimes a single factor, 
more than any other, determines the course of existence and the quality of experience of an 
individual human being. “This may be so because of what that factor is, or because of the 
reaction it engenders, or because of the features of the encounter with the environment.” 
The author furthermore elaborates by explaining that, similar to a psychopathological 
condition such as schizophrenia, or being part of a subjugated group, such as being black 
in a white supremacist state, it creates experiences of a very particular nature. Similarly, 
being blind creates a certain engagement or disengagement from the world of a particular 
kind, which could encompass a personal, social or political realm.2
However, the particular qualities of such a lived experience may vary from one individual to 
another. We cannot know, for example, what it is like to be healthy and not schizophrenic, 
or part of a subjugated group, in which case it should be grasped that a full understanding 
of what it is like to be blind, the phenomenological aspects of such a lived experience, 
1 Michelle Nell studies music at Stellenbosch University.
2 Rowland, W. P. 1985. Being Blind in the World. Pretoria: South African National Council for the Blind, 57.
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from visual loss themselves.
Nonetheless, it is the aim of this personal reflection to invite you, the reader, to engage 
alongside me in exploring this query of, as Rowland terms it elsewhere, the what-is-it-
likeness of being blind in the world and the dilemmas with regard to issues of faith this 
holds for me.
A peRsonAl hIstoRy
Is my understanding only blindness to  
my own lack of understanding? 3 
As you possibly might have surmised by now, the girl featured in the prologue to this article 
is indeed my much younger teenage self, attending what might have been the umpteenth 
healing service up to that particular stage. The reason for interventions (as some might 
term them) such as these is the fact that I was born with the eye disease known as glaucoma 
which, as in my case, usually result in severe loss of vision. I choose to call it visual “loss”, 
since what proceeded from my diagnosis back then is rather akin to the onset of the five 
stages of grief in both my parents’ and my life.
The first stage of grief, denial, was first experienced by my parents following the diagnosis 
of my eye condition years ago. Far from accepting the status quo, conceptions such 
as “blindness is imperfection, so surely God must heal my daughter from this iniquity” 
continued to dominate their everyday lives and soon began to infiltrate my life as well. In 
addition, questions were asked: “Why my daughter?” “What have I/we sinned for this fate 
to befall us?” 
As with many conceptual models of disability, such as the medical model, also not 
discounting the events in the long history of segregation, i.e. the witch hunts of the 1400s, 
or the era of institutionalisation, my visual impairment was viewed by both my parents, 
other parties such as family and faith healers alike, as well as myself, as an imperfection, 
even an iniquity, which promised a life of darkness, solitude and ignorance.
Following denial came the bargaining phase. Both my parents and I also shared this 
experience of bargaining with God. Conceptions such as living a good life on earth might 
reap positive benefits, particularly with regards to possibly restoring my lost vision, 
became an obsession, influencing every aspect of our lives. The constant questioning was 
gradually substituted with incessant bargaining, such as “if we live a life devoid of sin ...”, 
“if we continue praying as much as possible ...”, or “if I give enough money to the church ...”, 
then maybe I might be healed of my blindness.
As time passed my parents seemed to have made their peace with my situation, at least in 
some sense. For me, however, the battle with my visual impairment was far from over.
During the course of my adolescence I gradually became aware of the various conflicting 
attitudes toward my blindness, which indeed proved to be a complicating factor in my 
3 Wittgenstein, L. 1975. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell, 424.
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coming to terms with this loss of vision. Contrary to my parents’ initial aversion regarding 
blindness, I gradually came to notice a shift in their perception of visual loss. Suddenly 
my visual impairment was viewed as a gift from God and I was believed to be imbued 
with abnormally keen senses, even possessing “special” psychic or spiritual powers. In my 
occupation as a young musician, I also encountered what I would like to term the “savant 
mentality”, where my possibly mediocre or fairly acceptable level of musicality was exalted 
to being close to that of a musical genius.
I was told that my blindness is the will of God in order to show people true suffering which 
would serve the purpose of teaching and honing true gratefulness, or other features such 
as the exaltation of a deity.
However, iniquity or blessing, it gradually became clear to me that all these healing 
services, the incessant questioning and bargaining were in fact not paying off, contrary 
to many healers’ optimistic promises, and I gradually grew frustrated and angry with 
all the unanswered questions and prayers, the conflicting ideologies around my visual 
impairment, and also life in general. Growing older I came face to face with my blindness, 
and I soon began to realise that it infiltrated practically all facets of my life. On a social 
level I felt isolated from the remainder of my peers, since I had to attend an ELSEN school. 
My freedom was minimal, since my over-protective parents were not exactly bent upon 
honing the most independent blind girl there ever was, and I often found myself excluded 
from decision-making processes concerning personal matters – why, even at a restaurant 
the waiter would usually ask what “she” would like to have to drink.
Therefore, being in a “special” school removed from the broad community, and in addition 
then not being exposed to my sighted peers, created a sort dis-relationship with the world 
at large, or true reality as such. This was an environment particularly tailored to fit my 
every need, without keeping pace with the outside world. I felt out of touch with reality 
and I longed to experience it.
Meanwhile, life continued. The one day slipped into the next, and weeks became months, 
became years until it became time for me to enrol at a tertiary institution. Suddenly I was 
in a bigger, much more vast environment, both socially and academically. Attending 
university I experienced the overwhelming juxtaposition of my personal life, i.e. my visual 
impairment and my associated conflicting beliefs involving it, whilst being confronted by a 
new, fast-paced and potentially life-changing milieu. This meant that I had finally managed 
to step out of an extremely sheltered environment to find a world filled with new ideas and 
a great amount of freedom at my disposal. 
However, I began comparing myself to my sighted peers, soon to realise that for all the 
given similarities, there were an equal number of differences. This included on an academic 
level slower work tempo, not always having access to explore printed academic texts, or 
on a social level having to contend with people’s sometimes sceptical or uninformed views 
regarding my visual impairment, and I gradually grew frustrated and depressive at the 
realisation. Technically, I thus had access to the world, but not always appropriate access.
I faced a dilemma: is it me or the system? Regardless of the answer, how can the status quo 
be remedied?
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blind individual and music student, incomparable and in her own league, or the student 
suffering from visual loss and constantly at a disadvantage, particularly when compared to 
others, thus always regarded as standing in the shadow of her sighted peers? I frequently 
found myself in what felt like a tortoise and hare race and I was squarely confronted by 
true reality of a constant conflict between my environment and my visual impairment. 
I discovered that the abovementioned conflicting ideas around my visual impairment had 
become internalised and I was left unequipped to find the right answer, or how to deal with it.
ReflectIon
Doth God exact day-labour, light deny’d. 4
So real was this dilemma in my life that, with the undertaking of my Master’s degree in 
music education, I chose a research topic concerned with the personal experiences of 
visually impaired music students in the higher education system. During the course of my 
research I came across a conceptual model developed by Howell and Lazarus (2003) to 
address the challenges for students with disabilities in higher education. This model is 
comprised of three imperatives, namely access, participation and success. The challenge 
in evaluating the status quo according to this model lies partly in the recognition that, 
as seen earlier with Rowland (1985), each imperative extends over various realms within 
the lives of students with a disability, namely personal, social and political. To embark 
on a comprehensive theoretical analysis or scrutiny lies beyond the scope of this personal 
reflection; however, it shall be applied to my own lived experience here.
Firstly, when referring to access, one can argue that I had sufficient access to schooling and 
that my primary educational needs had been taken care of. However, on a social level I did 
not have access to a full independent life and could therefore not fully participate in life 
itself. At university the degree of my access to the world increased. I had access to peers of 
my age, could even attend unsegregated classes, and I could participate to a greater extent. 
However, still there remained something lacking, something on a personal level. As a result 
of these unresolved issues, my level of success was thus minimal as far as my dealing with 
blindness goes (as well as the consequent quandaries it gives rise to, i.e. my acceptance of 
my visual impairment).
In retrospect, I discovered that my grieving process was not resolved yet. The refusal to 
make piece with my “imperfection”, all the years worth of prayers and bargaining, as well 
as the anger and frustration and depression, none of those stages seemed to bring me closer 
to resolving my grappling – to accept the status quo for what it is.
As previously mentioned, this inner struggle also pertains to my identity. Is my blindness 
a blessing or a curse? Is it imperfection or divine intervention? Am I akin to the grovelling 
blind beggar condemned to live a life of darkness, solitude and ignorance, or am I in reality 
endowed with supernatural talents? Am I the special one, or in fact the excluded one?
4 Milton, J. 1939. On His Blindness. The Oxford Book of English Verse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, sonnet 318.
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However, what I eventually came to learn about my life is the following. The emotional 
responses of, initially my parents, but also myself, unmistakably reflect the fact that my 
loss of vision inevitably set off a grieving process of some sort. The denial, bargaining, 
anger, depression – it’s all part of a process in which an individual mourns the loss or 
absence of something important, treasured and vital. Even though all these emotions are 
admittedly detrimental to one’s health and frame of mind, I learnt that it, the process, is 
an insurmountable fact of life for me. The resolution lies in the fact that one must accept 
this very insurmountability: the fact that I’m blind and the fact that I cannot be impassive 
about this reality. Thus, acceptance of the blindness as well as the conflicting emotions, 
questions, as well as personal battles it provokes – therefore, a work in progress.
We all have various characteristics: tall or short, shy or talkative, sighted or blind, creative 
or analytical, each one having his or her own personal history, characteristics, experiences, 
possibilities, hopes and aspirations which equip us with different abilities. However, 
what we do with what we have, therein lies the secret to a fulfilled life, a life where the 
evolvement of work in progress becomes something to be admired and respected. 
In the end I learnt that it is my own personal opinion and stance on my visual impairment 
that has the greatest impact. Yes, to be blind, with all the associated issues and hampering 
is less desirable, but as Helen Keller once wisely stated: “The only thing worse than being 
blind is having sight but no vision.” Similarly this statement pertains to my own life: being 
blind but possessing no vision or goal in life. And what is my vision then? To be sighted? 
In all honesty, I would rather be the most successful individual I can be, blind or sighted. 
In the end it’s not how much you have, but how much you “wheel and deal” with what you 
do have. Life, whether disabled or not, is all about choices we make, perceptions we adopt, 
chances we take, dreams we envisage. In that way we are all equal: constantly engaged in 
the process of negotiating our place under the sun, conceptualising who we are, chiselling 
away at our identity and our destiny. To aim for success in life.
conclusIon
when we go home 
with what we have got 
when we climb the stairs reciting ancient deeds 
the seas grow deeper 
that we rose from 5
Seen in the light of the above-mentioned stance towards being blind in the world, this 
inevitably raises the question of the issue of faith. What is my true stance on being blind 
in the world, and what are my perceptions of the deity that ordained this cross to be 
borne by me? As much as I would like to reveal some deep-found wisdom in this regard, 
as much as I would wish to gushingly share an awe-inspiring account of thankfulness and 
gratitude, I must confess that I have not reached that point quite yet – possibly never will. 
5 Merwin, W. S. 1991. Last People. In Minow, M. (ed.), Making all the Difference: Inclusions, Exclusion, and American Law. 
New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 121.
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I might be fortunate enough to have my sight restored by miracle or medical advancement, 
this will remain part of my work in progress. Until then, I place faith in myself: to gain as 
much independence as I can, to live a full and meaningful life, always reaching higher in 
life, always striving towards a better self and to make a conscious decision not to dwell 
incessantly on what could have, should have, or might have been.
In closing, the words of blind author Georgina Kleege:
Miracles happen. Or even without miracles, ninety nine per cent of my days are 
just fine. I get up, I go to work, I teach, I read, I write. The fact that I use aids and 
assistants to do some of these things is not really central to my consciousness. 
When everything works, I consider myself “normal”. My blindness is just a fact of 
life, not an insurmountable obstacle blocking my path. I work around it. I ignore 
it. On a lot of days, it matters less than the weather.6
6 Kleege, G. 1988. Blind Rage. Southwest Review 83(1):53-9 (59).
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